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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I aim to make sense of the class of women. Gender classification 
is an issue that has become central to recent feminist philosophy. In particular, 
many feminist philosophers have begun asking, how can gender classes be 
made sense of for feminist political purposes. I will first show why this 
question is important and why feminist philosophers have come to view gender 
classification as problematic (chapter 1). I then consider four recent feminist 
responses to this issue suggested by Marilyn Frye, Iris Marion Young, Natalie 
Stoljar and Sally Haslanger. I argue that all four responses are inadequate in 
various ways (chapters 2-5). I then go on to suggest a way in which this issue 
can be more successfully responded to (chapter 6). In doing so, I draw from the 
works of G. W. F. Hegel and David Armstrong. 
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"If it proves difficult [in philosophy] to give an 
account of some phenomenon, somebody is sure 
to suggest that the phenomenon does not exist." 
(Ann strong 1978: 113-4) 
"Happily, to avoid the essentialist traps it is not 
necessary to eschew general categories or 
concepts ... To navigate around false 
generalizations we need not forgo generalization. 
In each case there are alternative paths to take if 
we choose." 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I argue for a way to make sense of the class of women. Consider 
the Queen of England and a black Sudanese Muslim mother of five fleeing 
violence in Darfur. As women, it seems, they should be members of the same 
class. But, what makes them members of the class of women? Is there 
something that the two women have in common that grounds their membership 
in this class? What makes them both women? One prima facie straightforward 
response would be to claim that the Queen and the Sudanese refugee share 
some physiological characteristics that make them women. Roughly, these 
would be characteristics female human beings possess: a particular body type 
and certain anatomical characteristics (having breasts, a vagina and other 
features that enable childbearing). In short, they have sex characteristics in 
common and this makes them women. By and large, feminist philosophers find 
this response unsatisfactory though. They take 'woman' to be a gender term 
and consider it to be a matter of social, not physiological and anatomical, 
factors (see e.g., Frye 1996, Haslanger 2000b, Spelman 1990, Stoljar 1995, 
Young 1997). As a result, an appeal to shared sex characteristics will not 
provide satisfactory answers to the questions I posed. 
Since feminist philosophers take womanness to be a matter of social 
factors, it seems that a more acceptable response to the questions above would 
be this: the Queen and the Sudanese refugee share some social factors relevant 
for womanness that make them women. However, feminist philosophers 
commonly regard this response as inadequate as well because it seems 
impossible to point at some particular social factors relevant for woman ness and 
that all women have in common (Butler 1999. Spelman 1990). Consider the 
two women mentioned. The Queen is extremely privileged. wealthy and 
powerful and probably not subject to oppression on the basis of being a woman. 
The Sudanese refugee lives in desperate poverty amidst a crisis where sexual 
violence against women is commonplace. They come from different cultural 
backgrounds and being an aristocratic English woman certainly entails a very 
different set of expectations and accepted behaviour than being an African 
Muslim woman. The Queen and the Sudanese refugee are both mothers, but it 
appears that their experiences of mothering differ radically. The Queen need not 
worry about natal or post-natal medical care whereas the Sudanese woman 
probably finds it hard to secure even basic medical care for herself and her 
children. It is far from obvious which social factors the Queen and the Sudanese 
woman have in common as women or if such shared social factors exist to 
begin with. The situation becomes more complex still when feminist 
philosophers consider all the women in the world: their lives. experiences and 
social circumstances and situations differ so hugely from one another that it 
seems impossible to articulate some particular social factors they all share. 
As a result. some have argued that there is no single feature women 
have in common that makes them women (e.g., Spelman 1990, Stoljar 1995, 
Young 1997). But if this is so, it seems hugely difficult to make sense of some 
class all women are members of. What makes individual women of the same 
sort such that they can be classified together due to their gender? And why does 
this matter? Being able to articulate what grounds membership in the class of 
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women is important because without some sense of gender classes, (the 
argument goes) feminist theory is left politically paralysed (Young 1997). 
Feminism is a political movement that aims to aid members of a particular 
social class: those who are women. But if such a class cannot be made sense of 
or spelled out, the political usefulness of feminism seems to be under threat. 
Without an adequate way to make sense of the class of women, it is unclear 
what (if anything) is left of feminism as a political movement - in this case, 
feminism will have no subject matter and no-one to fight for. Subsequently, a 
growing number of feminist philosophers now argue that the class of women 
must be made sense of although it is far from obvious how this is to take place. 
In this thesis, I will discuss four ways in which feminist philosophers 
have recently argued gender classes can be made sense of. I argue that they are 
all inadequate in various ways and in the final chapter I go on to propose a 
more successful way to understand membership in the class of women. Prior to 
doing so, I will consider why gender classification has become a problem for 
feminist philosophers and which arguments have convinced them that 
classifying women qua women is not straightforward (chapter 1). I then go on 
to look at ways in which feminist philosophers have responded to this problem. 
In chapter 2, I discuss Marilyn Frye's (1996) proposal. Frye denies that 
women have some single feature in common (that makes them women) but 
goes on to suggest that gender classes can be made sense of in terms of certain 
practices women engage in that make women structurally related to one 
another. I argue against this proposal, showing that the practices Frye takes as 
central to her position leave out some individuals we think of as women at the 
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same time including other individuals counter-intuitively as women (such as 
some men and certain animals). 
In chapter 3, I consider Iris Marion Young's (1997) suggestion that the 
class of women can be made sense of because women's everyday lives are 
arranged in similar ways. However, this does not (Young claims) entail that 
women share some single feature as a result. Again I argue that this position is 
inadequate: it does not seem to provide a good reason to think that there is a 
single class of women that all and only women are members of. Some 
individuals might counter-intuitively be classified as women provided their 
lives are arranged in certain ways Young takes to be typical of women's lives. 
In chapter 4, I argue against Natalie Stoljar's (1995) position. Stoljar 
suggests that the class of women can be made sense of in resemblance 
nominalist terms: in order for someone to be a member of this class, that 
individual must sufficiently resemble certain paradigm or exemplar women. 
Such a view (Stoljar argues) avoids having to rely on some single feature 
women share likely to be problematic and yet, we can classify women qua 
women. Nevertheless, I show that Stoljar's suggestion is inadequate because 
some individuals (such as George W. Bush) also sufficiently resemble the 
women paradigms Stoljar outlines and, as a result, would count as a woman. 
In chapter 5, I consider Sally Haslanger's (2000b) position. Unlike most 
recent feminist accounts of gender, Haslanger thinks that there is something 
women have in common that makes them women: they all occupying a 
particular kind of subordinate social position that is sex-marked. The class of 
women, then, can be made sense of on the basis of this shared feature. I agree 
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with many of Haslanger's claims but go on to suggest that feminist 
philosophers should feel reluctant to endorse her position. This is because 
Haslanger's view of what it is to be a woman is very unintuitive and it seems 
unhelpful to promote a view of womanness few (I suspect) would be willing to 
endorse. Rather, gender classes should be understood in a way that coheres with 
our intuitions about women and men as closely as possible. 
In chapter 6, I argue for a way to understand the class of women that (I 
think) more successfully responds to the feminist problem over gender classes. 
I suggest that our intuitions about gender are sufficient to ground the class of 
women for feminist political purposes. The key to my suggestion is that there is 
something women have in common: they are all women and possess the feature 
of womanness. But, instead of providing a definition of woman or a detailed 
account of what it is to be a woman, I argue that a thin notion of womanness is 
sufficient. On my view, feminist philosophers need not articulate some set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions of womanness to make sense of 
membership in the class of women. In doing so, I draw from the work of two 
philosophers: G. W. F. Hegel and David Armstrong. I argue that membership in 
the class of women can be made sense of, if womanness is understood either as 
a Hegelian substance-universal or as an Armstrongian substantival universal. 1 
also argue that my proposal provides a better way to understand why the Queen 
and the Sudanese woman are members of the same class than those proposals 
considered earlier. Finally, my proposal can better take into account women's 
diverse and dissimilar experiences as women because I am not making claims 
about any features women must possess in order to count as women. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND GENDER CLASSIFICATION 
I 
Questions concerning gender classification have become central to recent 
feminist philosophy. Some theorists have expressed scepticism about the 
existence of gender classes (Butler 1999, Spelman 1990). Others have argued 
that gender classes do exist but acknowledge that making sense of these classes 
is very difficult (Frye 1996, Fuss 1989, Haslanger 2000b, Nicholson 1994, 
Stoljar 1995, Stone 2004, Young 1997). The central question for these theorists 
is this: how can feminist philosophers make sense of gender classification?) 
One response would be to argue for some form of gender realism. This is the 
view that women have some single feature or set of features in common that 
makes them women On gender realist views, this feature (or set of features) 
would be definitive of womanness and it would ground the class of women. 
This common feature might be (for example) a specific psychological 
orientation or identification with a particular gender, a particular behavioural 
trait or a specific experience. Generally speaking it cannot, however, be a 
physiological or biological feature; feminist theorists commonly distinguish 
one's gender (being a woman or a man) from one's sex (being female or male) 
I For the remainder of this thesis, I take 'gender classification' as shorthand for 'gender 
classification of women'. Although it seems that classifying men qua men would 
encounter the same problems classifying women qua women does, I will concentrate 
on the latter problem. This is because making sense of the class of women is an issue 
feminist philosophers find particularly problematic due to feminism's political 
dimension. This will become clearer shortly. 
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where the latter is a matter of biological and anatomical features and the former 
is a matter of social factors.2 Gender realist positions (by and large) accept this 
distinction, rejecting the view that women share some biological or anatomical 
features that make them women. (I will discuss this in more detail shortly.) 
Much of current feminist theory, however, considers gender realism to 
be an anathema. Feminist philosophers commonly regard gender realist 
positions as counterproductive, regressive and politically insidious. Generally 
speaking, gender realism is considered to be something feminist philosophers 
should not endorse (Butler 1999, Frye 1996, Spelman 1990, Stoljar 1995, 
Young 1997). Many insist that this is the case because there is no single feature 
(or set of features) that all women have in common that makes them women. 
This nominalist view of gender is nowadays the preferred position most 
feminist philosophers hold; although there seems to be a range of features that 
are associated with being a woman or womanness (such as certain social roles, 
psychological dispositions, experiences and expectations), there is no single 
feature that all women have in common that is definitive of womanness. As a 
result, gender classes (many claim) cannot be made sense of by appealing to a 
feature that women have in common (Frye 1996, Nicholson 1994, Stoljar 1995, 
Stone 2004, Young 1997). 
In the next five chapters, I will consider different feminist responses, 
both realist and nominalist, to questions concerning gender classification. But 
2 What the social factors definitive of gender are is one of the most controversial issues 
within feminist theory. There is no simple way to outline the social factors feminist 
theorists often have in mind when they discuss gender and there is no conclusively 
settled understanding of which social factors define gender. Due to this, I deliberately 
say very little of them in order to keep the discussion focused. 
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first I will map out what kinds of arguments have convinced many feminist 
theorists that making sense of gender classes is a difficult task. The two most 
prominent views that have rendered gender classification problematic are 
Elizabeth Spelman's (1990) commonality problem and Judith Butler's (1999) 
normativity problem. Butler and Spelman both argue for versions of gender 
nominalism that I will call gender scepticism. They claim (roughly) that there is 
no single feature women have in common that makes them women (gender 
nominalism). In so doing, they aim to provide good reasons for rejecting gender 
realism. These arguments have another task as well: to question the viability of 
conceiving women as a group or class (gender scepticism). Butler and Spelman 
ask whether it makes sense to think of women as members of a single class to 
begin with and they go on to argue that it does not; they generate scepticism 
about the class of women suggesting that such a class does not exist. 
My aim in this chapter is two-fold. First, I will show that the cases 
Butler and Spelman make against gender realism do not in actual fact count 
against it. I suggest that feminist philosophers have no reason to reject gender 
realism in general; they have reason to reject only particular gender realist 
positions. Second, by questioning the viability of conceiving women as a class, 
Spelman and Butler illustrate that there are many difficulties with gender 
classification. Further, these difficulties lead them to endorse (what I call) 
gender scepticism. By contrast, I will argue that the problems Spelman and 
Butler draw attention to should not lead feminist philosophers to endorse 
scepticism about the class of women. I will suggest that gender scepticism is 
very counterproductive for feminist politics and that, as a result, feminist 
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theorists should feel reluctant to endorse such a view by giving up talk of 
women as a class that is central to feminist theory. This discussion will set the 
stage for the next five chapters; in what follows, I will discuss ways in which 
feminist theorists have attempted to make sense of gender classes following 
Butler's and Spelman's critiques. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I will first make some 
preliminary points about the terminology that I will be using for the remainder 
of this thesis (section II). I then move on to outline in more detail why feminist 
philosophers usually argue that gender classification cannot rely on any 
physiological or biological features (section III). Next I will consider Spelman's 
and Butler's arguments against gender realism and for gender scepticism 
(section IV). I end with a discussion of these arguments (in section V) arguing 
that neither Butler nor Spelman give good reasons to reject gender realism in 
general and that feminist philosophers should not endorse scepticism about the 
class of women. 
II 
In the previous section, I briefly characterised two responses to the issue at the 
heart of my project (how to make sense of the class of women). These were 
gender realism (which holds that women have some single feature in common 
that grounds classification) and gender nominalism (which holds that gender 
classification must be made sense of in terms of something other than shared 
features since women do not appear to have any single thing in common that 
makes them women). However, this terminology is not usual when feminist 
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philosophers discuss gender classes; they more commonly discuss this issue in 
terms of essentialism. By and large, I will avoid this common feminist 
terminology. During the past two decades terms such as 'essential', 
'essentialism' and 'essences' have become notoriously difficult to define within 
the context of feminist philosophy. As a result, I find it unhelpful to employ 
them. (It is worth pointing out that some feminist philosophers have recently 
clarified these notions in a helpful manner. See e.g., Stone 2004 and Witt 
1995.) For a start, gender classification is often discussed simply as an 
essentialist issue. But essentialism can denote a number of different things: it 
can denote generic essentialism (the view that there is some feature that is 
necessary for womanness shared universally by women) or it can denote 
individual essentialism (the view that some of an individual's features are 
necessary to the individual qua that individual). It is often unclear which form 
authors have in mind when they discuss essentialism in general. Further, 
generic essentialism is often unreflectively and confusingly coupled together 
with individual essentialism because feminist theorists tend to think generic and 
individual essentialisms go together; if some feature is necessary for 
woman ness, this feature is also assumed to be essential to individual women 
qua individual women. 
For instance, suppose that having the feature F is necessary for 
membership in the class of women. Many assume that F (as a result) wi1\ also 
be essential to individual members of this class qua individuals (e.g., Spelman 
1990). So, suppose the Queen has some feature that is necessary for 
membership in the class of women and that the Queen, as a result, is a member 
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of this class. Many feminists assume this also entails that being a member of 
this class (or being a woman) is something that is essential to the Queen as an 
individual - were the Queen to lose this feature, she would no longer be a 
woman nor would she be the same individual. On the contrary, Natalie Stoljar 
(1995) (among others) has argued that it is a mistake to couple generic and 
individual essentialisms together because the former does not entail anything 
about the latter. Having red hair (for example) seems to be necessary for 
membership in the class of redheaded people. But, it seems this does not entail 
having red hair is essential to individuals with red hair who are members of this 
class. If an individual member of this class were to dye his or her hair black, 
this individual would no longer be a member of the class of redheaded people. 
But it seems that dying one's hair does not mean the individual is no longer the 
same individual and this illustrates that features which are necessary for class 
membership mayor may not be essential to individual members of particular 
classes. 
It is not enough though just to clarify whether one is talking about 
generic or individual essentialism when using the term 'essentialism'. Further 
clarifications must be made. Feminist philosophers commonly understand both 
generic and individual essentialisms in a number of different ways and this 
further confuses feminist discussions of gender classes. For instance, Naomi 
Schor distinguishes two ways in which feminist philosophers commonly 
understand generic essentialism. First, "[it] consists in the belief that woman 
has an essence, that woman can be specified by one or a number of inborn 
attributes which define across cultures and throughout history her unchanging 
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being and in the absence of which she ceases to be categorized as a woman" 
(Schor 1989: 40). This characterisation makes specific reference to innate or 
inborn attributes and features suggesting that some biological features are 
necessary for membership in the class of women. Second, feminists understand 
generic essentialism to be "a form of 'false universalism' ... By its majestic 
singularity woman conspires in the denial of the very real lived experiences -
sexual, ethnic, racial, national, cultural, economic, generational - that divide 
women from each other and from themselves" (Schor 1989: 42). The idea with 
this characterisation is that some social, cultural or psychological factor is 
necessary for membership in the class of women. Experiencing oppression, 
occupying a particular social position or exhibiting a specific psychological 
disposition might count as such factors. As there are different ways of 
understanding generic essentialism, feminist philosophers must also be careful 
to characterise what they take such a view to entail - whether they take features 
necessary for class membership to be biological, social, cultural or 
psychological. 
The situation is further complicated as some feminists take 
'essentialism' (in the context of feminist theory) to imply something altogether 
different from both generic and individual essentialisms. First, being an 
essentialist (to some) implies that one is "complicitous with Western 
metaphysics ... remain[ing] a prisoner of the metaphysical with its illusions of 
presence, Being, stable meanings and identities" (Schor 1989: 42). Feminist 
theorists such as Helene Cixous (1981) are taken to suggest that depending on 
whether one takes traditional metaphysics to provide useful or useless 
12 
philosophical lessons one mayor may not be characterised as an essentialist. 
Second, feminist philosophers sometimes take essentialism to have a semantic 
dimension: a theory mayor may not be an essentialist one (according to some) 
depending on its view of language. This kind of essentialism takes language to 
be something that merely describes and reports disinterestedly the way the 
world is. By contrast, Drucilla Cornell (among others) claims that language 
does not in any way reflect, mirror or express reality. Rather, language 
constructs reality in certain ways such that it appears as if language merely 
mirrors and reflects the way the world is (Cornell 1993; see also Weedon 
1998). 
Since essentialism in general and generic essentialism in particular have 
such diverse meanings within feminist theory I find that any talk of 'essences' 
and 'essentialism' confuses, rather than clarifies, the issue I am looking at. 
Although my focus will be roughly on the issues covered by feminist 
discussions of generic essentialism, I will not discuss gender classification 
using this term. Instead I will discuss it in terms of gender realism and gender 
nominalism. It seems to me that employing this terminology (instead of the one 
feminist philosophers more commonly use) avoids terminological difficulties 
with 'essentialism' and its cognates and, as a result, makes theoretical sense. 
There are some useful preliminary points about gender realism and 
nominalism worth bearing in mind. The debate between gender realists and 
gender nominalists largely mirrors the standard debate between metaphysical 
realists and nominalists. Metaphysical realists commonly argue that all tokens 
(individual instances) of a certain type (sort or kind) instantiate the same 
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universal property that makes them tokens of that type where a universal 
property is commonly understood as something that may be shared by many 
individuals of some sort (Russell 1967). For instance, someone who is a 
metaphysical realist about colour would argue that all red tokens instantiate the 
universal property of redness that makes these entities red (or of the same type 
red). Metaphysical nominalists (of various fonns) commonly explain type 
membership differently. They all accept that individual red entities are tokens 
of the type red but they deny that the red entities share some universal property 
of redness that makes these entities red. Rather, the predicate nominalist (for 
instance) argues that entities picked out by the same predicate 'red' will be 
members of the same type red. (For more on the metaphysical issues here 
briefly sketched out, see Armstrong 1989.) 3 
3 The standard metaphysical and feminist debates over realism and nominalism. 
nevertheless. differ in some important respects. First. some gender nominalists -- those 
I call gender sceptics -- hold that since women do not seem to have anything in 
common that makes them women. feminist philosophers cannot make sense of the 
class of women (Butler 1999. Spelman 1990). There simply is nothing that makes 
women members of the same class and this generates scepticism about the class itself: 
whether or not it exists. (More on this position shortly.) Metaphysical nominalism (by 
and large) does not generate such scepticism and metaphysical nominalists hold that 
type membership can be made sense of. They merely deny that this can be done in 
terms of shared universal features. So. although metaphysical nominalists deny that all 
red entities have a universal redness in common, they do not deny or question the 
existence of the class of red entities. Second. gender nominalists seem to commonly 
hold that women do not have any single feature in common due to their gender; there 
may be similarities and family resemblances amongst women. but there is no single 
feature definitive of womanness necessary and sufficient for membership in the class 
of women (Stoljar 1995). Metaphysical nominalists do not generally speaking deny 
that some single feature may be shared by tokens of some specific type. Again. they 
deny that all entities of a certain sort share a universal property or feature - for 
example. a predicate nominalist (although denying that entities of some type share a 
universal property) would claim that entities of a certain type have in common that 
they are picked out by the same predicate. So. metaphysical nominalists (unlike gender 
nominalists) accept that entities of certain sorts have some feature in common qua 
entities of that sort. 
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III 
Most people think, I suspect, that classifying women qua women IS 
unproblematic. Over the past few decades, 'differences between men and 
women' seem to have become simply the polite and politically correct way to 
talk about the differences between males and females. This suggests that 
femaleness and womanness (and maleness and manness) are simply two ways 
of talking about the same thing. If so, classifying women qua women would 
simply be a matter of picking out certain physiological, biological and 
anatomical features shared by all female human beings. Such features would 
include one's chromosomal make-up (that an individual possesses XX 
chromosomes), the individual's outer sex organs (having a vagina rather than a 
penis), the relative size of reproductive gametes (that they are large egg cells 
rather than small sperm cells), the inner sex organs of the individual (such as 
ovaries) and other physical features (such as the amount of body hair, relative 
body size, body shape and so on). 
As mentioned, feminist philosophers (by and large) find this 
unsatisfactory. They commonly classify individuals in two distinct ways: by 
virtue of their sex (maleness and femaleness that are determined by the kinds of 
biological and anatomical features outlined above) and by virtue of their gender 
(manness and woman ness) considered to be matters of social factors with no 
necessary connection to one's sex. On most feminist accounts, if individuals are 
classified on the basis of their biological and anatomical features, these 
individuals will be classified by virtue of their sex, not by virtue of their gender. 
Furthermore, one's gender is not considered to be co-extensive with one's sex. 
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Some individuals who (for instance) count as women, tum out not to count as 
female (and vice versa) (Haslanger 2000b, Stoljar 1995). (Some theorists have 
argued that sex classification is not as straightforward as I have outlined here. 
For an interesting discussion of the problems with sex classification, see 
Fausto-Sterling 1993 and 2000.) 
Gender classification, then, requires a very different set of criteria from 
sex classification. Sally Haslanger writes, 
"one is a woman, not by virtue of one's intrinsic features (for example, a body 
type), but by virtue of one's part in a system of social relations ... gender is a 
relational or extrinsic property of individuals, and the relations in question are 
social." (1993: 88) 
The idea is that the characteristics by which individuals are classified as either 
male or female are anatomical. By contrast, the characteristics by which 
individuals are classified as women and men are considered to be social.4 The 
underlying feminist motivation for making this distinction between one's 
biological sex and one's social gender was to counter biological determinism. 
This is the view that "one's biological sex determines one's social and cultural 
4 Feminists also often draw a distinction between one's intrinsic biological sex and 
one's extrinsic social gender as Haslanger does in the passage quote above. Intrinsic 
features depend solely on the individual who possesses those features whereas extrinsic 
features depend on aspects external to the individual. Suppose Jack is a six feet tall 
uncle of Charlie. The feature of being six feet tall is intrinsic to Jack. He has this 
feature solely by virtue of himself and having this feature does not depend in any way 
on (for instance) how tall or short others around him are. Even if Jack were the sole 
entity that existed, he would still have the feature of being sixfeet tall. Then again, that 
Jack is the uncle of Charlie is not something that depends on Jack alone. It depends on 
a number of aspects external to Jack: whether Jack has any siblings, whether Jack's 
siblings have children and whether one of those children Jack's siblings have, is 
Charlie. If any of these fail to hold (if Jack has no siblings or if his siblings have no 
children or if none of these children are Charlie), Jack cannot possess the feature of 
being the uncle of Charlie. On most feminist views, being a woman is considered to be 
analogous to features such as being the uncle of Charlie. They are both extrinsic 
features distinct and independent from some intrinsic features individuals might 
possess, like beingfemate and being sixfeet tall. 
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characteristics and roles" (Squires 2000: 55). Historically many social, cultural 
and psychological differences between men and women were taken to be 
manifestations of some underlying physical differences between the sexes and 
these physical differences were often used to justify a range of oppressive social 
conditions. Toril Moi characterises views that justify oppressive treatment of 
women in terms of physical features as committed to a "pervasive" view of sex 
(Moi 1999: 11). On such views, one's biological sex (Moi claims) is regarded 
as something so pervasive that it defines everything about an individual 
including his or her social position and intellectual capacities (1999: 11). 
Beliefs about physiological characteristics were not only taken to define 
everything about individuals. They were also taken to provide general 
frameworks for social and political arrangements along gender lines. 
Consider one way in which a position of this type has been argued for 
(typical of positions committed to this pervasive view of sex). In 1889, two 
British scientists argued (with the help of the scientific methods of their day) 
that all differences between men and women could be explained in terms of 
certain metabolic states. These scientists, Geddes and Thompson, argued that 
females are 'anabolic': they conserve energy. Males, on the other hand, are 
'katabolic': they tend to expend energy since males (for some reason) tend to 
have surplus amounts of it. This (Geddes and Thompson argued) explains why 
"it is generally true that the males [of all animal species, including the human 
species] are more active, energetic, eager, passionate, and variable; [and that] 
the females [are] more passive, conservative, sluggish, and stable" (Geddes and 
Thompson quoted in Moi 1999: 18). They went on to argue against granting 
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women political, social and economic rights based on this scientific research. 
Geddes and Thompson suggested, "what was decided among the prehistoric 
Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament" (quoted in Moi 1999: 18); 
since nature has constituted men and women in this manner, any legislation that 
guaranteed equal rights would be futile. Women's natural constitution as 
passive and sluggish is inevitable and no amount of social reform will alter this. 
The pair went on to argue that the human species "will come to a ruinous end 
unless women are kept out of economic competition with men" (Moi 2000: 19). 
Contra views such as those by Geddes and Thompson, feminist theorists 
commonly argue that it is crucially important to maintain the distinction 
between sex characteristics and gender characteristics. As early as the 18th 
century, feminists suggested that women's inferior social, economic and 
intellectual positions did not reflect any biological facts about females. Rather, 
the features often cited as evidence of women's unsuitability to work outside 
the home, partake in political decision-making or own private property (such as 
being passive or only interested in nurturing babies) were socially conditioned, 
not innate (if present at all). Feminist theorists went on to argue (and rightly so) 
that since this is the case, physiological differences should not be used to justify 
oppressive social and political arrangements (for more, see Bryson 1992). Since 
the 1960s (and the onslaught of the so-called modem feminist movement) 
gender has become a central notion for feminist theorists. The idea is that 
cashing out those social factors constitutive of one's gender paves the way for 
social reform that ends women's political and social subordination. The idea 
seemed to be that knowing the social conditions constitutive of gender tells 
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feminist theorists which social arrangements are in need of reform. During the 
past 40 years, feminist theorists have largely embraced this separation of sex 
and gender having mostly concentrated on ways to theorise the latter. In doing 
so, they aim to find ways to effectively reform the social and political 
conditions responsible for women's subordination.s 
IV 
Since gender classification (on common feminist views) is not a matter of 
biological features but rather it is a matter of certain social factors, what are 
these social factors that make women women? For instance, reconsider the 
Queen of England and the black Muslim mother of five displaced by ethnic 
cleansing taking place in Darfur. As outlined, the former is extremely 
privileged, wealthy and powerful whereas the latter lives in desperate poverty; 
the two women come from very different social, cultural and religious 
backgrounds; and their experiences as mothers appear to differ greatly since the 
Queen (unlike the Sudanese woman) need not worry about natal or post-natal 
S In recent years, some feminists have argued that the sex! gender division is 
problematic. This is because it seems that our understandings of both sex and gender 
are shaped by social factors. For instance, what counts as sex characteristics (that 
determine whether one is male or female) can differ hugely; opting for one 
characterisation of sex over another is simply an expression of preference and bias 
produced by social settings in which scientists and biologists work (Butler 1993). 
Some feminists further argue that the supposedly disinterested and gender-neutral 
scientific ways in which human bodies are characterised as either male or female 
already contain gender stereotypic understandings of women and men. For example, 
descriptions of female bodies as weak (due to relative muscle mass) mirror 
stereotypical assumptions about women. Insofar as our understandings of both sex and 
gender involve numerous social presuppositions and presumptions (these feminists 
claim), it no longer makes sense to maintain a sharp distinction between one's 
biological sex and one's social gender (see e.g., Butler 1999, Gatens 1996 and 
Prokhovnik 1999). Although this is an interesting and worthwhile issue to consider I 
cannot take it up here in detail. 
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medical care. What, then, is the underlying shared social factor (or set of 
factors) that makes both the Queen and the Sudanese refugee women and thus, 
members of the same class? 
A number of different definitions of womallness have been suggested 
over the past 40 years that might answer my question and I cannot consider 
them aU here. One influential way to understand gender has been proposed by 
Nancy Chodorow (1978, 1995). Consider stereotypical gender differences. In 
traditional white Western societies, such differences include the following: "to 
be good at being a man (that is, to be masculine), one should be strong, active, 
independent, rational, handsome, and so on; to be good at being a woman, one 
should be nurturing, emotional, cooperative, pretty and so on" (Haslanger 1993: 
89). Chodorow argues that the underlying factor responsible for these kinds of 
gender differences is that women and men come to develop different kinds of 
egos. She claims that a person's gender is embedded in their psyche and that it 
develops as a response to a certain 'object-relations' that persons experience as 
infants. The object-relation responsible for ego (and gender) development is 
that which the person experiences towards his or her mother (or other female 
primary caretaker). Chodorow goes on to argue that infant girls and boys 
experience different kinds of object-relations to their mothers (or other female 
primary caretakers). Due to this, their egos develop in different ways where 
these differences are manifested in 'feminine' and 'masculine' behaviour, 
emotional responses, career choices and so on.6 
6 Chodorow does not simply assume that all primary caretakers will be women. She 
claims that women often end up being primary caretakers because they lactate: "For 
convenience, and not because of biological necessity, [lactation] has usuaIly meant that 
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Why do object-relations differ for infant boys and girls? In Chodorow's 
view, the reason is this: "we might expect that a woman's identification with a 
girl child might be stronger [than her identification with a boy child]; that a 
mother, who is, after all, a person who is a woman and not simply the 
performer of a formally defined role, would tend to treat infants of different 
sexes in different ways" (1995: 201). Her suggestion is that mothers probably 
identify more closely with their infant daughters (than with their infant sons) 
and, as a result, they tend to treat their infant daughters and sons differently. 
Chorodow goes on to claim: 
"It seems likely that from their children's earliest childhood, mothers and 
women tend to identify more with daughters and to help them to differentiate 
less, and that processes of separation and individuation [of the self] are made 
more difficult for girls. On the other hand, a mother tends to identify less with 
her son, and to push him toward differentiation." (1995: 202) 
Mothers unconsciously discourage their daughters from developing a clear 
sense of self at the same time encouraging their sons to do so. Until the mother 
actively encourages or discourages ego development (Chodorow assumes) both 
infant daughters and infant sons will have been equally dependent on their 
mothers being unable to recognise that they are distinct persons from their 
mothers. The mothers' encouragement or discouragement, then, results in the 
infant daughters and sons dissociating their egos differently from their mothers. 
The mothers' tendency to push infant sons away while retaining close 
identification with infant daughters results in male and female egos developing 
differently. As boys have been pushed away and forced to dissociate their own 
senses of self from their mothers', boys develop well-defined and rigid ego 
mothers. and females in general, tend to take all care of babies" (Chodorow 1995: 
201). 
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boundaries. By contrast, girls will not: a mother's identification with her 
daughter means that the mother discourages (and to some extent prevents) the 
daughter from developing her own sense of self. Girls, as a result, develop 
blurred, fragmented and confused ego boundaries. They find differentiating 
their own interests from the interests of others difficult as well as finding it 
difficult to think about their own well-being independently from the well-being 
of those around them. 
The kinds of gender traits men and women commonly exhibit (on 
Chodorow's view) can be explained as manifestations of these kinds of ego 
boundaries (where males have weB-defined and determined ego boundaries and 
females have fuzzy, blurry and fragmented boundaries). For instance, consider 
emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically observed to be more 
emotional, to relate to others more closely and to be more emotionaBy 
dependent on others around them (their families, friends and colleagues). These 
common traits (Chodorow claims) are all manifestations of women's muddled 
and confused ego boundaries. Women simply are unable to differentiate their 
own senses of self in clear and rigid manner, they are unable to distinguish their 
own interests from the interests of those around them and they merge their own 
aims and goals with the aims and goals of those around them. 
Men, on the other hand, are commonly observed to be emotionalIy 
detached and unable to relate to others around them, they are selfish in their 
pursuits and interests and they are ambitious preferring a career where 
dispassionate and distanced thinking is considered to be a virtue. These traits 
(Chodorow thinks) are manifestations of men's ego boundaries: since they are 
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clearly defined, men have no difficulties in distinguishing their own interests 
from the interests of their wives, children or family. Men tend to engage in 
more autonomous and independent pursuits since their senses of self are well 
defined and, as a result, men often tend to consider their individual well-being 
prior to the well-being of others around them.7 
Chodorow's position appears to provide a way to make sense of gender 
classes: having fuzzy and blurry ego boundaries (mirrored in behaviour that is 
stereotypically feminine) is constitutive of womanness and shared by all 
women. This, then, provides the criterion for membership in the class of 
women. However, suggestions such as Chodorow's are nowadays widely 
considered to be unsatisfactory. During the past two decades many feminist 
philosophers have argued for nominalism about gender and gender nominalist 
positions are nowadays prevalent. As mentioned, Spelman (1990) and Butler 
(1999) have put forward perhaps the most prominent arguments for gender 
nominalism. They argue against a specific metaphysical perspective, gender 
realism, which positions such as Chodorow's appear to hold.8 As mentioned, 
7 Chodorow thinks these differences are mutable though. If both male and female 
parents were equally involved in child rearing tasks, (Chodorow claims) infant girls 
and boys would develop similar ego boundaries and commonly observed gender 
differences between men and women would simply disappear: "boys need to grow up 
around men who take a major role in child care, and girls around women who ... have 
a valued role and recognized spheres of legitimate control [outside the home]. These 
arrangements could help to ensure that children of both sexes develop a sufficiently 
individuated and strong sense of self, as well as a positively valued and secure gender 
identity, that does not bog down either in ego-boundary confusion, low self-esteem, 
and overwhelming relatedness to others, or in compulsive denial of any connection to 
others or dependence upon them" (Chodorow 1995: 214). 
8 There are other reasons for why one might feel reluctant to endorse Chodorow' s view 
(apart from arguments for gender nominalism). For instance, her position seems to be 
empirically unverifiable: how could we ever confirm that women and men really have 
different kinds of ego boundaries? That Chodorow's position is empirically 
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gender realism is the view that women have some feature (definitive of 
woman ness) in common that makes them women. (For Chodorow, this feature 
would be women's fuzzy and confused ego boundaries manifested in typically 
feminine behaviour). First and foremost, Spelman and Butler deny that there is 
any feature women have in common that makes them women. In doing so they 
also question the existence of the class of women itself arguing that there is no 
such class. I will argue shortly that neither of Spelman's and Butler's 
conclusions should be accepted: feminist theorists are mistaken to think that the 
cases they make against gender realism provide good reasons to reject gender 
realism per se and they should feel reluctant to endorse scepticism about the 
class of women. Prior to doing so, I will outline Butler's and Spelman's 
arguments in more detail. (My reasons for arguing that feminist philosophers 
should not reject gender realism will become clearer later on. In the final 
chapter, I argue for two ways to understand gender realism that enable feminist 
philosophers to make sense of gender classes and that do not have the adverse 
consequences Spelman and Butler think gender realist positions have.) 
Spelman 
Elizabeth Spelman argues famously that women's individuality and their 
diverse and dissimilar experiences as women count against two things; first, 
they count against realism about gender, and second, they count against the 
view that there is a single class of women (that individual women are members 
unverifiable is enough (for some) to warrant its rejection. I will leave this worry to one 
side. For my purposes, it is more relevant to consider arguments feminist theorists have 
levelled against perspectives such as Chodorow's in general. 
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of). By contrast, Spelman argues that there are multiple gender classes that are 
culturally and socially specific. In her Inessential Woman, Spelman sets out to 
refute the gender realism that (she claims) many feminist theorists hold: this is 
the view that "underneath or beyond the differences among women there must 
be some shared identity - as if commonality were a metaphysical given" (1990: 
13). In short, Spelman argues that the features women are presumed to have in 
common (qua women) are in fact features that only some women have in 
common. She goes on to claim that woman ness is inseparable from other 
aspects of one's identity (such as race and class). Following on from this, 
Spelman finally argues that since woman ness is socially constructed and social 
construction differs from one society to the next, it turns out that womanness is 
a culturally specific feature and that only women with similar racial, cultural 
and social backgrounds share a particular gender. 
Metaphysical realists (roughly) hold that particulars of certain sorts share 
universal features - ones that may be shared by many individuals - that make 
them of those sorts (Russell 1967).9 Consider Russell's example of justice to 
characterise metaphysical realism in more detail: 
"Let us consider, say, such a notion as justice. If we ask ourselves what justice 
is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the other just act, with a 
view to discovering what they have in common. They must all, in some sense, 
9 There are a number of different metaphysical positions that may be characterised as 
realist. An important way in which these positions differ from one another is in what 
exactly they take universal features to be like: whether they are abstract, whether there 
is a distinct realm in which they exist and so on (for more, see Armstrong 1989). 
Providing a satisfactory characterisation of all of these views and the ways in which 
they differ from one another would be a huge task and one that I cannot undertake 
here. For my purposes the rough-and-ready characterisation of metaphysical realism 
will suffice (that particulars share a universal feature on such views). This is the 
common thread running through different realist positions and definitive of 
metaphysical realism regardless of how universal features are understood in detail. 
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partake of a common nature, which will be found in whatever is just and in 
nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just, will be 
justice itself, the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life 
produces the multiplicity of just acts ... This pure essence is what Plato calls an 
'idea' or 'form'." (Russell 1967: 52) 
He goes on to claim: "the word 'idea' has acquired, in the course of time, many 
associations which are quite misleading when applied to Plato's 'ideas'. We 
shall therefore use the word 'universal' ... to describe what Plato meant" where 
"a universal will be anything which may be shared by many particulars" (1967: 
53). 
Spelman claims that much of Western feminist theory is being done 
from a realist metaphysical perspective whereby it is assumed that women share 
a universal feature that makes them women (Spelman 1990: 2). Feminist 
theorists supposedly hold a view of gender parallel to the view of justice 
Russell outlines: individual women share a universal feature of womanness that 
makes them women and this feature is found in all and only women. Spelman, 
however, argues that no such universal exists. As this is the case, she holds that 
gender realism (of any kind) must be false. Spelman maintains firstly that the 
gender realist view, which she takes much of feminist theory to hold, has come 
about by white middle-class Western feminists falsely theorising gender and 
gender oppression from the perspective of 'white solipsism', the tendency to 
"think, imagine and speak as if whiteness describes the world" (Rich, quoted in 
Harris 1993: 356): 
"If ... I believe that the woman in every woman is a woman just like me, and if 
I also assume that there is no difference between being white and being a 
woman, then seeing another woman 'as a woman' will involve seeing her as 
fundamentaIly like the woman I am. In other words, the womanness underneath 
the Black woman's skin is a white woman's, and deep down inside the Latina 
woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through an obscuring cultural 
shroud." (Spelman 1990: 13) 
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In Spelman's view, white Western middle-class feminists have assumed that 
women all share some single feature and have theorised this feature as the one 
they possess. In doing so, they inadvertedly created a notion of womanness 
where women's common nature underneath the distorting cultural conditions is 
"white, middle-class, heterosexual, Christian, and able-bodied" (Minow 1993: 
339). Furthermore, this false notion of woman ness (Spelman claims) is "being 
passed off as a metaphysical truth" (1990: 186) thereby privileging some 
women while marginalizing others. White middle-class Western feminists 
simply did not understand the importance of race and class and by focusing on 
women merely as women (ignoring race and class differences) they "contlate[d] 
the condition of one group of women with the condition of all" (Spelman 1990: 
3). 
The work of Betty Friedan (1963) provides a well-known example of 
precisely this contlation. In her groundbreaking The Feminine Mystique Friedan 
called upon women to leave domesticity behind and find jobs outside the home 
in order to end women's social and political subordination. Some feminists 
were quick to point out that women from less privileged backgrounds 
(commonly poor and non-white) have held jobs and worked outside the home 
for decades to support their families and that Friedan's suggestion is clearly not 
applicable to all women: it is not applicable to those who already work outside 
the home. This illustrates that when Friedan called upon women to leave 
domesticity behind, she was clearly addressing only one group of women 
(white middle-class suburban housewives) falsely thinking she was addressing 
all women. 
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Spelman's discussion of white solipsism points to a further mistaken 
assumption (she thinks) feminist theorists hold: what makes one woman a 
woman is the same as what makes another woman a woman. On the contrary, 
she claims that "gender is constructed and defined in conjunction with elements 
of identity such as race, class, ethnicity and nationality" (Spelman 1990: 175). 
As a result, what makes it true that two women are women is not that they share 
something we can separate from other aspects of their identities: 
"What makes it true that Angela and I are women is not some 'woman' 
substance that is the same in each of us and interchangeable between us. Selves 
are not made up of separable units of identity strung together to constitute a 
whole person. It is not as if there is a goddess somewhere who made lots of 
little identical 'woman' units and then, in order to spruce up the world a bit for 
herself, decided to put some of those units in black bodies, some in white 
bodies, some in the bodies of kitchen maids in seventeenth century France, 
some in the bodies of English, Israeli, and Indian prime ministers." (Spelman 
1990: 158) 
Spelman goes on to argue that those committed to gender realism have falsely 
assumed a woman's womanness is a neatly distinguishable part of her identity 
separable from all other aspects of the woman's identity (such as her racial, 
cultural and class identities). This is because (Spelman thinks) the realist 
picture of gender falsely entails that all women share the same feature of 
womanness regardless of any other features they might possess (such as those 
invoked by racial and class identities). This is because they assume a woman's 
womanness will remain unaffected by her race and class. 
If gender were separable from race and class in this manner, (Spelman 
claims) all women would experience their womanness in the same way. On this 
view, "my being a woman means the same whether I am white or Black, rich or 
poor, French or Jamaican, Jewish or Muslim. As a woman, I'm like other 
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women" (Spelman 1990: 136). This is clearly not the case. It seems that (for 
example) a white female landowner in apartheid era South Africa will have a 
very different understanding of herself as a woman from a black South African 
woman who cleans up after her. It simply is not the case, as Spelman rightly 
points out, that all women experience their womanness in the same way. She 
concludes with a thought experiment to illustrate: "if it were possible to isolate 
a woman's 'womanness' from her racial identity, then we should have no 
trouble imagining that had I been Black I could have had just the same 
understanding of myself as a woman as I in fact do ... To rehearse this 
imaginary situation is to expose its utter bizarreness" (1990: 135). If it were 
possible to separate one's gender from one's racial identity, it should be 
possible -- even easy -- to imagine that had I been of a different race, as a 
woman I would have remained the same. Nevertheless, it seems to be very 
difficult (if not impossible) to imagine this and Spelman suggests this counts 
against gender realism. 
Finally, Spelman argues that women (qua women) do not share a single 
gender since a woman's womanness is shaped by cultural and social 
backgrounds: 
"Being a 'woman' is not the same thing as, nor reducible to, being a 'female'. 
'Women' are what females of the human species become. or are supposed to 
become, through learning how to think. act, and live in certain ways. What 
females in one society learn about how they are to think, act, and live. can 
differ enormously from what females in another society learn; in fact. as we 
have been reminded often, there can be very significant differences within a 
given society." (1990: 134) 
She claims further "if we can say with de Beauvoir that societies create women 
out of females (making gender out of sex) and that different societies do this 
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differently ... we can say in an important sense that there is a variety of genders 
[amongst women]" (Spelman 1990: 174-5). 
What Spelman has in mind is something like this: women who come 
from similar social and cultural backgrounds sharing racial and class conditions 
are gendered similarly. They come to have a particular gender in common 
because through social construction "females become not simply women but 
particular kinds of women" (Spelman 1990: 113). They become white working-
class women, black middle-class women, poor Jewish women, wealthy 
aristocratic European women and so on. Spelman's thought is that since 
womanness is constructed differently from one society to the next, it will differ 
from one society to the next and no single feature of womanness that all women 
cross-culturally share, exists. Rather, those individuals we think of as women 
exhibit a range of different genders that depend on their particular social 
conditions. Due to this (Spelman holds), it is not possible to classify women 
into a single class. 
Butler 
Judith Butler's Gender Trouble (first published in 1990) aims to "trace the way 
in which gender fables establish and circulate the misnomer of natural facts" 
(1999: xxxi). Butler argues that it appears as if the term 'woman' has some 
unitary cross-cultural and trans-historical meaning and as if the term picks out 
some determinate group of people who have a feature (an identity, trait or 
experience) in common qua members of that group. Unitary gender concepts 
(for Butler) falsely suggest that women form a group of some kind that 
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functions as the foundation for feminist theory, capturing some feminist 
'sisterhood' where individual group members identify with one another or have 
some specific trait in common. 
Contra such a mistaken picture, Butler first calls into question the 
meaning of the term ·woman'. She argues that the concept woman has no stable 
meaning across different cultures and societies (or even within a given society). 
Rather, "woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that 
cannot rightfully be said to originate or end. As an ongoing discursive practice, 
it is open to intervention and resignification" (Butler 1999: 43). She then goes 
on to claim that to assume women share something that makes them women is 
seriously misguided: she claims "[t]here is no [common] gender identity behind 
the expressions of gender" (1999: 33). For Butler, there is no determinate way 
,of being a woman, identifying oneself as a woman or a way of thinking about 
one's womanness.
10 The picture of gender Butler critiques does not in any 
meaningful sense describe the way the world is - rather, it is the unwitting 
product of feminist politics in its efforts to represent the interests of certain 
political subjects, namely women. On Butler's view, in aiming to aid women by 
representing their interests, feminism "constitutes the subject for whom 
10 Butler is not simply rejecting the thought that women have a gender identity in 
common. She also thinks that the notion of gender identity is incoherent because 
gender (in Butler's view) is not experienced in the manner feminist theorists 
commonly take gender to be experienced. For Butler, genders (manness and 
womanness) are not manifest in any identity, sense of self or way of thinking about 
oneself. Rather, gender (for Butler) is something people do: gender is a set of actions 
that are associated with men and women such as wearing certain gender coded 
clothing, putting on make-up and behaving in gendered ways. Individuals (in Butler's 
view) do not possess a gender. Rather, gender is something that is attached to actions 
and behaviours individuals perform. Insofar as this is the case, any talk of gender 
identities seems incoherent since actions and behaviours do not have identities (or a 
sense of self) as women or men (B utler 1990). 
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political representation is pursued" (1999: 3). Insofar as this is the case, Butler 
argues any notion of womanness used to capture a feminist 'sisterhood' (or the 
class of women) that feminist politics can take as its subject matter is unhelpful, 
masking rather than disclosing what women are like. Holding on to a unitary 
sense of womanness (that supposedly captures a single class of women) does 
not yield any political gains for feminist theorists. By contrast, having a unitary 
sense of womanness generates numerous problems for feminist theory. 
Butler's thought is roughly this: in order to represent women's interests, 
feminist theorists have assumed that feminist politics requires "a universal basis 
for feminism, one which must be found in an identity [of women] assumed to 
exist cross-culturally" (1999: 6). Achieving this universal basis (feminist 
theorists believed. according to Butler) was simply a descriptive matter: 
examine the world and the women in it with a view to defining womanness 
such that it reflects the way women are. Nevertheless, feminist theorists failed 
to realise two things: first, that there is no specific way that women are due to 
their gender and second, that no definition of womanness can ever be merely 
descriptive. Gender concepts are problematic because they are always 
normative: they (in Butler's view) entail something about the ways in which 
individuals should be in order to satisfy gender concepts. They articulate a set 
of conditions that those hoping to satisfy the concepts must cohere and comply 
with creating norms that determine how one should live, act and behave. Butler 
writes: 
"I would argue that any effort to give universal or specific content to the 
category of women, presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is required in 
advance [as the foundation of feminist politics]. will necessarily produce 
factionalization ... [a shared] 'identity' as a point of departure can never hold 
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as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement. Identity categories 
are never merely descriptive, but always normative. and as such. 
exclusionary." (Butler 1991: 160) 
Gender concepts articulated by feminist theorists turned out to articulate a set of 
conditions that those hoping to gain feminist political representation must 
satisfy thus prescribing a supposedly correct picture of how to be, live and 
behave as a woman (and to qualify for feminist political representation) (Butler 
1999: 4). 
Feminist theorists, Butler acknowledges. did not intentionally set out to 
prescribe such norms. They undertook the task of cashing out womanness in 
good faith and aimed to do so in a manner conducive to feminist political goals. 
Nevertheless (and as Spelman also argued), they failed to take into account 
women's diverse and dissimilar experiences and traits as women. Butler writes, 
"the insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of women 
[through a unitary notion of womanness] has effectively refused the multiplicity 
of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of 
'women' are constructed" (1999: 19-20). By assuming that all women identify 
with one another and that they share something qua women, feminist theorists 
in effect distorted (rather than clarified) the picture of womanness. 
Butler's claim (to some extent) rings true. For instance, belI hooks [sic] 
has famously pointed out that many women do not identify with feminist 
theorists or the proposed feminist goals and aims. In particular, those who come 
from racially, culturally or economically oppressed groups find the idea that 
feminism aims to better their conditions as women foreign to them: 
"Since men are not equals in white supremacist, capitalist. patriarchal class 
structure. which men do women want to be equal to? Do women share a 
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common vision of what equality means? ... women in lower class and poor 
groups, particularly those who are non-white, would not have defined 
women's liberation as women gaining social equality with men, since they are 
continually reminded in their everyday lives that all women do not share a 
common social status. Concurrently, they know that many males in their social 
groups are exploited and oppressed. Knowing that men in their groups do not 
have social, political, and economic power, they would not deem it liberatory 
to share their social status." (hooks 2000: 19, originally published in 1984) 
hooks goes on to argue that many non-white and non-middle class women were 
at best suspicious of feminism and at worst disillusioned with feminist theory 
that seemed to aid only white middle-class women who they did not identify 
with and who appeared to pay little (or no) attention to the specific situations 
women from racially, culturally or economically oppressed groups encountered 
(2000: 19). 
Feminist theorists failed to pay sufficient attention to women's diversity 
(Butler argues) because feminist theory itself was guided by certain norms, 
ideologies and principles that unwittingly reflected mainstream society and 
politics. Feminist theories of gender (Butler claims) were informed by white 
solipsism and heterosexism. The prevalent views of woman ness, then, reflected 
these theoretical biases. The former is already familiar to us from the discussion 
of Spelman in the previous section: it is the tendency to treat whiteness as the 
norm failing to take into account ways in which racial and ethnic differences 
affect individuals. Heterosexism is the tendency to treat heterosexual sexual 
practices as the norm and to naturalise such practices. On Butler's view 
heterosexist norms, ideals and traditions affect our behaviour to such an extent 
that (by and large) men and women are encouraged and even coerced to 
become heterosexual (Salih 2002: 49). Butler claims that heterosexism 
promotes a view whereby sexual practices between men and women are treated 
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as natural and normal whereas homosexual sexual behaviour is considered to be 
deviant, marginal, unnatural and something that should be prohibited. Feminist 
theory not only failed to take into account racial differences but it maintained a 
view of gender that did not seem to take into account the possibility of other 
sexualities alongside heterosexuality. 
Butler argues that hugely problematic consequences have followed from 
these factors (from ignoring women's particular traits and experiences, from 
assuming that there is a common identity amongst women and from failing to 
see ideological norms governing feminist theory). In order to satisfy some 
supposedly correct picture of womanness -- informed by white solipsism and 
heterosexism -- women (Butler claims) must "conform to [certain] unspoken 
normative requirements" constitutive of womanness (1999: 9). They must be 
white, middle-class heterosexual females. If individual women (for any reason) 
fail to satisfy these conditions, they risk being alienated or, worse still, 
explicitly excluded from feminist politics altogether. Linda Nicholson captures 
this thought nicely: 
"The belief that 'woman' does have some common meaning serves to coerce 
individuals into behaviour aimed to exhibit such meaning ... the idea of 
'woman' as unitary operates as a policing force which generates and 
legitimises certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes 
others." (Nicholson 1998: 293) 
For Butler, the practices commonly deemed illegitimate are those of minority 
races, cultures, ethnicities and sexualities with the result that much of feminist 
politics seems to privilege white, heterosexual and Western women over other 
kinds of women. 
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Butler's aim is not, however, merely to critique prevalent feminist 
notions of womanness showing that they are exclusionary and marginal ising. 
Her argument is meant to be stronger than this: every definition of womanness 
is always going to be normative prescribing some way that individuals ought to 
be in order to satisfy the concept woman. She continues claiming that because 
all such prescriptions will be exclusionary and marginalising, all attempts to 
define gender concepts will be politically insidious. In order to avoid excluding 
and marginalising some women (while privileging others), feminist theorists 
must give up the thought that woman can be defined in any unitary manner. 
Only then are marginalised and underrepresented women guaranteed a voice 
within feminist theory. Roughly, Butler's idea is that a single sense of 
woman ness promotes a single women's voice (so to speak) and this prevents 
women, who come from numerous marginalised groups, from speaking their 
minds and expressing themselves within the feminist movement. 
Insofar as this is the case, Butler suggests that feminist theorists should 
actively resist defining woman: they should deconstruct the term thereby 
"releas[ing] the term into a future of multiple significations, to emancipate it 
from the [oppressive and exclusionary] ontologies to which it has been 
restricted, and to give it playas a site where unanticipated meanings might 
come to bear" (Butler 1991: 160). She claims that woman should always be 
open to a multiplicity of different and non-competing definitions and that the 
idea that women have something in common that makes them women "ought 
not to be the foundation of feminist politics" since women clearly do not share 
any single common feature (Butler 1999: 9). On Butler's view, woman has no 
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definite meaning and, as a result, it is false to think that it picks out a class of 
women that feminist politics represents. Feminist philosophers (in Butler's 
view) must give up the class of women, not hold on to it as something that 
grounds feminist theory and politics. 
v 
Subsequent feminist philosophy has been shaped to a great extent by these 
arguments and they have served a valuable purpose. First and foremost, 
arguments such as those Spelman and Butler put forward have made feminism 
more inclusive as a discipline by drawing attention to many false assumptions 
and generalisations feminists have made. They have illustrated the need to 
understand that women have different and dissimilar experiences as women and 
that the interconnections between racial, cultural and sexual identities and 
gendered identities need to be taken more seriously. These arguments have also 
alerted feminist philosophers to ways in which seemingly neutral and 
descriptive claims about women may have normative and prescriptive force. 
This has reminded feminist theorists that nobody is beyond the reach of social 
forces, biases and prejudices that may influence theories and theorising. 
Despite these hugely valuable contributions, I will argue first that the 
cases Spelman and Butler make against gender realism do not provide good 
reasons to reject it. Second, I argue that although Spelman and Butler point to 
many difficulties with gender classification these difficulties should not 
convince feminist theorists to endorse gender scepticism. This is because 
37 
gender scepticism has hugely adverse political consequences that feminist 
theorists should aim to avoid and that they should feel reluctant to accept. 
White solipsism, marginalisation and the concept woman 
Spelman claims that white middle-class Western feminists have falsely 
assumed all women are like them and the resulting notion of womanness (she 
claims) reflects this false assumption. This notion (Spelman rightly argues) 
reflects features that only some women have in common. Recognising that 
feminist theorists hold a false view of woman ness supports Spelman's case for 
gender nominalism questioning commonly held gender realist views. I agree 
that the assumed notion of womanness (that women supposedly have in 
common) is clearly false and it is not something that all women possess. 
Nevertheless, the recognition that feminist theorists hold a false conception of 
what women (qua women) have in common does not give any reason to accept 
Spelman's conclusion: that there is no single feature (or woman ness) that 
women qua have in common. Rather, Spelman's claim invites us to modify our 
conception of womanness. 
Consider an analogy with the earth and its shape. Prior to Copernicus, 
most people believed the earth was flat: their conception of the earth's shape 
was mistaken. But this (then) widespread view does not give any reason to 
think that the earth has no shape or that the earth does not exist at all. 
Concluding this seems rather unjustified (not to mention false!). The claim that 
the earth's shape is falsely conceived as flat illustrates merely a need to modify 
our conception of the earth's shape. It seems similarly that although the 
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widespread feminist conception of what women (qua women) share is false. 
this does not give any reason to think that there is nothing women by virtue of 
their gender share. It merely illustrates the need to modify feminist conceptions 
of woman ness and to rethink this notion such that woman ness reflects features 
that are shared by all women (qua women). 
If feminists were to modify their claims about what it is that women qua 
women share (and to modify them such that the shared feature is not merely 
common to some women, but to all), 'white solipsism' should no longer be a 
problem. This would mean that the politically adverse consequences the false 
view of womanness resulted in would be corrected. It seems though that 
Spelman does not allow for this, suggesting implicitly that there cannot be an 
adequate way to understand womanness along gender realist lines: gender 
realism always leads to adverse political consequences and, as a result, it is 
impossible to rethink womanness along realist lines in a way that could avoid 
these consequences. Since it seems that there is no adequate way to rethink 
woman ness within the remits of gender realism such that the harmful 
exclusionary practices are avoided, rethinking womanness along realist lines at 
the same time avoiding white solipsism appears to be impossible. 
If indeed adverse political consequences (such as white solipsism) 
necessarily followed from gender realism, this would provide a practical reason 
to reject it. However, it is not the case that gender realism in general has the 
bad political consequences Spelman points out - only particular forms of 
realism about gender have had such results and Spelman in her work rightly 
critiques these forms. But, Spelman's argument that some forms of gender 
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realism have politically adverse consequences is not enough to justify the claim 
that gender realism per se has such consequences. Further, recognising that 
feminist gender realists have held a false view of womanness does not entail 
that there are immutable political problems with al\ gender realist perspectives: 
although some gender realist pictures of womanness are politically insidious, 
this does not provide a reason to reject gender realism per se as politically 
problematic. 
Much of the same appears to be true of Butler's view that al1 attempts to 
define the concept woman necessarily have politically insidious consequences. 
It seems that although feminist philosophers have defined it in ways that have 
marginalised and excluded some women (while privileging others), this does 
not and should not suggest that woman cannot be defined in an unproblematic 
way. For instance, the work of Sally Haslanger (2000b) provides an excellent 
illustration of a gender realist position that provides a definition of woman that 
does not have the adverse political consequences Spelman and Butler draw 
attention to. (Her position will be considered in chapter 5.) Contra Butler, 
Haslanger's view illustrates that defining woman per se is not problematic; only 
particular ways of defining it are politically insidious. As a result, feminist 
philosophers should not abandon gender realism in general or consider it 
irredeemably counterproductive because some realist views of WOmanness have 
had the consequence of excluding and marginalizing certain women within 
feminist theory. To do so, in my view, would be a mistake. Similarly, it would 
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Separability 
One might accept that white solipsism does not in the end count against gender 
realism and that Spelman was wrong to suppose it did. Nevertheless, in 
response one might draw attention to Spelman's second argument: because 
woman ness is inseparable from other aspects of identity (such as race and 
class), women (qua women) do not have womanness in common. However, this 
argument does not give reason to reject gender realism. Firstly, Spelman's 
argument turns out to be invalid; secondly, the idea that gender is inseparable 
from race and class does not seem to be incompatible with gender realism per 
se. 
Spelman claims that because gender is defined in conjunction with other 
aspects of identity individual women do not share a womanness. She presents a 
thought experiment that supposedly shows this: "if it were possible to isolate a 
woman's 'womanness' from her racial identity, then we should have no trouble 
imagining that had I been Black I could have had just the same understanding 
of myself as a woman as I in fact do ... To rehearse this imaginary situation is 
to expose its utter bizarreness" (Spelman 1990: 135). The idea is that because I 
cannot entertain this thought experiment, it must be the case that womanness is 
inseparable from other aspects of our identities and, as a result, there is no 
single womanness that all women have in common. 
This argument, however, is invalid for a number of reasons. For a start, 
there may be reasons other than the one Spelman mentions for why rehearsing 
such an imaginary scenario is not possible. For example, one might come from 
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a cultural and social background where one has no conception of what it would 
be like to be of a different race. In this case, the situation is unimaginable not 
because there is something about woman ness that prevents this. Rather, the 
situation cannot be entertained because the feature of having a different race is 
unimaginable. Entertaining the imaginary situation Spelman outlines may be 
impossible because of a whole range of imaginative limitations and not simply 
because the ontology of womanness poses such limits to our imagination. It 
may simply be the case that there are some serious epistemic problems in 
thinking about gender and its interconnections with race and class that means 
the thought experiment Spelman outlines and asks us to imagine cannot be 
entertained. In fact, I think it is very unlikely that we could entertain Spelman's 
thought experiment because of a whole range of imaginative limitations. 
This points to another reason for why the separability objection does not 
provide a good reason to reject gender realism per se. Spelman's argument for 
the inseparability of gender from race and class is made in terms of women's 
experiences: in terms of how women experience their gender. Now, it seems 
true that women experience their gender very differently from one another and 
that numerous different ways to experience womanness exist. But this does not 
count against a realist view of gender for two reasons. First, even if women qua 
women have the very same feature of womanness in common, the claim that 
they experience this differently from one another could hold. The two claims -
that women share the same feature of womanness and that they experience this 
feature differently from one another - are perfectly compatible. 
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Consider the case of perceptual experiences to illustrate. Imagine three 
different observers who have perceptual experiences of the same object, say, of 
a rectangular block. Imagine further that these observers are positioned such 
that they all observe the object from different angles. Now, it seems that all 
three observers are going to have very different perceptual experiences of the 
object. (They may even be positioned such that none of them perceives the 
object as rectangular.) Nevertheless, they all have a perceptual experience of 
the very same object and the fact that they have observed the object in different 
ways does not entail that the object in all cases was not the same object. To 
claim that the observers have a perceptual experience of the rectangular block 
in common and that they all perceptually experience this block differently from 
one another is perfectly fine: the two claims are compatible with one another. In 
a similar fashion, it is perfectly possible that women experience their 
womanness differently from one another although these experiences are of the 
same feature. 
Now, another reason that differences in experiences of womanness may 
differ from one another without this counting against gender realism is this: 
womanness might not be something that could be experienced in the way 
Spelman's discussion seems to assume. I have in mind here positions such as 
the one Sally Haslanger has recently argued for. (As mentioned, Haslanger's 
position will be considered in chapter 5.) She argues (roughly) for a way to 
understand womanness whereby gender is not an identity of individuals that 
designates something about individuals' psychology or sense of self. Rather, 
womanness (for Haslanger) designates a particular social position one occupies 
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within broad social structures and relations where one is sex-marked for a 
certain sort of treatment that is oppressive or subordinating: 
"Gender categories are defined in terms of how one is socially positioned ... 
[they] are defined hierarchically within a broader complex of oppressive 
relations; one group (viz., women) is socially positioned as subordinate to the 
other (viz., men), [and] [s]exual difference functions as the physical marker to 
distinguish the two groups, and is used in the justification of viewing and 
treating the members of each group differently." (Haslanger 2000b: 38) 
Women (and men) can experience their social positions in any number of 
different ways and their social positions may impact and shape their 
psychological orientation as women (or as men) in numerous different ways. 
Nonetheless, Haslanger's position is gender realist and she maintains that 
women have a feature (definitive of womanness) in common that makes them 
women: they are all socially positioned as subordinate or oppressed where this 
social positioning is sex-marked. If the inseparability thesis is to count against 
gender realism, woman ness must be conceived of as an identity or a 
psychological orientation of some kind. Consequently, any theory of gender 
that takes it to be something different (such as Haslanger's conception of 
woman ness as a social position), already avoids Spelman's inseparability thesis. 
In other words, any realist theory of gender that avoids defining woman ness as 
an identity or a psychological orientation avoids the separability objection. 
Finally, it seems unlikely that Spelman's separability objection could 
rule out gender realism simply by appealing to other aspects of women's 
identities because realism in general is not ruled out by appealing to other 
features entities possess. RecalI Russe11's description of realism and his 
example of justice: "Let us consider, say, such a notion as justice. If we ask 
ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and 
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the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common ... 
This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, 
the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the 
multiplicity of just acts" (Russell 1967: 52). On this view just acts do not 
simply follow from having the feature of justice. They must also contain other 
"facts of ordinary life" that are mixed and intertwined with justice. For 
instance, it seems that the justness of just acts may differ depending on the 
other features of such acts. Consider two intuitively just acts. Imposing parking 
fines on drivers who have violated parking regulations (by, for instance, 
parking for a longer time than allowed) is just insofar as they have broken 
certain transport rules and regulations. Then again, returning valuable 
possessions taken from Jewish households by Nazi soldiers to their rightful 
heirs is just insofar as the Nazi regime did not appear to have any legitimate 
claim to them in the first place. But, given the particular facts of these cases, it 
seems that the justness of these two acts differs; returning confiscated Jewish 
possessions seems intuitively more just than imposing parking fines. This is 
because the Nazi regime's claim to Jewish possessions was iIlegitimate to begin 
with and returning these possessions seems morally very significant whereas 
imposing parking fines (when parking regulations are violated) seems just 
although maybe somewhat trivial morally speaking. Now, although the justness 
of these two acts is inseparable from the other features of the acts this does not 
seem to give a reason to reject a realist conception of justice. This is because 
the other features particular to these two cases mentioned do not seem to be 
incompatible with a realist view of justice. There seems no reason to suppose, 
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then, that the inseparability of gender from race and class provides a reason to 
reject gender realism. 
Particularity 
My argument in the previous section might be responded to by drawing 
attention to Spelman's final suggestion: that gender is socially constructed 
provides a good reason to reject gender realism. Gender (feminist philosophers 
commonly argue) is a matter of extrinsic and relational social factors whereby 
"one is a woman, not by virtue of one's intrinsic features (for example, a body 
type), but by virtue of one's part in a system of social relations ... gender is a 
relational or extrinsic property of individuals, and the relations in question are 
social" (Haslanger 1993: 88). Social construction (in Spelman's view) strongly 
counts against gender realism: women do not have a single feature in common 
that makes them women because the extrinsic and relational features that 
woman ness depends on differ from one society to the next. Rather, because 
womanness differs from one society to the next, particular kinds of women 
(with similar social, cultural and racial backgrounds) have a gender in common 
qua women from those particular social, cultural and racial backgrounds. So, 
there can only be particular and culturally specific senses of woman ness (such 
as black womanness, middle-class womanness. lesbian woman ness and black 
middle-class lesbian womanness to name but few). If this is true, it seems that 
there really is good reason to reject any realist views of gender since women 
simply do not seem to have any single feature in common. 
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Now, it seems to me that social construction per se does not provide a 
good reason to reject gender realism entailing that only particular and culturally 
specific senses of womanness exist. This is because social construction does not 
appear to be incompatible with a realist view of womanness and this will 
become clear when other socially constructed features analogous to woman ness 
are looked at. 
Being a wife 
The feature of being a wife is extrinsic as it depends on external factors. In 
order for x to have this feature x must be a woman, the institution of marriage 
(broadly construed) must exist and x must be married to some other individual 
(or individuals). The feature is also socially constructed: it is a product of 
certain social practices that differ enormously from one society to the next. For 
example, many African tribes have traditionally engaged in the practice of 
polygyny (having multiple wives) in roughly two ways: males can take multiple 
(female) wives or females can take multiple (female) wives. This latter practice, 
woman-marriage, is the practice "whereby a woman could legally marry one or 
more women" (Greene 1998: 395). It has been documented in around 40 
precolonial African societies and in some societies "has endured to the present 
[day]" (Greene 1998: 395). It seems fair to say that this practice of woman-
marriage differs hugely from a traditional Christian practice of monogamous-
marriage between a (male) husband and a (female) wife. The feature of being a 
wife in these two practices, as a result, seems to also differ greatly. Compare 
these two cases with a third marriage system, such as polygamy, and the notion 
47 
of being a wife becomes more diverse still. Insofar as being a wife is an 
extrinsic feature that is socially constructed and can differ significantly from 
one society to the next, it seems to be analogous to Spelman's notion of 
woman ness. 
If social construction has the consequence that only particular and 
culturally specific senses of womanness exist, it must also count against realism 
about wives, such that there can only be particular and culturally specific senses 
of being a wife. Individual wives (as a result) would not share some single 
feature by virtue of their marital status. It seems to me, however, that the claims 
about social construction and being a wife do not hold. Although there may be 
culturally specific senses of being a wife (such as being a wife within a woman-
marriage and being a wife within a monogamous heterosexual Christian 
marriage) this does not seem to provide a good reason to reject the view that all 
wives have the feature of being a wife in common. And since social 
construction does not provide a good reason to reject realism about wives, I see 
no reason to think that it provides a good reason to reject realism about gender. 
Being an artist 
Consider another feature, being an artist, which also seems to be analogous to 
being a woman. Being an artist depends on external factors: whether x produces 
works of art that get displayed in galleries and whether x (according to, say, art 
critics) illustrates innovativeness and creativity. Being an artist seems to be 
socially constructed as it is a product of certain social practices and it seems 
highly sensitive to cultural and individual variance. Prima facie, someone who 
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paints icons or produces other kinds of religious art (qua artist) seems to have 
very little (if anything at all) in common with conceptual artists like Damien 
Hirst or Tracey Emin (qua artists). 
Again, if social construction counts against gender realism, there can 
only be particular and culturally specific senses of womanness. In a similar 
vein, if social construction counts against realism about artists, there can only 
be particular and culturally specific senses of being an artist. It seems to me 
that (again) this latter claim fails to hold: the cultural and artistic variance 
amongst individual artists does not seem to undermine realism about artists. 
Just because individual artists are particular kinds of artists (religious, 
conceptual or whatever) it does not seem to follow that they do not share some 
single feature (being an artist) by virtue of their trade. Social construction does 
not seem to entail that the particularity thesis about artists must be true. Once 
again, it seems that since this is the case there does not seem to be any good 
reason to think the particularity thesis about gender would count against gender 
realism. An appeal to social construction per se does not appear to entail that 
one cannot be a realist about women, wives or artists. 
Gender scepticism 
In the previous three sections I argued that the cases Spelman and Butler make 
against gender realism are unsuccessful. Now, what about the claim that there is 
no single class of women? After all, one could agree with Spelman and Butler 
that gender nominalism of some kind is more plausible than gender realism. But 
should feminist philosophers agree with them about gender scepticism? To 
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recap, Spelman thinks that gender scepticism follows because there is no single 
feature of woman ness that every woman possesses; by contrast, she argues that 
there are multiple gender classes that depend on cultural and social 
backgrounds. Then again, Butler holds that because the term 'woman' lacks 
definite meaning it does not pick out any such thing as the class of women. She 
further argues that every attempt to define woman such that it would pick out 
the class of women will be politically insidious, privileging some way of being 
a woman over others. For Butler, the task of feminism should be to engage in a 
genealogy of the class of women by deconstructing womanness in order to see 
how it has been falsely understood within feminist theory (1999: 9). Only by 
deconstructing gender notions will feminist theorists avoid promoting a view of 
woman ness that (instead of solidifying some sense of a feminist 'sisterhood') 
"was the very source of a painful factionalization" (Butler 1991: 160).11 
Both positions. in effect. suggest that feminist theory must give up the 
view that women form a single class or group around which feminist theory and 
practice is organised. Either feminist theory should be organised around 
mUltiple gender classes (as Spelman claims) or. since gender terms must always 
remain open to redefinition according to Butler. feminist theory should not be 
organised around any gender classes. Both positions. nevertheless. result in 
undesirable political consequences that feminist philosophers should aim to 
II Alison Stone (2004) has argued that the notion of genealogy Butler endorses can 
provide fruitful ways of understanding gender. gender classes and women. However. 
contra Butler. she argues that instead of applying genealogy to the concept woman. 
feminist philosophers should apply it to women themselves. This application. Stone 
maintains. is more beneficial as it allows feminist philosophers to trace a common 
history of women. femininity and gendered oppression providing a helpful way to 
think about how women are gendered. 
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avoid and, I argue, feminist philosophers should feel reluctant to endorse 
gender scepticism. 
I am not alone in suggesting this. Some feminist philosophers and 
political theorists have begun questioning whether Spelman's and Butler's 
positions are politically useful: they both seem to entail political paralysis of 
some kind (see e.g. Benhabib 1992, di Stefano 1990, Hirschmann & di Stefano 
1996, Martin 1994, Tanesini 1996, Young 1997). Consider Spelman's 
suggestion that feminist theory must be organised around multiple gender 
classes. How can Spelman envisage that on her view key feminist goals, such as 
ending women's oppression, could be achieved? On her view, feminist politics 
is only able to address injustices encountered by particular groups of women 
(black women, white women, Jewish women, lesbian women and black lesbian 
Jewish women, to name but few). But some theorists have argued (and rightly 
so, in my view) that feminist politics cannot effectively devise strategies to 
counter inequalities particular groups of women encounter (Young 1997). For 
instance, it seems extremely difficult to articulate what kinds of strategies could 
aid black lesbian Jewish women and counter the oppression they are subject to 
due to their gender (that, for Spelman, is black, lesbian Jewish womanness). It 
also seems that feminist theory would need separate strategies to counter 
oppression white lesbian Jewish women and black lesbian Jewish women are 
subject to, and given that there are so many different kinds of women, feminist 
theorists would have to devise numerous different strategies to help different 
kinds of women. And since feminist goals and ways of achieving these goals 
would become dispersed amongst different kinds of women, it seems feminism 
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In general will lose political impetus; feminist goals like aiming to end 
oppression women are subject to due to their gender could not be achieved. 
This suggests to some theorists that, following Spelman, the political 
effectiveness of feminist theory would be hugely diminished since she does not 
allow for positive visions that could benefit all women. Jane Roland Martin (for 
instance) writes "in our determination to honor diversity among women, we 
told one another to restrict our ambitions, limit our sights, beat a retreat from 
certain topics, refrain from using a rather long list of categories or concepts, and 
eschew generalization. I can think of no better description for the stunting of a 
field of intellectual inquiry" (1994: 631). Iris Marion Young holds that 
"[w]ithout conceptualizing women as a group in some sense, it is not possible 
to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process" 
(1997: 17, italics mine): losing this ability would be detrimental to feminism as 
a project that aims to (broadly speaking) liberate women from gender 
oppression. 
Butler's position is no better off; in fact, it seems even more politically 
paralysing than Spelman's. This is because it does not seem to allow for any 
prescriptive strategies that could benefit women. For Butler, the task of 
feminism should be to deconstruct womanness with the view that there is no 
viable way to define it. As a result, there is no way to make sense of the class of 
women that feminist politics would aim to aid. Contra Butler, Iris Marion 
Young claims that if her view is endorsed, feminist politics risks becoming 
inefficient: 
"I find the exclusive critical orientation of such arguments [like Butler's] 
rather paralysing. Do these arguments imply that it makes no sense and is 
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morally wrong ever to talk about women as a group, or in fact to talk about 
social groups at all? ... If not, then what can it mean to use the term 'woman'? 
More importantly, in the light of these critiques, what sort of positive claims 
can feminists make about the way social life is or ought to be?" (Young 1997: 
16) 
Butler's view suggests to Young that feminist theorists can never make claims 
about how political and social structures should be arranged such that the 
subordinate positions women in general find themselves, could be altered. I 
agree with Young. Consider some important feminist goal such as ending 
sexual violence against women. If feminist theorists accept Butler's position 
(and accept the view that the task of feminism is to deconstruct womanness), 
this goal could not be achieved because Butler's critical orientation does not 
allow for (what Young calls) positive visions about the way social structures 
ought to be. Following Butler, feminist theorists would uncover numerous ways 
in which woman ness has been defined and they could articulate in detail ways 
in which feminist theory has shaped womanness that have had exclusionary 
effects. But feminist theorists could not tackle the issue of how to end the 
sexual violence women encounter. For one thing, Butler does not think such a 
group exists and secondly, her position does not allow for ways to theorise how 
things ought to be (or how feminist goals could be achieved). If Butler's 
position is accepted, it is unclear what is left of feminist politics apart from 
critique. 
Feminist theorists should, as a result, feel reluctant to accept gender 
scepticism (that there is no class of women); it seems that accepting this and 
giving up the class as that which grounds feminist politics is too high a price to 
pay. Although it is important to bear in mind ways in which women differ from 
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one another and to recognise ways in which theories of gender can have 
politically adverse consequences, there is no need to give up talk of women (in 
general) so that feminist theorists can pay attention to differences and be self-
critical. As 1 will argue in chapter 6, it is not necessary to give up the class of 
women nor is it necessary to give up gender realism in order to pay sufficient 
attention to women's particularity and to avoid adverse political consequences. 
VI 
Feminist philosophers (I argue) have no reason to reject gender realism on the 
basis of the arguments Butler and Spelman put forward. These arguments point 
to difficulties with gender classification and they show that feminist 
philosophers should be careful when making claims about women in general. 
Feminist philosophers should also (I argue) feel reluctant to endorse scepticism 
about the class of women as Spelman and Butler do. 1 am not alone in 
suggesting this and in the next four chapters I will discuss ways in which 
feminist philosophers have aimed to make sense of gender classes in response 
to Spelman's and Butler's arguments; they all share the thought that gender 
classification is not straightforward but they reject the view that this entails 
scepticism about the class of women. 12 
12 It might seem as if there are some important omissions in my list of chosen 
theoreticians that I go on to discuss next. For instance, I do not consider Butler's well-
known view that gender is (what she calls) perfonnative: roughly, that gender is a way 
of acting and behaving rather than an identity or a way of being (Butler 1990, 1999). 
The feminist positions and proposed ways of understanding womanness I discuss next 
have all been proposed as responses to the problems Butler and Spelman articulate. 
They all share the view that we should be able to make sense of gender classes 
(rejecting gender scepticism) at the same time maintaining that gender classification is 
a difficult and complex issue. By contrast, Butler's views on gender in no sense aspire 
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to provide a solution to feminist worries over classification or to provide a way to 
make sense of the class of women. Insofar as this is the case, it seems appropriate not 
to consider her position. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FRYE, POSITIVE CATEGORIES AND WOMEN 
I 
Feminist philosophers have found it hard to point out some social factors that 
women have in common and that make them women. Some theorists (like 
Spelman and Butler) claim that. as a result. there is no single class of women 
that all women belong to. Contra such views. Marilyn Frye argues in her paper 
"The Necessity of Differences: Constructing a Positive Category of Women" 
(1996) that even though women have no single feature in common. feminist 
philosophers can still make sense of the class of women. This is because gender 
classification need not rely on shared features that are necessary and sufficient 
for womanness. Rather. by endorsing a different classificatory model. feminist 
theorists can classify women qua women at the same time taking into account 
their diverse and dissimilar experiences as women: something Frye thinks is 
crucial for any plausible account of gender. Frye further argues that such a 
model would take certain practices that women engage in as that which grounds 
classification: women would form (what she calls) a 'positive category'. 
I will argue that the alternative Frye outlines is inadequate because the 
criterion for picking out women is problematic. On the one hand. it appears that 
some individuals we think of as women (like the Queen) may fall outside the 
class of women on Frye's suggestion. On the other. some individuals (like men 
and certain guide-dogs) counter-intuitively seem to count as women. I will first 
outline some background against which Frye develops her notion of positive 
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category (in section II). I then move on to outline Frye's alternative in more 
detail (section III) and I end with a discussion of the problems Frye's 
suggestion encounters and argue that it should not be endorsed (section IV). 
II 
Frye's suggestion, in short, is this: the class of women should be thought of as a 
positive category. It should be "self-supporting rather than dependent on 
negation" (Frye 1996: 998). In order to argue for her view, Frye first singles out 
two feminist philosophers who (she claims) have understood womanness 
incorrectly. She then goes on to develop her own position as a response to these 
positions. The theorists Frye argues against are Simone de Beauvoir (1953) and 
Luce Irigaray (1985). The reason these philosophers have theorised womanness 
incorrectly (according to Frye) this is: they define woman ness in opposition to 
men and in terms of certain features women lack but men possess. 
Contra de Beauvoir and Irigaray, Frye claims that the class of women 
should not rely on features women lack. Rather, woman ness should be defined 
such that it relies solely on aspects relevant for women's lives and their 
experiences as women. Thinking about womanness and the class of women in 
this manner (Frye claims) "is a vital political function of feminist community 
and politics" (Frye 1996: 998). She claims further that her suggestion is 
compatible with women's diversity; the position Frye argues for recognises and 
incorporates women's diverse and dissimilar traits and experiences because it 
follows "a logic of category construction congenial to this project as a practice 
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of pluralism" (1996: 998). Before I go on to look at what Frye means by this, I 
will briefly outline the views she takes herself to argue against. 
Frye claims that Beauvoir's existentialist feminism and Irigaray's 
psychoanalytic feminist theory both define woman ness as a negation of what it 
is to be a man. Insofar as women are those individuals who lack qualities men 
possess, we can classify them on the basis of their gender. Beauvoir and 
Irigaray (Frye outlines) both claim that under certain oppressive social 
conditions subjectivity is coextensive with masculinity. As this is the case, 
women (on both views) tum out to lack subjectivity and it is this lack that is 
definitive of their gender. Beauvoir explains this in the following manner. In 
order to be a subject, one must live a life of transcendence: one must be 
autonomous and free to decide one's own destiny, one must be able to freely 
choose one's goals and aims and one must be able to freely pursue those goals 
and aims one has set for oneself. Only men (on Beauvoir's view) live such a 
life. They are in a position to actively pursue their own ends and goals, to work 
within the wider community and to define their own destinies through self-
development as they go about achieving the ends and goals they have set for 
themselves. Women, by contrast, are unable to freely choose their aims and 
goals or to freely pursue these aims and goals because their actions are 
constrained by their biology and bodily functions. Beauvoir seems to have in 
mind something like this: women's child bearing abilities make it very hard for 
them to freely pursue goal and aims outside the home and outside child rearing 
tasks. Women who give birth find that their actions are constrained by their 
mothering duties and they cannot combine home life with a life where they 
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independently pursue personal goals in the wider society. Women, as a result, 
are confined to a life of immanence: to a life of stagnation, repetition of 
mundane tasks where one's potential as an active human subject cannot 
develop. And those who live such a life are not (and cannot become) fully 
fledged human subjects. (It is worth pointing out that Beauvoir's work dates 
from the 1940s and women's lives have changed significantly during the past 
60 years. It seems fair to say, nevertheless, that during the time Beauvoir was 
writing her Second Sex the only way in which women could avoid, what she 
calls, the life of immanence was by avoiding pregnancy thus rejecting 
traditional values prevalent in French society.) 
This state of affairs (Beauvoir argues) is not due to any natural order of 
things. Women have an equal claim to subjectivity. The reason why subjectivity 
and masculinity are coextensive (or are considered to be coextensive) is that in 
certain oppressive social conditions men confine women to the life of 
immanence in order to secure their own privileged position. They confine 
women to a state of affairs where "he is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is 
the Other" (de Beauvoir 1953: 8). Beauvoir goes on to claim that "here is to be 
found the basic trait of woman: she is the Other" (1953: 11). Women are 
actively prevented from becoming fully fledged human subjects capable of 
realising and pursuing their own individual ends and goals and men are the ones 
h . h· f 13 W 0 Impose t IS ate on women. 
13 Beauvoir thinks women are not the only individuals unable to escape their condition 
as being confined to 'the life of immanence'. Working-class people along with Jewish 
and Black people share this condition with women. Nevertheless, working-class, 
Jewish and Black men and women are not equally disadvantaged. Beauvoir maintains 
that (for instance) working-class men confine working-class women to an even deeper 
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Irigaray shares this basic sentiment with de Beauvoir: subjectivity is 
coextensive with masculinity due to certain oppressive social conditions and 
women (due to these conditions) lack subjectivity. Her explanation is somewhat 
different though. For Irigaray, being a subject requires that an individual is a 
signifier. Roughly, 'signifiers' are sources of and creators of meanings, they 
have the power and authority to signify, to be meaningful and significant, and 
to speak authoritatively (Frye 1996: 994). (Irigaray's position draws on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. On both accounts, to be a signifier has a much more 
nuanced meaning than the one I have outlined here. My intention is simply to 
outline Irigaray's very difficult and complex position in as simplified manner as 
possible.) Men (on Irigaray's view) occupy such subject positions as signifiers 
because our social realities are defined in phallogocelltric terms: 
"[I]n the West, thinking and being coincide in such a way as to make 
consciousness coextensive with subjectivity: this is the logocentric trend. It 
also refers, however, to the persistent habit that consist in referring to 
subjectivity as to all other key attributes of the thinking subject in terms of 
masculinity or abstract virility (phallocentrism)." (Braidotti 1998: 299) 
Men (as signifiers) are in a position to create social meanings and to provide 
norms, regulations and rules that everyone must comply with, having the power 
and authority to do so because of the symbolic meanings their bodies are 
endowed with. However, women whose bodies are endowed with very different 
kinds of meanings do not signify because they lack the qualities needed to 
signify (they lack masculine attributes). Insofar as this is the case, women lack 
subjectivity: "any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the 
'masculine' ... Subjectivity [is thus] denied to woman" (Irigaray 1985: 133). 
condition of immanence because they "see the women as dangerous competitors" in 
the labour market (1953: 15). 
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Frye argues that both positions are unsatisfactory for the same reason. 
She claims that both Beauvoir and Irigaray take the view that "the subject! man 
is constituted either logically (Lacan) or through existential struggle (Sartre), by 
opposition with its negation - not-self, not-man, the-absence-of-it ... Both are 
ways of constructing the social/ ontological category of men as the A side of a 
universal exclusive dichotomy: AI not-A" (Frye 1996: 994). She goes on to 
claim that defining women as those who lack masculine qualities (freedom, 
masculine attributes and subjectivity) is highly problematic. Instead of thinking 
about gender relations in terms of two classes where one class is always the 
negation of the other (AI not-A), gender should be understood in terms of two 
self-standing classes men and women respectively constitute: A and B (Frye 
1996: 998). 
Frye claims that the unsatisfying picture of gender classes that relies on 
negation (AI not-A) has come about because feminist theorists have relied on 
set theory to make sense of gender classes. Set theory (in Frye's view) 
determines membership in particular classes in terms of certain necessary and 
sufficient conditions individuals must possess: 
"Each set has a membership of 'individuals', conceived as logically and 
ontologically independent of each other ... These individuals have properties, 
or predicates. Individuals that have all those properties [necessary and 
sufficient for membership in a set] are members; individuals that lack them are 
not members. Each set divides the universe (universal) into separate realms 
(dichotomous), excluding the possibility of any individuals that belong to 
neither or both realms (exclusive)." (Frye 1996: 999)14 
14 Frye often couples properties and predicates together when she is talking about 
certain features individuals' possess. This is, of course. a mistaken use of terminology 
since individuals cannot possess predicates. It seems that Frye has in mind properties 
or features when she uses 'predicate' but confusingly uses the terms 'predicate' and 
'property' interchangeably. In what follows, I take it that Frye means 'property' when 
she uses the term 'predicate' in her text. 
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The idea behind this somewhat perplexing claim seems to be something like 
this: some features are considered to be necessary and sufficient for 
membership in a set where all and only those particulars that possess the 
necessary and sufficient conditions will count as members of that set. For 
example, take the set of water molecules. All and only those entities where an 
oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms that are bound together in the 
appropriate manner are members of this set, satisfying the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being a water molecule. All other entities will fall 
outside this set. In a sense, set theory has divided the world into two: water 
molecules and not-water molecules. 
Frye goes on to elaborate her perplexing thought further: "the universal 
reach, the exhaustiveness (or totality) of the AI not-A sort of category is 
accomplished by what has been called 'the infinitation of the negative'" (1996: 
999). 'The infinitation of the negative' divides the world in the following 
manner: "in AI Not-A dichotomies only one term has positive reality; Not-A is 
only the privation or absence of A ... As John Dewey has written, 'If, say, 
'virtue' be assigned to A as its meaning, then Not-A includes not only vice, but 
triangles, horseraces, symphonies, and the precession of the equinoxes'" (Jay 
1981: 44). Frye illustrates this thought with the help of another example: 
"If, for instance, 'vanilla' is assigned as the A, then not-A includes not only 
strawberry, chocolate, and peppermint ripple but also triangles, the square root 
of two, the orbit of Haley's comet, and all the shoes in the world. All these are 
not vanilla, and as not-vanilla, they are indistinguishable ... So far as the 
category of vanilla is concerned, the category of not-vanilla is an infinite 
undifferentiated plenum, unstructured, formless, a chaos undelineated by any 
internal boundaries '" it [set theory that results in AI not-A type categories] 
does not construct two things." (1996: 999) 
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In more standard metaphysical terms, what Frye has in mind seems to be 
something like this. In order for certain entities to constitute a genuine class (as 
opposed to a merely gerrymandered, miscellaneous and arbitrary set of things) 
these entities must possess certain conditions necessary and sufficient for 
membership in the class. IS So, the entities with two hydrogen atoms and an 
oxygen atom bound together by an appropriate type of bond satisfy the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a water molecule and will be 
members of the genuine class of water molecules. However, the class of entities 
that lack these necessary and sufficient conditions not only includes other kinds 
of molecules, like sodium chloride. but it will also include this pen. that jumper 
and the lamp across the room (to name but a few). That class will include every 
single object that is not a water molecule and insofar as this pen and a sodium 
chloride molecule share the feature of not being water molecules. there is 
nothing to distinguish the two entities from one another. So. the picture Frye is 
painting is this: one of the sets (for instance. the set of water molecules) will 
constitute a genuine class whereas the other set (the set of entities that are not 
water molecules) constitutes a thoroughly gerrymandered and miscellaneous 
coIlection of things. 
Gender classifications that rely on such set theoretical approach (like 
those Frye takes Beauvoir and Irigaray to be committed to) have the 
consequence of defining womanness as that which does not satisfy the 
15 A gerrymandered class is a random collection of particulars. For example. I can 
collect together any random set of objects arbitrarily (like the globe. this cup and that 
football). At the same time. I can classify together all red entities by virtue of their 
colour. This does not seem arbitrary and the set of objects so classified would not be 
entirely random. The red entities, metaphysician commonly hold, would constitute a 
genuine (rather than a gerrymandered) class. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions of man ness. This results in the following 
state of affairs: 
"When woman is defined as not-man. she is cast into the infinite 
undifferentiated plenum. The man/not-man dichotomy makes no distinctions 
on the not-man side. This helps make it so 'natural' to lump women 
indiscriminately with children in 'women and children' and to cast 'nature' 
(which is another name of not-man) as a woman and woman as nature. It also 
connects with the fact that many men can so naturally speak in parallel 
constructions of their cars and their women, and say things like, 'It's my 
house, my wife, and my money, and the government can't tell me what to do 
about any of it'. It also illuminates the fact that women are so easily associated 
with disorder, chaos, irrationality, and impurity. Undifferentiated from the rest 
of not-man, woman is not a category. There are no categories in not-man; it is 
a buzzing blooming confusion. Everything is similar to everything." (Frye 
1996: 1000) 
Frye's point is this (although her empirical claims are rather contentious): if 
womanness is defined as that which does not satisfy the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being a man, it seems that women cannot constitute a 
genuine class or (as Frye puts it) a distinguishable something. Women are 
simply part of a gerrymandered and miscellaneous set that also includes all 
other entities that do not satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
manness (such as cars, children and money). Frye goes on to claim that as long 
as women are defined in relation to men in this fashion feminist theory will 
never be able to liberate women from their social situation as those who are 
subordinated on the basis of their gender. In order to 'liberate' women, the class 
of women must be conceived of in a different way. How this is to be done on 
Frye's view is what I turn to next. 
III 
So, Frye thinks that the class of women should be 'positive' in that it should be 
self-standing and not rely on features women lack. Saying this, she does not 
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want to appeal to any shared or common features: Frye seems to reject gender 
realism although she does not explicitly argue against it. Rather, Frye suggests 
that the class of women will be cashed out in terms of women's differences 
(1996: 998). As mentioned, Frye holds that this needs not entail a set theoretical 
approach to classification since "categories do not have to be constructed by a 
list of predicates and a division of the universe into individuals-with-those-
predicates and everything-else" (Frye 1996: 1000). On the contrary, she offers 
an alternative method: that of positive categories. 
Frye identifies three criteria that are analytically "required to create a 
category" (1996: 1000). I take it that she means this: there are three necessary 
features that classes must possess. First, individual members of a class must be 
related to one another in some way. They "have to become related to each 
other, associated with one another, in some way that distinguishes their 
relations with each other from the infinity of logically possible relations among 
all logically possible entities" (Frye 1996: 1000-1). For instance, individual 
atoms can be related to one another in arguably infinitely many different ways. 
But only when they are related to one another in specific ways, do individual 
atoms constitute molecules. So, two individual hydrogen atoms and an 
individual oxygen atom may be related to other atoms and to each other in 
numerous different ways. But only once the two hydrogen atoms exchange 
electrons with the oxygen atom (and the outer sphere of the atoms, chemists 
say, becomes saturated) do the three atoms form one water molecule. Only after 
the atoms become related to one another in a specific manner does the 
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collection of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom become a water 
molecule (or a distinct something, as Frye would put it). 
Second, these relations that determine collections of entities as distinct 
'somethings' must be structured. Individuals must be related to one another 
through a structure: that is, through "a set of relations" where these relations 
"stand between differentiated individuals" (Frye 1996: 100 O. In the case of the 
water molecule, the individual atoms stand in specific structured relations to 
one another. The chemical bond that exists between the two hydrogen atoms 
and the oxygen atom is that which makes the water molecule distinct from other 
molecules and objects. If the bond did not exist (or if for some reason it existed 
in a different and warped manner), the three atoms would not form a water 
molecule. Frye elaborates on this thought with two examples. She claims 
(firstly) that "what makes an amoeba an amoeba is not that all the molecules 
involved in it ... share some set of attributes; it is how they are organized" 
(Frye 1996: 1001). Her idea seems to be the same as my example of the water 
molecule: unless the constituent parts of the amoeba are organized and 
structured in some peculiar way, they do not constitute an amoeba. A further 
example Frye provides is of a club for people with red hair: "what makes the 
Redheads' Club a club is not that all the individuals who are members of it have 
red hair, or that they have identical experience, though hair colour and 
experience are salient; it is that individuals are involved, in various ways, in a 
structure" (1996: 1001). 
Finally, the structure through which individuals are related to one 
another must be internally complex. This is because any viable and useful 
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"structure requires that the things structured are not all alike. At a logical 
minimum, they differ in their relations to each other (e.g., one is to the left of 
another, but the second is to the right of the first); but organic and social entities 
require differentiation on many vectors" (Frye 1996: 1001). The example Frye 
gives is that of a cat: u a cat must have some cells that are skin cells and some 
that are blood cells" (1996: 1001). Only such internal complexity guarantees 
that a cat is a cat. In a similar sense, social classes must be internally diverse 
and various. Consider the club of redheads. If all the members of this club had 
exactly the same attributes, experiences and features they would not form a 
genuine club. On Frye's view, sameness of attributes, experiences and features 
is not what makes a social whole that which it is (a particular kind of social 
whole or class). Rather, U a real category ... has internal complexity and, hence, 
requires variation among its elements" (Frye 1996: 1001). So, the redheads' 
club requires that the individual members of this club differ from one another 
perhaps by coming from different backgrounds, having different features and 
attributes as well as having different kinds of experiences as redheaded. 
The three criteria mentioned (relations, structure and diversity) provide 
a way to make sense of distinct and self-standing classes that are, nevertheless, 
internally complex. Frye claims that this is what positive self-standing classes 
require. A positive category is u a plurality with internal structure whose 
elements are differentiated and differentiable and are in a significant variety of 
relations with each other, and that is, by virtue of this structure, coalesced as a 
distinguishable 'something'" (Frye 1996: 1002). And it is in this way that the 
class of women should be understood: women must be related to one another in 
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some structured way where this structure must be internally diverse thereby 
incorporating women's diverse and dissimilar features and experiences. 
How such a class of women is in actual fact constructed is not entirely 
clear. Frye claims: "the political strategy suggested by this categorical logic is 
that of actively and socially constructing a concrete and historically real 
positive category of women - deliberately, creatively elaborating and 
articulating the differences among women in, by and as a means to constructing 
a sociality ... a web of meanings of and among women" (1996: 1002). She goes 
on to claim that this manner of accounting for gender classification is not new. 
Rather, it "has been in practice ... in advance of its being understood" through 
certain practices women have been engaged in (Frye 1996: 1006). Frye lists 
such practices: 
"I am thinking here of innumerable projects such as the women's music and 
arts festivals, the deliberate and the precipitate evolutions of the National 
Women's Studies Association in the United States, women's creative writing 
groups, and the interactive communities of authors, editors, and audiences of 
feminist publications and the collectives of women engaged in their production 
and circulation. Women's bookstores, and the international women's book 
fairs, are other sites of such practices. 1 refer also to caucuses, collectives, 
projects, conferences, and gatherings of women who share certain distinctions 
of race, ability, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, nationality, politics, citizenship 
status, and/or interests in arts, sport, adventure, entertainment, scholarship, 
technology, and so on." (1996: 1006) 
What is significant about these practices (in Frye's view) is that if such 
practices are engaged in for any length of time, women will become 
"profoundly involved .,. in articulating, elaborating, appreciating, defining, 
exploring, recognizing, negotiating, consolidating, and travelling differences 
among women ... If women were going to be together in women-focused, 
women-defined, and women-defining spaces and enterprises, women Were 
going to engage in many varieties of what might be called 'the practice of 
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differences'" (Frye 1996: 1007). The idea seems to be something like this: 
engaging in the kinds of practices Frye outlines will elaborate, show and 
illustrate that women differ from one another. Women will come to incorporate 
different experiences, features and attributes into their notion of womanness and 
what it is to be a woman. Recognising that they differ from one another 
supposedly changes the way in which women think about themselves as women 
and they will come to view woman ness in terms of features not shared by all 
women (rather than concentrating on the features that are shared). This 
significantly (in Frye's view) shapes women's identities, senses of selves and 
self-understandings as women. The reason for this is that, Frye claims, being 
involved in a class such as that of women (supposedly by engaging in the kinds 
of practices Frye outlines) is "self-constructing" for the individual members 
(1996: 1004-5). Being involved in the kinds of practices through which the 
class of women is constructed has the consequence of shaping the participants 
identities qua members of that class. Furthermore, since the class itself is 
internally diverse, the identities women come to have qua women will also 
differ from one woman to another (Frye 1996: 1005).16 
Frye acknowledges that many feminists will disagree with her proposal. 
This is not, however, because they might disagree with the details of how to 
classify women qua women. Rather, Frye anticipates that many will find her 
proposal objectionable because they agree with feminists like Spelman and 
16 It is worth pointing out that it is unclear why individuals get involved in the kinds of 
practices Frye outlines; Frye does not address this issue. It is clear, however, that a 
shared identity does not bring individual women together and that class formation does 
not require that individuals who are engaged in the same or similar practices identify 
with one another. This is because Frye takes affinities and identities to follow from 
class membership and not vice versa. 
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Butler endorsing gender scepticism. Firstly, Frye responds to those feminists 
who think that making sense of the class of women may (or will) have 
politically insidious consequences (e.g., Butler 1999). She claims that this 
worry "rest on the assumption that such a category [of women] can be 
constructed only by stipulating a set of attributes shared by all and only the 
members of the category" (Frye 1996: 1002). But (she continues) as her 
alternative is not committed to any necessary and sufficient conditions of 
womanness her proposal is not politically insidious in this manner. 
Secondly, Frye responds to those feminists who worry about 'white 
solipsism' (the view that feminism is done from a 'white perspective' where 
racial and cultural differences go unnoticed). If (Frye acknowledges) her 
position were guilty of 'white solipsism' it 
"would require of its participants either that they leave race and culture behind 
as outside of significance or that they assimilate to the unacknowledged 
racedness and culturedness of the category ... If this were so, I would agree 
that the construction would he a disaster." (Frye 1996: 1003) 
But because her position does not rely on some attributes and features that are 
necessary for being a woman, Frye claims her position does not require that 
women must leave their particularity behind: "if the category of women is 
constructed as a positive self-supporting category ... the identity or subjectivity 
associated with it has no built-in exclusivity or closure against other identity 
categories, no analytically build-in hostility to multiple category memberships 
and subjectivities" (1996: 1004). 
Finally, Frye considers whether her account "entails the construction of 
a unitary female or women's subjectivity" (1996: 1005). This seems to denote 
two separate issues. First, whether women as members of the same class end up 
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having a subjectivity, an identity or a psychological orientation in common. 
Frye goes on to claim her view does not entail this because it requires that alJ 
individuals classified as women differ from one another. Second, it might be 
claimed that Frye's position does not allow for individual women's senses of 
woman ness to change over time and that in this sense she is offering a unitary 
view of female subjectivity. Frye maintains that her view does not entail this: 
individual women's subjectivities and identities change over time through 
associating and interacting with different kinds of women. There is no stable 
and unchanging sense of gender individual women experience qua individual 
women. To elaborate, Frye considers colour: 
"My metaphoric image here is that of colored objects. Any colored object 
takes on a different hue, intensity, and brightness (value) depending on the 
colors surrounding it. It is bluer next to yellow or orange, or grayer next to 
brighter colors, and so on. Without some kind of contextual framing that gives 
particular salience to one set of relations, no one of the-colors-it-is has any 
claim to be the-color-it-is. If what-I-am ... is constantly being coconstructed 
with and in relation to different others, there is no single absolute what-I-am." 
(1996: 1005) 
The reason many feminists have abandoned the class of women (thinking that 
this is the only way to secure multiplicity and plurality), Frye claims, is because 
they have relied on the set theoretical approach to classification. But, Frye's 
position does not rely on such a view and, due to this, particularity (within the 
remits of Frye's position) does not foreclose classification. In fact, diversity is a 
prerequisite for gender classification. 
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IV 
I find Frye's suggestion that feminist philosophers can make sense of the class 
of women without appealing to some necessary and sufficient conditions of 
womanness plausible and correct. It seems that different ways of classifying 
women qua women are available and that not all plausible alternatives rely on 
necessary and sufficient conditions. (Indeed this is what I go on to argue in 
more detail in chapter 6.) I also find Frye's thought that a genuine class of 
women must be internally diverse very appealing. Nevertheless, Frye's case for 
(what she calls) a positive category of women seems to me less persuasive. 
Apart from being perplexing and at times opaque, Frye's position is implausible 
for two reasons. First, as an account of gender classification her proposal is 
inadequate failing to classify all and only women. Second, Frye's proposal is 
counterintuitive in that it seems to explain shared attributes in terms of class 
membership. 
Criteria for class membership 
Frye claims that bringing the class of women "into concrete social reality" is "a 
constantly troubled and contentious process and is not the sort of process that 
reaches a final conclusion, much less a conclusion characterized by unity, 
thoroughgoing consistence, or homogeneity" (Frye 1996: 1008). This seems 
correct. If gender classification were an uncontroversial and uncontentious 
process, (I would presume) feminist philosophers would not be as troubled by it 
as they currently are. But what is problematic about Frye's suggested method of 
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bringing gender classes into 'concrete social reality' (whatever this means) is 
the criterion for membership in such classes. Class membership (on Frye's 
view) is delimited by one's engagement in certain practices. Nonetheless, it 
seems that this criterion may not capture all those individuals we think of as 
women and it may capture some individuals counter-intuitively as women. 
Insofar as this is the case, the practices Frye outlines are problematic. 
On Frye's view, women stand in certain relations to one another 
partaking in certain practices that structure women together. Frye claims such 
practices are: 
"innumerable projects such as the women's music and arts festivals, the 
deliberate and the precipitate evolutions of the National Women's Studies 
Association in the United States, women's creative writing groups, and the 
interactive communities of authors, editors, and audiences of feminist 
publications and the collectives of women engaged in their production and 
circulation. Women's bookstores, and the international women's book fairs, 
are other sites of such practices. I refer also to caucuses, collectives, projects, 
conferences, and gatherings of women who share certain distinctions of race, 
ability, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, nationality. politics, citizenship status, 
and/or interests in arts, sport, adventure. entertainment, scholarship, 
technology, and so on." (1996: 1006) 
The idea seems clear enough. When women come together and participate in 
these practices, they stand in certain relations to one another and a discrete 
structure starts to form. This discrete structure then develops into what Frye 
calls a positive category (or what metaphysicians more standardly would call a 
genuine class). 
But it seems that not all women partake in various women's 
movements, women's groups, events organised for women or in conferences 
and gatherings of women. Accounting for the class of women on the basis of 
the practices and gatherings Frye has in mind may leave out vast numbers of 
women who do not engage in the kinds of practices she mentions. It seems that 
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on Frye's views those individuals would not be classified as women if indeed 
the class of women develops from the practices Frye outlines. And this seems 
problematic: surely women who never in their lifetimes engage in the practices 
Frye lists should be classified as women? For instance, consider the Queen. It 
seems unlikely that she regularly participates in women's bookfairs, 
consciousness-raising groups for women, in women's creative writing 
collectives or other such gatherings. Insofar as this is the case, should we not 
think of the Queen as a member of the class of women? On Frye's criterion this 
seems to follow but (I suspect) few would be willing to accept this. 
Moreover, it seems that this criterion may pick out individuals counter-
intuitively as women. Imagine Ted who is male and calls himself 'a man'. Ted 
works for a publishing company that exclusively publishes women authors. One 
of the publishing company's aims is to encourage women to write and in order 
to do this, the publishing company regularly organises various women's 
creative writing groups, workshops and conferences. Suppose that it is Ted's 
job to organise such events and Ted partakes in all the workshops and creative 
writing groups the publishing company organises. Ted partakes in the kinds of 
practices through which membership in the class of women is delimited. Does 
this mean that Ted is or should be a member of the class of women? It seems 
that on Frye's criterion the answer is: yes. But simply partaking in these 
practices does not seem to be sufficient to justify Ted's membership in the class 
of women and this suggests to me that Frye's criterion is implausible. 
To avoid this problem one option would be to rethink the criteria for 
class membership. Frye could include other practices associated with women to 
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her list of practices through which women are related to one another. For 
instance, she could insist that cooking, cleaning, shopping, nurturing, ironing 
and other domestic tasks would count as practices through which women form 
a genuine class. Maybe then we could say that those individuals who stand in 
certain relations to one another by virtue of participating in these typically 
female practices, constitute a structure through which the class of women can 
be made sense of. 
But, this modification does not render Frye's view unproblematic. It 
seems that some individuals may still counter-intuitively count as women and 
some individuals may still counter-intuitively be excluded from the class of 
women. Again, consider the Queen. It is rather unlikely that the Queen does her 
own dusting, cleaning, cooking and ironing given that she has an army of 
servants to do these tasks for her. But to claim that the Queen does not (or 
should not) be classified as a woman because it is unlikely that she engages in 
domestic tasks traditionally associated with women, does not seem sufficient to 
justify leaving the Queen outside the class of women. Intuitively the Queen 
should be a member of this class whether or not she partakes in practices 
women are associated with. 
By contrast, consider John who is male and calls himself 'a man'. As it 
turns out, John likes to live in a clean and organised household. He also likes to 
cook and he likes his clothes to be ironed. In order to maintain such a 
household, John spends much of his time engaging in tasks like cleaning, 
ironing and cooking. In fact, John engages in most domestic tasks that an 
average housewife engages in. Imagine further that John is a single parent and 
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engages in many nurturing tasks and practices in bringing up his child. He 
partakes in many activities and practices where most (if not all) other 
participants are women such as baby-parent playgroups. If we take this 
extended list I have proposed as that by virtue of which individuals become 
related to one another and that delimits membership in the class of women, it 
seems that John will be classified as a woman. He will be related to other 
individuals in certain fashion (relevant for woman ness) as he is engaged in 
many of the practices constitutive of the class of women. But it seems hugely 
counter-intuitive to classify John as a woman based on this criterion. That he 
partakes in many practices commonly associated with women does not seem to 
sufficiently justify the claim that John should be classified as a woman. 
Shared attributes and class membership 
The above cases point to this: the practices that supposedly ground the class of 
women are hugely difficult to articulate. It seems extremely difficult to discern 
some set of practices that capture all and only women at the same time 
excluding individuals like Ted and John. Setting this worry aside I wish to 
discuss another problem with Frye's position. Frye appears to assume that 
membership in the class of women determines or conditions shared attributes 
and features (and not vice versa). Consider Frye's example of the Redheads' 
Club. She claims that what makes this club a club is that the individual 
members become involved with one another despite their particular difference. 
They may come from different religions, cultures or just living areas, thus 
making the group of redheads internally diverse. Sure enough, this may qualify 
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calling something a club. But calling it a Redheads' club is going to require 
something different. In order to say why this club is a Redheads' club, the most 
obvious answer is that the individual members of the club share something: 
they all have red hair and this has brought them together. 
Now, Frye's discussion of women suggests something different. She 
seems to think that attributions of womanness result from belonging to a 
structured collection of individuals and only after women come together to 
engage and partake in certain practices and activities, are they classified as 
women. But this is counterintuitive. Consider the redheads' club on this picture. 
Following Frye, the suggestion would be that because individuals have joined 
this club, they come to have red hair. This is clearly false and the situation 
seems to be precisely the opposite. Consider another example. Imagine an 
individual called Mary who is very active in various women's groups and 
collectives. She regularly attends feminist meetings and helps to organise 
events such as women's bookfairs and gender empowerment workshops. Mary 
is precisely the kind of individual Frye's structure would pick out and she 
would be classified as a woman on Frye's view. 
Imagine further that Mary is visually impaired and has a guide-dog 
called Barney. Barney goes everywhere Mary goes including her women's 
group meetings and other feminist gatherings. But, following Frye's 
classificatory method it seems that Barney the guide-dog would also be picked 
out as a member of the class of women. Barney can be said to partake in 
numerous gatherings of women such as women's groups, women's bookfairs 
and gender empowerment workshops. Admittedly Barney is not a very active 
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participant in these practices but arguably this shouldn't matter. As long as 
Barney partakes in such activities, Barney is structured with relation to the 
other participants and seems to count as a woman on Frye's proposal. But this 
seems almost laughable - surely the class of women should not include guide-
dogs on any membership criterion! The example of Barney suggests that Frye's 
method is unsatisfactory regardless of the details of her account (such as which 
practices contribute to individuals' becoming structured in ways that make 
them members of the class of women). Regardless of how engaged Barney 
were in practices that structure the class of women it still seems counter-
intuitive to hold that Barney, as a result, would be a member of that class. I7 
Moreover, it seems that the situation is reversed: women engage in 
certain shared practices because as members of the same class they have 
something in common that gives them a reason to engage in these practices 
(and not vice versa). It seems counterintuitive to hold that by virtue of engaging 
in certain practices and events one suddenly finds oneself as a member of a 
specific class. As if those who attend the redheads' club suddenly find 
themselves as members of the class of redheaded people. Engaging in the kinds 
of practices Frye outlines depends on certain affinities or shared attributes 
17 One might claim that Barney could not be a member of the class of women because 
Barney seems to be thoroughly unable to develop an identity as a woman (or, at the 
very least, we could never know whether Barney has developed such an identity). But 
this does not matter for class formation. What classes (or, as Frye calls them, 
categories) require is that individuals become involved with one another through 
certain category building practices. Having an identity as a member of a class and 
identifying with other members of the class (Frye thinks) will follow from class 
membership: identifying oneself as a woman is not required for membership in the 
class of women. So, even though Barney (it seems) will never think of itself as a 
woman, this does not foreclose the possibility that Barney could be a member of the 
class of women on Frye's view. 
78 
amongst those who engage in them, not the other way round. Women come 
together and partake in the kinds of practices Frye mentioned because they are 
women, not vice versa. 
v 
I have argued that classifying women in the manner Frye suggests is 
inadequate. First and foremost, Frye's method may not pick out all and only 
women. Second, Frye's position curiously seems to suggest that if one engages 
in certain practices and structures that pick out the class of women, one will 
count as a woman. But, as I argued, this would allow us to classify Barney the 
dog as a woman. These reasons, it seems to me, are enough to warrant the 
rejection of Frye's proposal. 
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CHAPTER 3 
YOUNG, SERIAL COLLECTIVITY AND WOMEN 
I 
In her paper "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social 
Collective", Iris Marion Young (1997) sets out to successfully respond to the 
problem that has "cast doubt on the project of conceptualising women as a 
group" (Young 1997: 12). This problem is by now a familiar one. It seem that 
women do not have any single feature (or set of features) in common that 
grounds membership in the class of women. And yet, feminist politics seems to 
require that membership in this class can be made sense of. As Young puts it, 
unless there is "some sense in which 'woman' is the name of a social collective 
[feminism represents], there is nothing specific to feminist politics" (1997: 13). 
Young goes on to suggest a way to settle this dilemma: she proposes that the 
class of women should be understood as a serial collective drawing this notion 
from Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of social classes. On Young's view, women 
have no shared features that justify classification. Rather, women's practico-
inert realities (very roughly, the ways in which their lives and actions are 
organised) ground gender classification. Young suggests that her view "allows 
us to see [women] as a collective without identifying common attributes that all 
women have or implying that all women have a common identity" (1997: 13). 
In what follows, I will argue against Young's proposal. I begin by 
mapping out some background to her view (section II). In section III, I will 
outline Sartre's notion of serial collectivity in detail. Next I go on to outline 
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Young proposal that this notion allows feminist philosophers to classify women 
without making claims about shared features (section IV). Finally, I argue that 
Young's proposal should not be endorsed (in section V). As I will show, she 
does not provide a plausible criterion for classifying women into a single class. 
II 
How are feminists to make sense of gender classes following Young? She 
suggests that this requires a pragmatic orientation to classification: 
"We should take a more pragmatic orientation to our intellectual discourse. By 
being 'pragmatic' I mean categorizing, explaining, developing accounts and 
arguments that are tied to specific practical and political problems, where the 
purpose of this theoretical activity is clearly related to those problems." 
(Young 1997: 16-17) 
The specific political and practical problem feminist philosophers like Young 
aim to respond to, is this: to prevent feminist theory from evaporating and 
becoming politically ineffective by offering a way to make sense of gender 
classes. Young singles out two recent feminist proposals for doing this: firstly, 
"the attempt to theorize gender identity as multiple" and secondly, "the 
argument that women constitute a group only in the politicised context of 
feminist struggle" (Young 1997: IS). She goes on to argue that both of these 
proposals fail, suggesting that her own position provides a more plausible 
alternative. 
Spelman (1990) endorses the former, so-called, 'multiple genders 
approach'. Instead of assuming that there is a single class of women that all 
women are members of, women's particularity suggests (to Spelman) that 
particular kinds of women form different gender classes depending on their 
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social, cultural and economic backgrounds. There is no single class of women; 
rather, there are numerous different classes. These include the class of black 
women, the class of working-class women, the class of lesbian women, the 
class of black lesbian women, the class of Jewish women and the class of 
working-class Jewish women (to name but a few). In Young's view, Spelman's 
approach has two significant advantages. First and foremost, it highlights the 
fact that not all women are equally oppressed. By and large, those who are 
members of the class of white women are more privileged than those who are 
members of the class of Black women. In doing so, this kind of position does 
not commit one to the seemingly false and unlikely view that all women are 
equally disadvantaged as women. Spelman's position (Young claims) also 
highlights the fact that in order to properly understand what gender is and how 
it affects our lives, race and class identities cannot be ignored. 
Despite these benefits, Young finds certain aspects of Spelman's 
position objectionable. For instance, Spelman assumes "a stability and unity to 
the categories of race, class, religion, ethnicity, [and so on]" (Young 1997: 20). 
She simply seems to think that all black women share something qua black 
women, all Jewish women share something qua Jewish women, all black 
lesbian women share something qua black lesbian women and so on. Elsewhere 
(and independently of Young) Vma Narayan (1998) has argued against views 
that assume racial and cultural categories are homogenous. Narayan argues: 
"The project of attending to differences among women across a variety of 
national and cultural contexts then becomes a project that endorses and 
replicates problematic and colonialist assumptions about the cultural 
differences between 'Western culture' and 'Non-Western cultures' and the 
women who inhabit them. Seemingly universal essentialist generalisations 
about 'all women' are replaced by culture-specific essentialist generalizations 
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that depend on totalising categories such as 'Western culture', 'Non-western 
cultures', 'Western women', 'Third World women' and so forth." (Narayan 
1998: 87) 
It simply is false to think that all women from a particular race, religion or 
culture share something qua women from that particular race, religion or 
culture. After all, particular racial, cultural or religious groups are themselves 
internally diverse. 
Young goes on to claim that subsequently "[Spelman's] strategy can 
generate an infinite regress that dissolves groups into individuals" (1997: 20). 
Just like Narayan, Young rejects the idea that there is a specific Western 
women's gender identity or a specific Jewish women's gender identity: "why 
claim that black women, for example, have a distinct and unified gender 
identity? Black women are American, Haitian, Jamaican, African, Northern, 
Southern, poor, working class, lesbian, or old" (1997: 20). Take Condoleezza 
Rice and the Sudanese refugee. Prima facie they differ greatly from one another 
and it seems hard to point out what they share qua black women (apart from 
having similar skin tones). According to Young, the upshot of this is that 
Spelman's view dissolves groups into individuals and (following Spelman) 
feminist theorists can legitimately only talk of individual women and their 
individual experiences: after all, if there is no single feature all black lesbian 
women share qua black lesbian women, it is not legitimate for feminist theorists 
to make generalisations about this particular group of women. They can only 
talk of traits possessed and experiences encountered by individual black lesbian 
women. Spelman herself does not recognise that her position might have the 
consequence of dissolving groups into individuals. But, Young goes on to claim 
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that insofar as it does, Spelman's approach "does not resolve the dilemma I 
have posed" (Young 1997: 20). 
Insofar as we accept Young's conclusion that Spelman's views mean 
feminist theorists can only legitimately speak of individuals, her critique is 
justified and well placed. Nevertheless, Young's conclusion, that due to this 
Spelman's position cannot provide a framework for understanding the class of 
women, is somewhat less justified. It seems to me that although Spelman's 
position appears to have the consequence of dissolving groups into individuals, 
it seems unjustified to claim that a problem with Spelman's position is that it 
fails to classify women together. This is because Spelman is not trying to make 
sense of a single class of women. Rather, Spelman is trying to argue for 
precisely the opposite view: that there is no such class since women do not 
share anything that makes them women. As this is the case, it seems rather 
unsurprising that Spelman fails to unify the class of women: she is not aiming 
to do this. 
The second alternative Young discusses, that (according to her) aims to 
classify women qua women, holds that there is "an identity 'woman' that unites 
subjects into a group [where this identity] is not a natural or social given, but 
rather the fluid construct of a political movement, feminism" (1997: 20). This 
rather enigmatic thought is further elaborated: "feminist politics itself creates an 
identity 'woman' out of a coalition of diverse female persons dispersed across 
the world" (Young 1997: 20). Young attributes such a view to Diana Fuss 
(1989). Fuss has proposed (roughly) that the class of women arises out of 
certain social positions individuals take up with respect to feminist political 
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goals. She contrasts her own proposal (which will become clearer shortly) with 
a suggestion put forward by Donna Haraway who claims that a distinct sense of 
feminist politics arises from certain affinities women have towards each other 
(Haraway 1985). These affinities then give rise to political coalitions and a 
distinct feminist politics. Now, Fuss writes, 
"[w]hereas Haraway posits a coalition of women as the basis of a possible 
feminist socialist politics, I see politics as the basis of a possible coalition of 
women. For Haraway. it is affinity which grounds politics; for me. it is politics 
which grounds affinity ... [Political c]oalition precedes class and determines 
its limits and boundaries; we cannot identify a group of women until various 
social. historical. political coalitions construct the conditions and possibilities 
for membership." (Fuss 1989: 36) 
Fuss' idea seems to be something like this: instead of thinking that a distinctly 
feminist politics arises out of some unified class of women, the situation is 
reversed. Feminist politics enables the formation of certain political affinities 
that in tum give rise to a unified class of women. Presumably this takes place 
since women are organised around and aim to fight for the same political goal. 
Such a position (Young claims) encounters two problems. Firstly, 
Butler's normativity problem (discussed in chapter 1) may not be avoided. 
Regardless of whether a shared identity is a product of feminist politics or that 
which grounds feminist politics, such identities (Butler claims) are prescriptive 
and exclusionary: they create norms that dictate what women should be like. 
Those women who fail to satisfy the norms (or, as Butler would say, fail to 
cohere with them) will effectively be ostracised or excluded from the scope of 
womanness and alienated from feminist politics. As all exclusionary 
consequences of this kind are problematic and harmful any position that seems 
to entail them should be rejected (Butler 1999). 
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The second problem with Fuss' position (according to Young) is with 
the thought that the class of women arises from feminist politics: "Some 
women just choose to come together in a political movement and form 
themselves as a group of mutually identifying agents. But On the basis of what 
do they come together? What are the social conditions that have motivated the 
politics? ... [Moreover] do feminist politics not refer to women who do not 
identify as feminists?" (Young 1997: 21). Young's thought is that feminist 
politics cannot ground the class of women. This is because those women who 
are not members of feminist political coalitions are left outside of the class and 
ignored. By contrast, feminist politics should address all women, even those 
who are not explicitly feminist, who do not identify themselves as feminists and 
who do not partake in feminist political coalitions. Insofar as Fuss' position 
seems to ignore those women, it should be rejected. 
III 
As a response to these positions outlined, Young suggests that the way to make 
sense of the class of women is by means of seriality proposed by Jean-Paul 
Sartre in his Critique of Dialectical Reason (1976). According to Young, "we 
[should] understand gender as referring to a social series, a specific kind of 
social collectivity that Sartre distinguishes from groups" (1997: 22). This way 
of thinking about gender does not "requir[e] that all women have commOn 
attributes or a common situation" that grounds classification (Young 1997: 22). 
A crucial aspect of Sartre's (and Young's) position is the distinction between 
groups and series. The idea is that women constitute the latter (a series) but not 
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the fonner (a group). Group membership requires that individual members 
share some experiences, traits or features and that they, as a result, have a 
particular identity as members of a group in common. Such an identity (for 
Young) expresses a "self-ascription as belonging to a group with others who 
similarly identify, who affinn together or are committed together to a set of 
values, practices, meanings, and so on" (Young 1997: 33). Young seems to 
think that previous feminist efforts to classify women encountered precisely the 
problems they did because they attempted to make sense of the class of women 
as a group with common features, attributes or experiences that give rise to a 
common sense of gender. Insofar as no such common sense of gender exists, it 
seems that any account of gender that appeals to such an identity is going to be 
unsatisfactory. Young further argues that if the class of women is understood as 
a series, many problems previous feminist proposals encountered will be 
avoided. This is because series membership does not require that there are some 
shared features, attributes or experiences amongst individual members of a 
series. (It is worth pointing out that many feminist attempts to classify women 
do not rely on shared features or experiences that supposedly give rise to a 
distinct sense of womanness shared by all women. Young seems to think that 
the only ways in which feminists can make sense of the class of women are 
either in tenns of groups - with a shared sense of gender - or in terms of series. 
She is, of course, wrong in thinking that these are the only possible alternatives. 
This will become clearer still during the course of this thesis.) 
Consider the distinction between groups and series that Young endorses 
more closely. According to Sartre, there are a number of different kinds of 
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collections of individuals, some of which are groups and others that are series. 
(On Sartre's view, other kinds of collections exist apart from these two. 
However, Young notes "for the purposes of addressing the problem of thinking 
about women as a social collective, the important distinction is between a group 
and a series" [Young 1997: 23]. Her reasons for thinking this are, nevertheless, 
unclear.) Sartrean groups have four features: (i) they are collections "of persons 
that recognize themselves and one another as in a unified relation with one 
another", (ii) group members "mutually acknowledge that together they 
undertake a common project", (iii) they are "united by action that they 
undertake together" and (iv) "in acknowledging himself or herself as a member 
of the group, an individual acknowledges himself or herself as oriented towards 
the same goals as the others" (Young 1997: 23). Philosophy lecturers employed 
by the University of Sheffield seem to constitute a group on this description. 
They recognise themselves and other faculty members as being in a unified 
relation with one another (being members of the same department). They seem 
to acknowledge that they undertake a common project (educating students 
about philosophy and discovering truths). Philosophy lecturers seem to be 
united by action: they teach, conduct research and engage in administrative 
tasks. Finally, it seems that members of the Sheffield philosophy department 
acknowledge that their actions are oriented towards the same goal of educating 
students about philosophy and discovering truths. 
A series, then again, importantly lacks the feature of being unified by 
common goals and pursuits. Rather, it is 
"a social collective whose members are unified passively by the objects their 
actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results of the material 
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effects of the actions of the others ... The unity of the series derives from the 
way that individuals pursue their own individual ends in respect to the same 
objects conditioned by a continuous material environment, in response to 
structures that have been created by the unintended collective result of past 
actions." (Young 1997: 23-4) 
Individual members of a series do not aim to accomplish any shared goals. 
They pursue their own individual goals and aims. In doing so, individuals 
unwittingly constitute a series as the "objects and practices through which they 
aim to accomplish their individual purposes" are (in a sense) similar (Young 
1997: 24). They, nevertheless, lack a shared group identity since they do not 
mutually acknowledge having goals and aims in common. 
It is not clear why Young thinks that an appeal to certain objects (that 
individual action is oriented around and towards) provides a plausible way to 
understand social classes. Why should we think that a view of social collectives 
that are organised around everyday objects is plausible (and should be 
endorsed)? Young does not address these questions. Sartre's existentialist 
philosophy may provide some motivation for this view of social classes. Sartre 
claims that human freedom depends on being able to act and perform actions of 
certain kinds (Sartre 1958). Recall de Beauvoir's feminist appropriation of 
Sartre's existentialism discussed in the previous chapter. She claimed that 
women are not fully fledged human subjects because they are unable to perform 
certain kinds of actions: women are unable to formulate their own ends and 
goals, determine their own destinies and pursue projects they have set for 
themselves. Women are confined to a life of repetition of mundane tasks 
through which they cannot realise their human potential whereas men (by and 
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large) are free to set and pursue their own individual goals and be the authors of 
their own destinies. 
Sartre not only thinks that human action is a prerequisite for freedom 
but he also acknowledges that different kinds of actions exist. For example, 
there is action that is organised around shared goals and aims (like the storming 
of the Bastille) and there is action that is organised around everyday life, habit 
and routine (like doing one's weekly shopping). In both cases, certain objects 
bring the individuals together to form collectives. Those storming the Bastille 
are brought together by Bastille. Those doing their weekly shopping in (for 
example) Sheffield's largest Tesco are brought together by the Tesco store they 
shop in. These collections of people (those storming the Bastille and those 
doing their weekJy shopping in Tesco) differ because the objects around which 
people's actions are organised differ. These collectives also differ from one 
another because in the former case the object around which the collective is 
formed (the Bastille) provides the members of the collective with a shared goal: 
storming the Bastille. 
However, some classes (like the working class) are not organised 
around shared goals and aims. The objects around which the working class 
forms do not provide an impetus to pursue shared goal. And yet, it seems that 
working class people constitute a social collective of some kind. This suggests 
to Sartre (paraphrased by Young) that "most of the time what it means to be a 
member of the working class or the capitalist class is to live in series [where 
action is organised around everyday habit and routine] with others in that class 
through a complex, interlocking set of objects, structures, and practices in 
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relation to work, exchange, and consumption" (Young 1997: 26). In a similar 
way, it seems that women do not have some specific goals and aims in 
common. And yet, women appear to constitute a social collective in some 
sense. This suggests (to Young) that women constitute a social class in a similar 
way to working class people. Women's lives are unified together on the level of 
similar everyday habits and routine, not on the level of shared goals and action. 
(I will discuss Young's application of seriality to gender in the next section.) 
In order to illustrate his view, Sartre describes people waiting for a bus 
as an example of a series: 
"[People waiting for a bus] are a collective, insofar as they minimally relate to 
one another and follow the rules of bus waiting. As a collective they are 
brought together by their relations to a material object, the bus, and the social 
practice of public transportation. Their actions and goals may be different: they 
have nothing necessarily in common in their histories, experiences, or identity. 
They are united only by their desire to ride on that route." (Young 1997: 24) 
The people waiting for a bus constitute a series insofar as their action (of 
waiting for a bus) is organised around the same object (the bus) and around the 
same practice (public transportation). The people waiting for a bus do not aim 
to accomplish any shared goals. They simply want to ride on the bus in order to 
accomplish their individual goals. Some have the goal of getting to work, some 
of running errands or going shopping, others may simply like the scenery from 
the bus window and ride for pleasure. 
Objects, like the bus around which the series of people at the bus stop is 
organised, are practico-inert: "Ca] series is structured by actions linked to 
practico-inert objects. Social objects and their effects are the results of human 
action, they are practical. But as material they also constitute constraints on and 
resistance to action, which make them experienced as inert" (Young 1997: 25). 
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Young is not particularly clear in her characterisation of practico-inert objects 
and it seems she uses 'inert' in a rather odd fashion here. The idea seems to be 
something like this: in our everyday lives human action is constantly 
constrained by material objects and their effects. For instance, if the bus fails to 
come, this constrains the actions of the people at the bus stop. They are unable 
to get to work, run their errands and so on. Such practico-inert objects are 
everywhere: "all of the products of human decision and action, daily used by 
and dwelt in by people, the streets and buildings are inert" (Young 1997: 25). It 
seems that what Young (drawing on Sartre) has in mind is that everyday 
common objects prevent human agents from performing certain actions and 
obstruct human action. Insofar as they do so, such objects are practico-inert. (It 
seems that most, if not all, material objects fit this description. As a result, it is 
unclear whether there is a difference between objects in general and practico-
inert objects in particular.) 
Apart from certain kinds of objects, it seems that other people and 
actions of other people also contribute to our practico-inert realities (although, 
of course. human agents are not usually thought of as inert): 
"A market [place] is paradigmatic of such structured relations of alienation and 
anonymity [that constitute practico-inert realities and] that are felt as 
constraints on everyone. I take my com to market in hopes of getting a good 
price. knowing that some people are trading on its price in a future market. and 
that other farmers bring their com as well. We know that by bringing our large 
quantity of com we contribute to a fall in its price. and we might each play the 
futures market ourselves. But we are all equally as individuals unable to alter 
the collective results of these individual choices. choices which themselves 
have been made partly because of out expectations of what is happening to 
market prices." (Young 1997: 25-6) 
Young's thought is that the practico-inert realities of someone selling their com 
at the market place are not merely determined by practico-inert objects like 
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com: they are also detennined by other traders of com and those buying the 
com at the market place. 
It is then in response to such practico-inert realities (material objects and 
actions of other people) that individuals constitute series. Those who are faced 
with the same or similar practico-inert realities constitute a particular series 
(like the people at the bus stop or com sellers at the market place). Being a 
member of a series, in a sense defines an individual: "one 'is' a fanner, or a 
commuter, or a radio listener, and so on, together in series with others similarly 
positioned" (Young 1997: 26). But this identification is of very different kind 
from that experienced by members of groups. To say 'I am a fanner' does not 
describe one's identity as a farmer that one has in common with other farmers. 
Rather, saying 'I am a farmer' tells us something "about the material conditions 
of one's life" (Young 1997: 26). It indicates membership in a series of farmers 
that describes the social position, situation and the material conditions of my 
life. It indicates that I organise and orient my actions around and towards 
certain material conditions of farming (such as cultivating land, producing 
edible goods and employing particular kinds of machines in order to do so). In 
order to be a member of a series (like the series of farmers), "no specific set of 
attributes that form the sufficient conditions for membership" must be had 
(Young 1997: 26). In Young's view: 
"To be said to be part of the same series it is not necessary to identify a set of 
common attributes that every member has, because their membership is 
defined not by something they are, but rather by the fact that in their diverse 
existences and actions they are oriented around the same objects or practico-
inert structures. Membership in the series does not define one's identity ... 
there is no concept of the series within attributes that clearly demarcate what 
about individuals makes them belong. The series is a blurry, shifting unity, an 
amorphous collective." (1997: 27) 
93 
As mentioned. the most crucial difference between series and groups is 
that members of the former (unlike those of the latter) do not organise 
themselves according to shared goals and action. A series is not a self-
conscious collective of individuals with a common collective identity. Consider 
the people waiting for a bus. Prima facie they do not constitute a group since 
they have no goals and aims in common nor do they identify with one another 
qua people waiting for a bus. But this series can become a group: 
"The latent potential of this series to organize itself as a group will become 
manifest ... if the bus fails to come; [the members of a series] will complain to 
one another about the lousy bus service. share horror stories of lateness and 
breakdowns. perhaps assign one of their number to call the company. or 
discuss sharing a taxi." (Young 1997: 24) 
The members of a series have organised themselves: they have a shared self-
conscious goal and they identify with one another. Thus. the series of people 
waiting for a bus has been transformed into a group of people waiting for a bus. 
Each person at the bus stop identifies with one another and they all have some 
attribute in common by virtue of which they are members of the same group. 
However. if the bus suddenly arrives this group will once again disperse into a 
series - people will simply get on the bus and go about their own individual 
lives no longer identifying with the other passengers. 
IV 
Young suggests that "applying the concept of seriality to gender ... makes 
theoretical sense out of saying that 'women' is a reasonable social category. 
expressing a certain kind of social unity" without relying on shared features or 
experiences (1997: 27). Moreover, Young maintains that her position avoids the 
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problems Spelman's and Fuss' positions encountered (outlined in section 11). 
On Young's view, the class of women should be though of as a series where 
this series is 
"the name of a structural relation to [practico-inert] material objects as they 
have been produced and organized by a prior history ... Gender, like class, is a 
vast, multifaceted, layered, complex, and overlapping set of structures and 
objects. Women are the individuals who are positioned as feminine by these 
activities." (1997: 28) 
Those individuals gendered as women stand in certain relations to particular 
practico-inert material objects and realities that position them as women. To put 
this in another way, certain practico-inert realities gender individuals. The ways 
in which these realities gender individuals is determined by the totality of the 
practico-inert realities: by the set of practico-inert objects and structures that 
individual's actions are oriented towards along with the actions of other human 
agents. If the class of women were thought of as a group (on Young's view) 
classification would require that women share some goals and aims thereby 
(presumably) sharing features, attributes, experiences and a group identity as 
women. Saying this, however, seems hugely problematic since women simply 
do not seem to share any single feature or a specific gender identity as women. 
So, what are the practico-inert objects and realities that govern gender 
and provide a way to classify women qua women? First and foremost, Young 
thinks these include female bodies: 
"Clearly female bodies have something to do with the constitution of the series 
'women', but it is not merely the physical facts of these female bodies 
themselves - attributes of breasts, vaginas, clitorises. and so on - that construct 
female gender. Social objects are not merely physical but also inscribed by and 
the products of past practices. The female body as a practico-inert object 
toward which action is oriented is a rule-bound body, a body with understood 
meanings and possibilities. Menstruation, for example, is a regular biological 
event occurring in most female bodies within a certain age range. It is not this 
biological process alone. however, that locates individuals in the series 
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'women'. Rather, the social rules of menstruation, along with the material 
objects associated with menstrual practices, constitute the activity within 
which women live as serialized. One can say the same about biological events 
like pregnancy, childbirth. and lactation." (Young 1997: 28) 
Young claims that female bodies along with other objects and events associated 
with them are rendered practico-inert by the structures of enforced 
heterosexuality: "the assumptions and practices of heterosexuality define the 
meaning of bodies - vaginas, clitorises, penises - not as mere physical objects 
but as practico-inert" (Young 1997: 28). 
She does not, unfortunately, elaborate much on this thought. Young 
notes that structures of enforced heterosexuality "serialize women as objects of 
exchange and appropriation by men, with the consequent repression of 
autonomous active female desire" (1997: 28). It seems that she has in mind 
something like this: female bodies are endowed with certain kinds of meanings 
since we live within the remits of compulsory and enforced heterosexuality (cf. 
Butler in chapter O. Women do not create these meanings; rather, men create 
and impose them on women thereby conditioning authentic female desire. This 
supposedly renders female bodies as practico-inert. 
Women are not serialised exclusively because of their female bodies and 
the meanings these bodies are endowed with. Young claims a huge array of 
other objects that condition gender and determine "women's lives as gendered" 
exist (1997: 29). These include 
"pronouns [that] locate individual people, along with animals and other 
objects, in a gender system. Verbal and visual representations more generally 
create and reproduce gender meanings that condition a person's action and her 
interpretation of the actions of others. A multitude of artifacts and social 
spaces in which people act are flooded with gender codes. Clothes are the 
primary example, but there are also cosmetics, tools, even in some case 
furniture and spaces that materially inscribe the norms of gender. I may 
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discover myself 'as a woman' by being on the 'wrong' dorm floor." (Young 
1997: 29) 
These practico-inert objects are not conditioned by enforced heterosexuality 
though. Rather, the sexual division of labour conditions these latter kinds of 
practico-inert objects. Not only does it commonly result in women caring for 
babies and engaging in housework, but division of labour also renders the use 
of certain kind of language, clothing and work 'natural' to women. As a result, 
it (for instance) appears natural for women to work in offices wearing skirts and 
make-up. To sum up, Young maintains: 
"Bodies and objects constitute the gendered series women through structures 
like enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of labor ... Individuals 
move and act in relation to practico-inert objects that position them as 
'women'. The practico-inert structures that generate the milieu of gendered 
serialized existence both enable and constrain action, but they do not 
determine or define it. The individuals pursue their own ends; they get a living 
for themselves in order to have some pleasures of eating and relaxation ... The 
gender structures are not defining attributes of individuals, but material social 
facts that each individual must deal with and relate to." (1997: 29-30) 
It is important to remember that individuals positioned as women through these 
structures need not have an identity as women in common. Rather, these 
structures provide a background for such an identity (Young 1997: 30). 
Thinking about gender in this way (Young believes) is politically useful 
in that it allows us to talk of women in general without implying that women 
share attributes, features, experiences or a gender identity. Each woman will 
have her own particular way of responding to the practico-inert structures that 
gender her and, as a result, women will "have differing experiences and 
perceptions from those differently situated" (Young 1997: 31). Contra Spelman 
and Fuss, Young claims her position allows that 
"there is a unity to the series 'women', but it is a passive unity, not one that 
arises from the individuals called women, but rather that positions them 
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through the material organization of social relations as enabled and constrained 
by the structural relations I have called enforced heterosexuality and the sexual 
division of labor ... Saying that a person is a woman may predict something 
about the general constraints and expectations she must deal with. But it 
predicts nothing in particular about who she is. what she does, or how she 
takes up her social positioning." (1997: 32) 
Her position, Young maintains, does not dissolve the class of women into 
individuals (as Spelman's position did). It also provides a way to make sense of 
the class of women that exists "prior to the formation of self-conscious feminist 
politics" (Young 1997: 22) - something Fuss' suggestion did not allow for. 
Of course, as already mentioned, serial collectives can become groups 
on Young's view. In fact, "groups, as self-conscious collectives of persons with 
a common objective that they pursue together, often, if not always, arise on the 
basis of and in response to a serialized condition" (Young 1997: 34). Our social 
reality (Young maintains) consists of "constant ebbs and flows of groupings out 
of series" (1997: 34) and the same is also true of the series of women: women 
often form groups with common purposes and shared goals although for the 
most part they are merely a serialised collection of individuals. When faced 
with certain undesirable or oppressive serial conditions (for instance), the serial 
collective of women (Young thinks) has the potential to transform itself into a 
group. As an example of such a situation, Young describes a scene from a novel 
by Meredith Tax. In this novel Tax portrays the lives of Russian Jewish 
immigrants living on the Lower East Side of Manhattan at the tum of the 
century: 
"In one episode of the novel some women in the neighborhood discover that 
the local merchant has manipulated the chicken market in order to get more 
profits ... They talk with one another with anger and then go about their 
business. One of them, however, thinks a bit more in her anger and decides to 
act. She calls her three or four women friends together and tells them that they 
should boycott the butcher. The women organise a boycott by going from 
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apartment to apartment talking to women. Gradually these neighborhood 
women, formerly serialised only as shoppers, come to understand themselves 
as a group, with some shared experiences and the power of collective action." 
(Young 1997: 34) 
In Tax's novel, women (who are always serialised) sometimes form groups to 
fight their own comer. Young thinks that even if women never form groups 
with shared goals and aims, they would still be more than mere individuals 
insofar as they are serialised together. She concludes: 
"This is how I propose that using the concept of seriality and its distinction 
from the concept of group can help solve the conundrums about talking about 
women as a group in which feminist theory has recently found itself. Woman is 
a serial collective defined neither by any common identity nor by a common 
set of attributes that all the individuals in the series share, but rather names a 
set of structural constraints and relations to practico-inert objects that condition 
action and its meaning. I am inclined to say that the series includes all female 
human beings in the world, and also others of the past." (1997: 36) 
v 
I will now argue that Young's proposal outlined above is implausible and 
should not be endorsed. First, Young's criterion for being a member of the 
series of women does not seem to provide a good reason to classify women 
from different backgrounds into the same series. It is far from obvious why the 
criterion for membership in the series of women results in only a single series 
(rather than many different series of women). In order to make it clearer that 
women are members of the same series, Young would need to say something 
more specific about the practico-inert realities that govern gender - she would 
have to tighten the criteria for series membership. I go on to suggest two ways 
in which this might be done: by appealing to some rather invariable physical 
features or by appealing to stricter social criteria for series membership. But, I 
argue, this modification does not render Young's position unproblematic 
99 
although it may prima facie avoid the first problem I drew attention to. The 
modification one is required to make in order to show that women are members 
of the same series creates another set of problems since such a modification is 
likely to result in false (or, at least, implausible) claims about women in 
general. 18 
Criterion for series membership 
How does Young suggest women can be classified together? Firstly, she 
maintains that being a member of a series does not entail (or require) that one 
has anything at all in common with other members of the series. This is 
beneficial; even though it seems that women qua women do not share any 
single feature (or set of features), they can still be classified together. However, 
in doing so, Young also aims to avoid Spelman's conclusion: that there are 
multiple female genders. She clearly wants to make sense of a series of women, 
not of many. Second, Young claims that women are serialised by virtue of their 
actions: women's actions are oriented towards and organised around certain 
practico-inert realities and objects that "construct gender" marking those 
18 These do not appear to be the only problems with Young's position. Stone has 
argued that Young's proposal is problematic because it "tacitly reinscribes the 
descriptive essentialism from which she [Young] distances herself' (2004: 145). Stone 
argues that although Young claims to classify women qua women without appealing to 
shared features or experiences, Young does precisely this. Women's actions (that 
govern their gender) are oriented towards and organised around the same or similar 
practico-inert objects and realities. Insofar as Young claims this to be the case, her 
position relies on a universally shared feature women have in common and that makes 
them women. Although Stone is correct in her analysis of Young, I find that her 
objection is not sufficient to render Young's position implausible. This is because (in 
my view) claiming commonalities between women exist is not prima facie 
problematic. Claiming women have something in common can become problematic 
depending on what women supposedly share and depending on how this claim is used 
in our philosophical endeavours. 
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individuals as 'feminine' (Young 1997: 28). These realities and objects (Young 
claims) mark individuals in this way because of enforced heterosexuality and 
the division of labour whereby certain bodily features and processes associated 
with them are endowed with feminine meanings. FinaIly, Young maintains that 
numerous different practico-inert objects construct gender (ranging from 
tampons to pronouns) and that individuals respond to these objects (and to their 
social series as women) in many different ways: 
"In a heterosexist society, for example, every [woman] must deal with and act 
in relation to structures of enforced heterosexuality. But there are many 
attitudes a particular individual can take toward that necessity: she can 
intemalise norms of feminine masochism, she can try to avoid sexual 
interaction, she can affirmatively take up her sexual role as a tool for her own 
ends, and she can reject heterosexual requirements and love other women. to 
name just a few." (1997: 30) 
In Young's view, the practico-inert realities of women can be experienced and 
responded to in numerous different ways. Nonetheless, these realities position 
individuals in feminine ways and serialise them as women. 
Now, why do the practico-inert realities, which themselves differ 
considerably from one another and that can be responded to in numerous 
different ways, constitute a single series of women? Consider Young's 
characterisation of female bodies that are practico-inert: 
"the female body as a practico-inert object towards which action is oriented is 
a rule-bound body ... Menstruation, for example, is a regular biological event 
occurring in most female bodies within a certain age range ... the social rules 
of menstruation. along with the material objects associated with menstrual 
practices, constitute the activity within which the women live as serialized." 
(1997: 28) 
Now, it seems fair to say that the social rules of menstruation and the material 
objects of menstrual practices differ greatly from one woman to another. Prior 
to the invention of modem sanitary towels (in the 1920s), females had to wear 
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gannents similar to babies' diapers that they washed and reused (Delaney, 
Lupton and Toth 1988: 58). Many females who come from less affluent parts of 
the world still wear garments similar to these rags. In contrast to such practices, 
females from affluent (mostly, Western) countries need not engage in this 
unhygienic and rather unpleasant sounding activity. They have access to 
disposable sanitary towels and have a choice from a range of manufacturers, 
sizes and shapes. 
Bearing in mind further many taboos and menstruation rites different 
cultures have exercised (and still exercise), the social rules of menstruation 
become more diverse still. A relatively moderate practice followed by Orthodox 
Jewish women is to refrain from sexual intercourse until seven days after their 
menstruation has ended and only after they have immersed themselves in a 
ritual bath or mikveh (Delaney et al: 39). Other more extreme culturally specific 
practices and rules of menstruation have been observed. For example, "the 
Kolosh Indians of Alaska confined pubescent girls in a tiny hut, completely 
blocked except for one small airhole, for one year, during which time they were 
allowed no fire, no exercise, no company" (Delaney et al: 29). This rite marks 
the passage from childhood to adulthood after which females were usually 
considered to be marriageable. A Brazilian tribe, Uaupes, have exercised even 
more extreme menstrual rites to make their daughters marriageable: 
"At her menarche, a girl is confined to her house for a month, with only a little 
bread and water for nourishment. When her seclusion is complete, she is 
brought out naked to be beaten with sticks by her relatives and friends of her 
parents until she falls senseless or dead. Hutton Webster notes [in his Taboo: A 
Sociological Study]: 'If she recovers, the flagellation is repeated four times, at 
intervals of six hours, and it is considered an offense to the parents not to strike 
hard. Finally the sticks are dipped into pots of meat and fat and given to the 
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girl to lick. She is now considered a marriageable woman'." (Delaney et al: 32; 
see also, Webster 1942: 90-1) 
The practico-inert objects and realities a Kolosh Indian woman's actions 
are oriented towards and organised around (the tiny hut, for instance) seem to 
differ hugely from those practico-inert realities of Western menstruating 
women who can choose their sanitary towels from a range of different and 
competing brands. Bearing in mind examples like those of the Brazilian 
Uaupes, the differences between different women's practico-inert realities 
become more diverse still. It seems very different to endure a 24-hour beating 
from one's relatives (that may result in the girl's death) than it is to have a 
cleansing bath or to simply stop at the local pharmacy to buy some tampons. In 
thinking about these different cases, it does not seem immediately obvious to 
me why the women mentioned are members of the same series and apparently 
so on the same criterion since menstrual practices can differ so radically. 
Consider another case. Young claims that pregnancy, childbirth and 
lactation also playa significant part in the practico-inert realities that position 
individuals in feminine ways (constructing their gender as women). But clearly 
not every woman's actions are oriented towards these practico-inert realities. 
Imagine Anna who is a 40-year old mother of 15. In certain parts of rural 
Finland women like Anna are not uncommon. In many villages in the north of 
the country a particular form of Christianity (called 'Lestadiolaisuus') that bans 
contraception and TVs and demands procreation from its members is prevalent. 
Most families in many of the villages in this area are members of this religious 
sect. (In fact, women who give birth to less than 10 children are considered 
anomalous and the only grounds for divorce allowed is jf the wife fails in her 
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duty to procreate sufficiently.) It seems clear that Anna's life is largely 
organised around and oriented towards practico-inert realities of childbirth, 
pregnancy, lactation and so on. Now, contrast Anna's practico-inert realities 
with those of Condoleezza Rice. She has no children and her actions are clearly 
not oriented around the same practico-inert realities Anna's actions are (like 
pregnancy and lactation). She is also a hugely powerful and influential 
politician and many of her actions (it seems fair to say) are oriented towards 
and organised around practico-inert realities and objects characterised as 
'masculine' given her political position. 
So, it seems that Anna and Condoleezza Rice are serialised very 
differently as women. Would it not then be more appropriate to consider them 
as members of different series of women? Why does it not follow that 
depending on the nature of the practico-inert objects different series of women 
form? It seems that the practico-inert objects around which Condoleezza Rice 
orients her actions are very different from the practico-inert objects around 
which Anna orients hers. Bearing in mind further that when all females are 
considered the range of practico-inert realities and objects women's actions will 
be oriented towards and organised around is going to be huge. How can 
Young's proposal, then, provide a reasonable way to make sense of a single 
series of women? It is hard to see what would unify the series of women 
enough to avoid this unity collapsing or dissolving into specific sub-series of 
women who come from similar social and cultural backgrounds. 
Another issue that Young (in my view) addresses inadequately is this: 
how much of an individual's life and actions must revolve around feminine 
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practico-inert realities to render that individual a member of the series of 
women? After all, being a woman (for Young) is "an anonymous fact [about an 
individual] ... It means that I check one box rather than another on my driver's 
license application, that I use maxi pads, wear pumps, and sometimes find 
myself in situations when I anticipate deprecation or humiliation from a man" 
(Young 1997: 30). Again, consider Condoleezza Rice. She holds a hugely 
influential political position and, given her current social situation, she seems 
very privileged. Many of the tasks and activities Condoleezza Rice engages in 
are not traditionally associated with women. She is not a homemaker or a carer 
but in charge of the foreign policy of (arguably) the most powerful nation on 
earth. Now, she does appear feminine in that she wears suits designed for 
women and make-up. She also has female physical features and clearly 
possesses a female body. But is this enough to gender her as a woman? Why is 
she not serialised as a man because many of her actions are oriented towards 
and organised around practico-inert realities that appear traditionally masculine 
(like being involved in politics)? 
Consider a different example. Imagine an individual called 'Sandy' who 
has male sex characteristics, a male body and who calls himself 'a man'. 
Imagine further that Sandy is a single parent and Sandy's actions are largely 
oriented towards and organised around traditionally feminine practico-inert 
realities: Sandy is the primary caretaker, he cooks, cleans and nurtures engaging 
in many tasks Young claims are 'naturally' associated with women (Young 
1997: 29). Now, imagine Sandy also organises and orients his actions around 
and towards practico-inert realities that traditionally gender individuals as men. 
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(Although Young does not discuss what such realities would amount to, it 
seems fair to assume that they would be largely parallel to those that gender 
women.) Presumably enforced heterosexuality would endow male bodies with 
certain kinds of meanings whereas the sexual division of labour would render 
certain activities and tasks as naturally falling in men's domain. So, imagine 
that apart from being the primary caretaker, Sandy works as a builder. He is 
engaged in physical labour and his actions are organised around numerous 
objects that inscribe a masculine gender (such as clothing typically associated 
with men and hard physical labour). Since Sandy's actions seem to be 
organised around and oriented towards both feminine and masculine practico-
inert realities, which series is Sandy a member of? How do we decide which 
gender inscriptions are overriding? How many of Sandy's actions must be 
organised around and oriented towards those practico-inert realities that 
position individuals as men in order for Sandy to be a member of the series of 
men? Or, is Sandy's social positioning enough to gender him as a woman? All 
of these questions are left unanswered by Young. 
In response, Young might simply claim that the issues I draw attention 
to above are non-problematic for her. This is because she aims to provide a 
pragmatic response to the problems of gender classification and she does not 
aim "to provide an entire social theory" (Young 1997: 17). Recall what Young 
means by this: "By being 'pragmatic' I mean categorizing, explaining, 
developing accounts and arguments that are tied to specific practical and 
political problems, where the purpose of this theoretical activity is clearly 
related to those problems" (1997: 17). She contrasts her pragmatic approach 
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with a theoretical stance that "aims to be comprehensive, to give a systematic 
account and explanation of social relations as a whole ... [and] tells the way 
things are in some universal sense. From it one can derive particular instances, 
or at least one can apply the theoretical propositions to particular facts, which 
the theory's generalities are supposed to 'cover'" (1997: 16). Had Young been 
concerned to provide a theory in this sense, the issues I draw attention to would 
be problematic. But since she is only providing a pragmatic account of gender, 
the problems I mentioned are simply not relevant: Young's proposal is not 
designed to provide answers to the worries I raised because it is not aiming to 
provide a systematic theory of gender as a whole. 
This response does not, however, succeed. Young's pragmatic 
orientation does not, however, mean that she need not provide a general theory: 
in order to make sense of gender classes, Young (or any other theorist) must 
provide a general framework in order to settle various problems with gender 
classification. In order to make sense of the class of women, Young must 
provide some criterion for womallness from which individual instances may be 
derived. And for such general criterion to be plausible and persuasive, she will 
have to respond to the challenges I raised. Without a general theory, Young 
cannot achieve her goal: to settle the issue of gender classification. 
Rethinking the criteria for series membership 
What if Young's criteria for membership in the series of women were 
understood in the theoretical (rather than pragmatic) sense? Will her proposal 
work then? In my view: it does not. There is still a problem with Young's 
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criteria for series membership. It remains unclear why (on Young's view) there 
would be a single series of women, rather than many. Young does not address 
this worry. Nonetheless, if I am right in claiming that her criterion for 
membership in the series of women is not sufficient to unify women together, 
Young faces a serious problem. She clearly wants to avoid the series of women 
simply dissolving into different sub-series of women and her argument against 
Spelman's 'multiple genders approach' illustrates this. Young claims that 
feminism cannot in any politically effective manner speak for or in the name of 
particular women and this is why she finds Spelman's position problematic. 
But, (as I argued) it is not clear how Young avoids this consequence since she 
does not offer a good reason to suppose that women on her view will form a 
single series. I argued further that Young's position does not account for why 
(for example) Condoleezza Rice should be a member of the series of women 
given that she seems to orient her actions and organise her life around many 
practico-inert realities that are traditionally thought of as masculine. 
One way in which Young's position might be rendered more plausible is 
by tightening the criteria for series membership thereby making it clearer to us 
why Anna, Condoleezza Rice, the Brazilian Uaupes girls beaten at their 
menarche and the women who buy Tampax tampons are all members of the 
same series. In other words, Young would need to say something stronger and 
more specific about the practico-inert realities that gender individuals as 
women. She could, for example, concentrate on some rather invariable physical 
features to ground membership in the series of women (such as having a female 
body type or sex characteristics). These features could even be connected to 
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some rather invariable phenomena like menstruation without connecting 
menstruation further to any socially specific and culturally variable rules of 
menstruation or objects of menstrual practices. With this modification, series 
membership would depend on certain practico-inert realities that are closely 
related to female bodies and only those individuals whose actions are oriented 
towards and organised around these practico-inert realities would be members 
of the series of women. 
This strategy seems to explain why Condoleezza Rice (for example) is a 
member of the series of women. Regardless of her political and social positions, 
it seems fair to assume that her actions are largely oriented towards and 
organised around her female body. For instance, she wears clothing that fits her 
body shape, her life (presumably) is organised around some biological 
processes that take place due to her femaleness and she does (I would imagine) 
use certain sex-coded facilities, like female toilets. Further, it seems that 
appealing to physical phenomena that are relatively invariable could provide a 
better way to justify why there is a single series of women: series membership 
would depend on practico-inert realities governed by female bodies and since 
these are relatively similar in all females, it does not encounter the same 
problems hugely variable cultural rules of menstruation (for instance) 
encountered. 
I would suspect, however, that many feminists would be unwilling to 
accept such a tight connection between female bodies and woman ness since 
being a woman does not seem to be reducible to certain bodily features. If this 
were the case, it seems feminist theorists would not have such a hard time 
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pointing out exactly what womanness amounts to: they could simply appeal to 
some physical features all women (qua women) share. Curiously. Young's own 
position on whether sex and gender are coextensive is rather unclear. When 
setting up her position. Young claims that she takes the series of women to 
include "all female human beings in the world. and also others of the past" 
(1997: 36). Insofar as this is so. it is not obvious why Young does not simply 
appeal to femaleness as the criterion for membership in the series of women to 
begin with. However. I suspect that Young would be reluctant to endorse the 
view that sex characteristics ground gender classification. After all, if she did 
endorse this view. appealing to the practico-inert realities that position 
individuals in feminine ways would be thoroughly unnecessary. I take it then 
that although the series of women might include all the female human beings in 
the world, Young would also want to include some individuals who are not 
biologically female in the series of women. 
To avoid the tight connection between woman ness and femaleness at the 
same time providing stricter criteria for membership in the series of women, 
Young might appeal instead to some specific social factors. roles. or 
experiences endowed with feminine meanings and commonly associated with 
women. These would then amount to the practico-inert realities that serialise 
and gender individuals as women. The kinds of factors. experiences and roles I 
have in mind are. for example. the following: experiences of gendered 
inequalities or oppression (whether at home, in the workplace or in society at 
large); roles typically associated with women (such as being a homemaker or a 
carer); being seen as the one who does and should do most of the cooking. 
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cleaning and laundry; and having certain ostensible features associated with 
women (such as wearing make-up, having a certain hairstyle and dressing in 
typically female clothing). With this modification, only those individuals whose 
actions are oriented towards and organised around these practico-inert realities 
would be positioned as feminine and gendered as women. 
But this strategy is not unproblematic either: how can we say these 
factors gender women without making false claims about all women? If Young 
appeals to some particular social phenomenon (or set of phenomena) to make 
sense of the class of women, it is very likely she will end up saying something 
false about women in general. After all, if some single feature, trait, attribute, 
role or experience existed that all women organised their actions around, it 
seems gender classification would be non-problematic. It is precisely because 
the strict criteria that Young's position seems to require is so very difficult to 
point out, that feminist philosophers have gone as far as to doubt the existence 
of the class of women. Since it seems impossible to point at some social aspect 
that is relatively invariable amongst women and that could ground the series of 
women, Young fails to provide a way to make sense of (what she calls) a 
reasonable social collective of women. 
VI 
As I have argued, Young's suggested way of making sense of the class of 
women is unsuccessful. First, she does not provide a good reason to think her 
position captures a single series of women. In order to avoid this problem, I 
suggested that Young would have to tighten her criteria for membership in the 
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series of women so that it becomes clearer why women form a single series 
despite their particular differences. But such a modification turned out to be 
problematic since it seemed to require that Young would have to make 
generalisations about all women likely to be false. The position Young argues 
for does not seem to be able to successfully make sense of gender classes and, 
as this is so, I recommend that her position be rejected. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STOLJAR, RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM AND WOMEN 
I 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, gender classification is not a 
straightforward matter. It seems (for instance) that the Queen and the Sudanese 
woman do not have any single feature in common that makes them members of 
the same class. And yet, feminist theory appears to require some way of making 
sense of the class of women such that these two women are both members of it. 
Natalie Stoljar (1995) has argued that resemblance nominalism provides a good 
way of doing this in her "Essence, Identity and the Concept of Woman". 
Resemblance nominalism is (roughly) the view that entities can be classified 
together on the basis of a certain kind of resemblance relation that holds 
between the entities (see Armstrong 1989: chapter 3). On Stoljar's view, 
women are members of the same resemblance structure and this allows us to 
classify them together. She goes on to claim that her position does not rely on 
any shared features likely to be problematic at the same time offering a 
"justification for feminist action on behalf of women" (Stoljar 1995: 282). 
I will argue that classifying women in resemblance nominalist terms 
should not be endorsed. Contra Stoljar, I argue that the resemblance structure 
she makes the case for and that allows us to classify the Queen and the 
Sudanese woman together also allows us to classify, for instance, George W. 
Bush as a member of the class of women. The resemblance structure used to 
make sense of gender classification has the consequence of dissolving the 
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distinction between men and women to a large extent: a highly undesirable 
consequence, given Stoljar's political goals. I begin by first outlining Stoljar's 
case against gender realism (section II). I then go on to map out Stoljar's case 
for resemblance nominalism (in section III) and I end with a discussion of why 
her position is inadequate (in section IV). 
II 
Stoljar seems to accept Spelman's particularity argument. She claims "there are 
many significant differences among members of the category 'woman' , 
differences in race, class, culture, as well as more fine-grained differences in 
individual experience and role. Individual women are particular, not the same" 
(1995: 262). In doing so, she also rejects realism about gender. Her paper aims 
to show (among other things) that "there is [no] universal 'woman'" (Stoljar 
1995: 263) and that there is no single feature women (qua women) have in 
common that makes them women. 
Why does Stoljar reject gender realism? She takes such a view to entail 
the following: women share a universal feature that is identical in all women 
and that is necessary and sufficient for womanness. Only those individuals who 
possess this feature wiIl count as women (Stoljar 1995: 263). She goes on to 
suggest, however, that no such feature exists and, as this is the case, gender 
realism does not seem promising. In order to illustrate her view, Stoljar outlines 
three ways of characterizing gender realism (or, as she calls it, essentialism) 
(1995: 267). According to these characterisations, women have womanness in 
common where this feature can be understood in one of three ways: either as a 
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biologically essential feature, as a biologically accidental feature or as a 
socially essential feature. Stoljar, nevertheless, goes on to reject all three 
characterisations. Apart from her arguments against these three specific gender 
realist (or, as she terms them, essentialist) views, Stoljar also appears to reject 
the possibility of a plausible gender realist position appealing to Spelman's 
argument. 19 
lVomanness as biologically essential 
First, Stoljar considers whether a gender realist view committed to an 
Aristotelian picture of kinds and species could provide a plausible way to 
classify women. On (what Stoljar takes to be) the Aristotelian picture, 
individual entities of a particular kind or species share a species-essence (kind-
essentialism). Membership in a particular kind or sort, then, is delimited by the 
possession of this species-essence: those who possess it will be members of the 
kind whereas those who lack this essence will fall outside the kind. On the 
Aristotelian view, the species-essence not only delimits kind membership. The 
species-essence will also be essential to the individual members of a species 
qua individuals (individual essentialism): 
"[S]uppose human beings constitute a species and that the species-essence is 
rationality: That is, it is a necessary and sufficient condition of being a human 
being that an individual has rationality. On the Aristotelian notion of species-
essence, it is also necessary that an individual human being have rationality to 
be the individual that it is: If an individual human being were to lose 
19 It is not clear why Stoljar feels the need to discuss these particular gender realist 
positions given that she thinks Spelman's arguments provide good reasons to reject 
gender realism in general. As I see it, providing arguments against these particular 
gender realist positions appears to be a sort of a safety net: in case someone is not 
convinced by Spelman's case against gender realism, Stoljar argues against (what she 
takes to be) the only gender realist positions that might work. In so doing, she 
supposedly illustrates that all gender realist positions worth considering are untenable. 
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rationality, it would not only cease to be a human being, it would cease to be 
the individual that it is and hence cease to exist." (Stoljar 1995: 267) 
On this view, the class of women would be understood in the following manner. 
Women would constitute a species where their species-essence would be 
something like the feature of womanness (Stoljar 1995: 268). This feature 
would be necessary and sufficient for membership in the kind woman and all 
members of the kind (or all women) would share this feature. Womanness 
would also be essential to individual women in that were they to lose this 
feature, they would no longer remain the same individuals. On the Aristotelian 
picture, if the Queen were to lose her womanness, she would no longer be a 
member of the kind women nor would she persist as the same individual. 
As the Aristotelian view considers species-essences to be biological or 
natural, the species-essence of women would also have to be cashed out in 
biological or natural terms (Stoljar 1995: 268). Stoljar suggests that the only 
plausible way to cash out woman ness in this fashion is to hold that it is 
coextensive with being a female human being (1995: 268). Her reasons for 
thinking this are somewhat elusive. She seems to think that being a female 
human being is the only biological feature that individual women could not 
sustain the loss of and because of this being a female human being is the only 
plausible candidate for women's biological species-essence. Some other 
features like being emotional or being caring are not good candidates for 
women's species-essence as "[being caring] does not seem necessary to an 
individual's identity; for example. the same individual would persist even after 
the loss of the capacity for caring" (Stoljar 1995: 268). 
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Stoljar goes on to claim (and rightly so, in my view) that this 
Aristotelian way of understanding gender classes is implausible. Roughly, this 
is because females (or women, the two being coextensive) do not constitute a 
distinct species. Stoljar offers three arguments for this. Firstly, she considers 
Anne Fausto-Sterling's suggestion that properly speaking human beings can be 
classified in five different ways depending on their sex characteristics. Apart 
from and in addition to the usual classifications (male and female) individuals 
can be classified as 'intersexed' in three different ways: there are 'herms' or 
hermaphrodites, who possess one testis and one ovary; there are 'merms' or 
male pseudohermaphrodites, who possess testes, some aspects of female 
genitalia but no ovaries; and there are 'ferms' or female pseudohermaphrodites, 
who have ovaries, some aspects of male genitalia but no testes (Fausto-Sterling 
1993: 21). 
According to Stoljar, Fausto-Sterling's claim that there are five sexes 
could be dealt with in two ways within the Aristotelian picture (1995: 269). She 
goes on to claim, however, that both of these ways to accommodate Fausto-
Sterling's suggestion are problematic. As a result, (Stoljar claims) the empirical 
considerations Fausto-Sterling draws attention to count against the Aristotelian 
view of gender. On the one hand, proponents of the Aristotelian view could 
maintain that sex classification takes place on a continuous plateau from male 
to female with various intersexes in between with no precise boundaries 
between the sexes. But if this is so, (Stoljar claims) the Aristotelian view can no 
longer hold on to the thought that females constitute a separate species from 
males, herms, merms and ferms. On the other hand, those who hold the 
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Aristotelian picture could maintain that all five sexes should be thought of as 
distinct species. In this case, however, one could no longer hold that 
woman ness is coextensive with being a human being - an assumption Stoljar 
thinks is necessary for the Aristotelian view. She claims that if all five sexes 
were thought of as separate species, "it would then become implausible and ad 
hoc to propose that women are all and only female human beings, as many 
hermaphrodites (i.e., those brought up us girls) have most of the features we 
associate with women" (Stoljar 1995: 269). In this case, womanness would also 
pick out individuals who are not females (like some hermaphrodites). Fausto-
Sterling's 'five sexes' view counts against the Aristotelian picture because it 
undermines the thought that woman ness is coextensive withfemaleness. 
Second, Stoljar argues against the Aristotelian picture by appealing to 
our intuitions about logical possibility: the claim that females constitute a 
distinct species conflicts with these intuitions. Stoljar writes: 
"If women [or females] constitute a species, it would be logically impossible 
for particular men to be women in the same way that it is logically impossible 
for particular men to be insects or eagles. Yet there is a qualitative difference 
between the claim that, for example, Michelangelo could have been an insect 
and the claim that he could have been a woman." (1995: 269-0) 
The difference is (according to Stoljar) that we cannot conceive of 
Michelangelo's mother giving birth to an insect (instead of Michelangelo) but 
we can conceive of Michelangelo's mother giving birth to a baby girl (instead 
of a baby boy). Our intuitions about these two claims differ. But, if females 
form a distinct species from males, our intuitions about logical possibility 
should be the same when considering these two propositions: 'Michelangelo's 
mother gave birth to an insect' and 'Michelangelo's mother gave birth to a baby 
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girl'. Since our intuitions about these propositions differ, Stoljar takes this to be 
evidence of the fact that females do not constitute a distinct species. 
Finally, Stoljar appeals to evolutionary theory to establish that females 
are not a distinct species. On this view, "membership in a species is delimited 
through the capacity of members for interbreeding" (Stoljar 1995: 271). Stoljar 
argues evolutionary theory seriously counts against conceiving females as a 
species due to procreative considerations. Individuals of a particular species 
(the evolutionary argument goes) cannot breed with members of another 
species: if females constitute a separate and distinct species from males, they 
should not be able to procreate with males any more than they are able to 
procreate with camels. But, of course, this is not the case. In fact, females can 
only procreate with males and this suggests to Stoljar that males and females 
are members of the same species. As a result, the Aristotelian picture is 
implausible and one that feminist philosophers should not endorse. 
Stoljar goes on to claim that feminist philosophers commonly think 
arguments like Spelman's count against the Aristotelian view. Contrary to this 
(in Stoljar's view) common belief, she suggests, "the Aristotelian essentialist 
position that all women have the same essential womanness - a position which 
has been the target of so much feminist criticism - will fail for reasons which 
are quite independent of the feminist arguments" as the discussion above shows 
(1995: 272). However, it seems to me that Stoljar is falsely attributing to 
Spelman the view that her arguments are aimed against the Aristotelian picture. 
After all, Spelman is not arguing against the view that women constitute a 
species or that women share some essential biological feature like a species-
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essence. As this is the case, it is not surprising that Spelman's appeal to 
diversity does not count against an Aristotelian conception of gender. 
Womanness as an accidental biological feature 
The view discussed above took certain biological features as essential to 
individuals. The idea was that if an individual lost its species-essence, not only 
would the individual cease to be of that species but the individual would also 
cease to be that individual. If Aristotle were to lose his species-essence or 
humanness, he would not only cease to be a human being but he would cease to 
be the same individual. Contrary to this view, Stoljar's second candidate for a 
feature that women qua women might share (and that would ground gender 
classification) is a non-necessary biological feature (1995: 272). On this view, 
"[womanness] will be characterized as an intrinsic, natural, yet accidental 
property of individual women" (Stoljar 1995: 272).20 Insofar as this non-
necessary feature is natural, Stoljar claims, features of this kind are '''fixed and 
unchanging' ... in the sense of being unable to be revised through social 
reform" (1995: 272). Whiteness (the colour) is an example of such a feature: 
"even if ... whiteness is a universal [and something all white entities share], it 
does not follow that whiteness is an essential property of individual white 
things" (Stoljar 1995: 272). Stoljar's thought is that even though it seems all 
white cars (for instance) share the property of whiteness, possessing this 
20 Stoljar's terminology here is potentially confusing. Occasionally she describes 
features of this kind as 'non-necessary'. She clearly equates non-necessary and 
accidental features indicating that 'non-necessary' features are not essential to the 
individuals' possessing such features: non-necessary features are not essential to an 
individual qua that individual. Nonetheless, Stoljar holds that such properties are 
necessary features for membership in a particular type. 
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property is clearly not essential to the individual white cars qua cars. If a white 
car were painted blue, the entity would not cease to be a car (although, of 
course, it would cease to be a white car). 
Other examples of accidental (or non-necessary) biological features 
Stoljar mentions are having a certain facial structure or skin colour: 
"Individuals having the same facial structure or skin color have an intrinsic, 
natural feature in common which can be characterized as a universal without 
implying that facial structure or skin color is an essential feature of the 
individuals instantiating the universal" (Stoljar 1995: 272). The idea is that 
having a tall forehead, for example, is not an essential feature of individuals 
with tall foreheads. If they were to undergo surgery to reduce the sizes of their 
foreheads, they would still remain the same individuals. Nonetheless, having a 
tall forehead is a biological feature all taU foreheaded individuals have in 
common (it is universal amongst them). 
On this view, being a woman would be analogous to having a tall 
forehead. All women (qua women) would share womanness where this feature 
would, in some sense, be understood as a natural feature. But womanness would 
not be essential to individual women. So, if the Queen were to lose her 
womanness, she would still remain the same individual. She would, however, 
no longer count as a member of the class of women. As womanness on this 
view would be a natural feature (just as in the Aristotelian picture) it would 
have to be cashed out in terms of some biological characteristics. Stoljar again 
suggests that the most plausible way to do this is to claim that being a woman is 
coextensive with being afemale human being (1995: 273). (Her reasons for this 
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are unclear but they seem to be the same as those outlined in the previous 
section: being a female human being appears to be the only biological feature 
that can plausibly be thought of as coextensive with womanness.) On this view, 
the class of women would be the same as the class of females but femaleness 
would be thought of as accidental to particular individuals. 
Stoljar goes on to argue (and correctly so) that this view is implausible 
since being a female human being is not coextensive with being a woman 
(1995: 273). She suggests that our language use illustrates this: "the concept 
woman does not apply to all and only female humans ... If the concept 
'woman' does not apply to all and only female human beings, it follows that the 
type 'woman' is not the same as the type 'female human being'" (Stoljar 1995: 
273). The idea is that if being a female human being were coextensive with 
being a woman, the concept woman would pick out individuals that were all 
both females and women. But, this is not the case. Our concept woman seems 
to pick out individuals who are not female such as male-to-female transvestites 
and "sexually indeterminate people" (Stoljar 1995: 273). Consider male-to-
female transvestites who arguably have many features associated with women, 
but who are biologically male. That the concept woman picks out such 
individuals suggests that woman does not pick out individuals on the basis of 
their physical and biological features. Stoljar takes this to entail that "there is 
more to the concept 'woman' than having an XX chromosome and related sex 
characteristics. At most, [this entails] that female sex is not necessary for being 
a woman" (1995: 274). In short, our use of the concept woman seems to count 
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against the view that being afemale human being is coextensive with being a 
woman. 
Womanness as an essential social feature 
Having rejected the view that women all share some biological feature (either 
essential or accidental), Stoljar goes on to consider whether a plausible gender 
realist view could be cashed out in terms of shared social factors. Feminists 
inspired by Lockean nominal essentialism (Stoljar claims) hold such a gender 
realist view. Lockean nominal essences are "set[s] of characteristics that we 
associate with individual members of a species. not their internal constitution or 
real essence" (1995: 275). They are used as "pragmatic device[s] introduced by 
us to classify a vague natural world" (Stoljar 1995: 277).21 Consider, for 
example, gold. On the Lockean view, we would classify entities as gold on the 
basis of some overtly perceived features (such as gold's yellowness, shining 
colour and malleability) - not on the basis of some internal constitution of gold 
(like its chemical composition). On a Lockean inspired feminist view, women 
would be classified as women on the basis of some overtly perceived features: 
for example, because women are subordinated due to their gender. 
Stoljar goes on to claim that Lockean inspired views of gender are 
unacceptable: 
21 Although this position is called 'nominal essentialism' it is important to bear in 
mind that the feminist views inspired by the Lockean position are not standard gender 
nominalist positions. On the standard view, women have no single feature (or set of 
features) in common that makes them women. On the Lockean view, women do: they 
all share a nominal essence (a set of characteristics associated with womanness). As a 
result, nominal essentialism about gender is a form of gender realism. 
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"If 'woman' is defined by a certain social relation, e.g., being subordinated on 
the basis of having a female sex, then, on Locke's view, the real essence of 
womanness is precisely the relation of being sexually subordinated. In order 
for an individual to be a woman, it is necessary and sufficient for that 
individual to be in a relation of sexual subordination." (1995: 278) 
The social relation mentioned would ground gender classification being 
necessary and sufficient for womanness. For Stoljar, however, this warrants the 
rejection of all Lockean inspired feminist positions: they rely on "a single 
property or set of properties constituting [and being necessary and sufficient 
for] womanness" (Stoljar 1995: 275) and all position that rely on necessary and 
sufficient conditions should be rejected because they cannot cope with 
Spelman's commonality problem. 
To illustrate, Stoljar considers Catharine MacKinnon's position on 
gender claiming that it is an example of a nominal essentialist position. (It is 
worth pointing out that MacKinnon herself does not characterise her view as 
nominal essentialist.) MacKinnon takes gender to be the social position one 
inhabits in certain social relations where these relations are sexual in nature 
(MacKinnon 1989b: 127). Roughly, one's gender (on MacKinnon's view) 
depends on whether one is positioned as sexually subordinate or sexually 
dominant. Those individuals who occupy sexually dominant positions count as 
men (sexualized dominance being definitive of manness); those who occupy 
sexually submissive positions count as women (sexualized submissiveness 
being definitive of womanness). In MacKinnon's words, "to be rapable, a 
position which is social, not biological, defines what a woman is" (MacKinnon 
1989a: 66). On MacKinnon's view, it seems that being sexually submissive is 
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necessary for womanness and something that all women qua women have in 
common. 
So, the nominal essence of women that MacKinnon seems to endorse is 
being sexually subordinate. This means that 
"[o]n [MacKinnon's] view, it is both necessary and sufficient in order to be a 
woman that an individual either be in a relation of sexual subordination or 
experience sexual subordination because of cultural conceptions of sex. Thus, 
womannness is literally the same relation or experience in all individuals who 
are women - that is, it is a universal." (Stoljar 1995: 279) 
MacKinnon's position (Stoljar claims) cannot cope with Spelman's 
commonality problem because MacKinnon defines what it means to be a 
woman using "a single relation: there is a unitary role or social experience 
[being positioned as sexually subordinate] which is necessary and sufficient for 
being a woman" (Stoljar 1995: 280). Insofar as MacKinnon endorses such a 
unitary definition of womanness, Stoljar thinks MacKinnon fails to take into 
account the diverse and dissimilar ways of being a woman across various 
cultures and societies. 
Stoljar concedes that MacKinnon's positions could be rescued if it 
"could be reconciled with the evident diversity of roles and experiences within 
even western industrialized culture by claiming that difference is a difference 
in manifestation of the same relation or experience of sexual subordination. 
For example, subordination on the basis of cultural conceptions of sex could be 
manifested differently among Hispanic women than among black women, etc., 
while still remaining, at a general level of description, subordination on the 
basis of cultural conceptions of sex." (1995: 280) 
If MacKinnon argued that sexual subordination could take many forms and 
guises and that it can be experienced differently by different kinds of women, 
her position would be more plausible. In such a case, MacKinnon could hold on 
to the thought that sexual subordination is crucial for womanness without 
making the implausible claim that all women experience sexual subordination 
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in the same way. MacKinnon does, in actual fact, seem to claim this thereby 
taking into account that subordination can be sexualised in diverse and 
dissimilar ways. She writes "[m]ale dominance appears to exist cross-culturally, 
if in locally particular forms. Across cultures ... whatever defines women as 
'different' [is] the same as whatever defines women as 'inferior' [and] the same 
as whatever defines women's 'sexuality' [as subordinated]" (MacKinnon 
1989b: 130-1). MacKinnon also claims that sexual subordination of women 
takes many different forms: "Pressure, gender socialization, withholding 
benefits, extending indulgences, the how-to books, the sex therapy are the soft 
ends; the fuck, the fist, the street, the chains, the poverty are the hard end" 
(MacKinnon 1989b: 136). Stoljar does not acknowledge this though. She goes 
on to argue that this alternative (that MacKinnon's view may be rescued, if she 
allows for culturally specific forms of sexualised submission) is 
"unconvincing": 
"The greater the difference in manifestation, the less plausible will be the 
claim that those manifestations are of a single role or experience ... If the 
evidence shows an enormous range of experiences and roles of women, it will 
be ad hoc to label them manifestations of the same thing." (1995: 280) 
The suggested way to rescue MacKinnon's position, Stoljar claims, is not open 
to MacKinnon. As a result (Stoljar claims), MacKinnon's analysis of gender 
does not adequately take diversity into account and MacKinnon's (supposedly) 
Lockean inspired analysis of gender fails. 
Diversity 
Stoljar's three arguments outlined above do not, of course, show that gender 
realism per se should be rejected: there could be alternative ways of conceiving 
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what women share that are plausible. (And as I claim in the final chapter of this 
thesis, there are). Nevertheless, it seems that Stoljar aims to reject even the 
possibility of a gender realist position by endorsing Spelman's argument. 
Stoljar holds that given how greatly women differ from one another, it seems 
implausible to think that they might have something in common that makes 
them women. In short, Stoljar agrees with Spelman's thought that women's 
diverse and dissimilar traits and experiences count against gender realism 
(1995: 266). But, as I showed in chapter 1, the recognition of diversity amongst 
women per se does not give good reason to reject gender realism. As this is so, 
Stoljar does not make a good case against gender realism in general nor does 
she provide arguments that show all gender realist positions to be untenable. 
III 
Having argued that gender realism is untenable, Stoljar moves on to "develop a 
nominalist account of the type 'woman'" (1995: 263; see also, Stoljar 2000). 
Unlike Spelman and Butler who argue for gender scepticism, Stoljar thinks that 
a single class of women can be made sense of. Of course, she does not think 
gender realism provides a way to do this. Rather, she claims to make sense of 
gender classes "in some other way" (Stoljar 1995: 263), namely by appealing to 
resemblance nominalism. Roughly, Stoljar's idea is that women form a 
resemblance class that grounds gender classification. Before I outline Stoljar's 
resemblance nominalist alternative in detail I will briefly look at why she 
rejects other nominalist alternatives open to her. 
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Predicate nominalism 
Metaphysicians standardly claim that there are six different versions of 
nominalism (Armstrong 1989). In order to cash out how women constitute a 
genuine class (and not merely a gerrymandered collection of entities)22, Stoljar 
thinks only two forms of nominalism are promising: predicate and resemblance 
nominalism. (Why she holds this view is unclear and Stoljar does not justify her 
choice of nominalisms that she takes to be relevant for gender classification.) 
According to predicate nominalists those entities that are picked out by the 
same word or predicate will be classified together (Armstrong 1989: 6). 
Resemblance nominalists, on the contrary, hold that those entities that are 
members of the same resemblance structure will be classified together (Stoljar 
1995: 263): if they resemble one another in some appropriate manner, they will 
be members of the same class. (This will be considered in more detail shortly.) 
Stoljar goes on to claim that although prima facie predicate nominalism 
provides a promising way to classify women qua women, such a position turns 
out to be implausible. She takes Spelman's 'multiple genders approach' to 
entail predicate nominalism and uses it to illustrate why predicate nominalism 
is implausible. Stoljar takes Spelman to endorse this view because Spelman 
claims: "to know what 'woman' means is to know that it applies to me and 
Angela Davis, and doesn't apply to my brother Jon or to James Baldwin" 
(Spelman 1990: 158). However (Stoljar claims), the predicate nominalism 
Spelman endorses does not provide "principled reasons for collecting women 
22 Recall that a gerrymandered class is a random collection of individual entities (such 
as the globe, this cup and that football) whereas a genuine class (like the class of red 
entities) is not a thoroughly arbitrary set of entities classified together at random. 
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into a type, and hence cannot provide justification for feminist action on behalf 
of women, nor an explanation of the similarities among individual members of 
the type" (Stoljar 1995: 282). This is because women on the predicate 
nominalist view are classified together "simply in virtue of the arbitrary 
designation of the word 'woman"', not "on the basis of shared experiences, 
political goals, and similar behaviour and bodily features" (Stoljar 1995: 282). 
Stoljar thinks that Spelman forgets such similarities and she goes on to claim: 
"just as it fails to be explanatory to ignore differences among individual 
women, it also fails to be explanatory to ignore similarities" (1995: 282). 
Because Spelman ignores what women have in common, she fails to give a 
plausible account of gender classification. 
However, this charge against Spelman does not seem wholly justified. 
After all, Spelman is not in the business of unifying women together, she is 
precisely trying to argue the opposite. She is arguing for the view that to 
assume womanness is a feature shared by all women is to grossly 
misunderstand the role that other features (like race and class) play in women's 
womanness. Spelman is arguing for the view that since (for instance) the lives 
of the Queen and the Sudanese woman are so very different, we seem to be 
more justified in claiming that the former has more in common with English 
aristocratic men than with the Sudanese refugee (although they are both 
women). So, given that Spelman's task is precisely to show that no single class 
of women exists, Stoljar's critique seems rather misplaced. It seems 
unsurprising that Spelman fails to provide a principled reason for classifying 
women qua women given that she is not aiming to provide such a reason. 
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Resemblance nominalism 
Stoljar takes her discussion of Spelman to show that predicate nominalism is 
not a plausible option when feminist philosophers aim to make sense of the 
class of women. She goes on to make the case for her own preferred nominalist 
version, resemblance nominalism. Certain semantic considerations, Stoljar 
argues, suggest that such a view should be endorsed when classifying women. 
Again, consider the comparison between the Queen and the Sudanese woman. 
It appears that the two women have no single feature in common, but we, 
nevertheless, attribute womanness to them both. As it seems hard to point at 
something shared on the basis of which womanness is attributed, it seem that 
womanness must be extended on the basis of some features the Queen and the 
Sudanese woman individually possess. This suggests the following: "when we 
attribute womanness, we are using a complex 'cluster' concept that picks out 
different arrangements of features in different individuals" (Stoljar 2000: 27). 
The term 'woman' seems to be like the term 'game' Wittgenstein famously 
discusses: if we look at all the various entities called 'games', we "will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them" (Wittgenstein 1997: 31e). Some games are played in a group, 
some alone; some are played by skill, others depend on luck; some games 
involve winning, others not (and so on). Our use of the term 'game' seems to 
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capture a cluster of different features commonly associated with games, not 
some single feature shared by all games. 23 
The term 'woman' (like the term 'game') does not seem to pick out 
entities that share some single feature. Rather, it seems that different uses of the 
term capture features from some (or aU) of the following clusters of features 
that are commonly associated with women: 
(a) Female sex - the characteristics of a human female (XX chromosome, sex 
characteristics and general morphology) and "having other bodily 
characteristics such as gait or voice quality" (Stoljar 1995: 283); 
(b) Phenomenological features "or aspects of what itfeels like to be a woman" 
(Ibid.: 283) - "like having menstrual cramps, and female sexual experience, 
and the 'lived experience' of child-birth, breast-feeding, or at least the 
potential to have such lived experience ... [it] also includes feelings which 
are the product of social factors, like fear of walking on the streets at night 
or fear of rape"; 
(c) Certain roles - wearing typicaIly female clothing, being oppressed on the 
basis of one's sex or undertaking 'private' child-care responsibilities "rather 
than 'public' responsibilities in the wider community"; 
(d) Self-attribution and the attribution of womanness by others - "caIJing 
oneself a woman, being caIled a woman." (Stoljar 1995: 284) 
Thinking of the term 'woman' in this Wittgensteinian manner explains why 
wamanness is attributed to both the Queen and the Sudanese refugee: in both 
cases, the term 'woman' applies due to some features that are particular to the 
individuals in question. 
Stoljar takes the semantics of 'woman' to entail that resemblance 
nominalism should be endorsed (Stoljar 2000: 28). Presumably this is because 
the term seems to pick out individuals that resemble one another, rather than 
23 Stoljar is not alone in suggesting that woman is a cluster concept and that the class 
of women can be made sense using Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances. See 
also Green & Radford Curry (1991) and Nicholson (1994). These theorists do not, 
however, provide full arguments for their views and, as a result, I will not discuss them 
in detail here. 
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individuals who all share some single feature. Resemblance nominalists 
commonly hold that entities are classified together on the basis of a 
resemblance relation that holds between these entities. Some claim that this 
relation is egalitarian whereby x is a member of some class or type F by virtue 
of resembling all other entities that are F (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002). Others 
claim the resemblance relation is aristocratic whereby x is a member of F by 
virtue of resembling some paradigm or exemplar of F (Price 1953). On this 
latter view, paradigms are necessary for cashing out resemblance classes and 
these "standard objects or exemplars" hold a resemblance class together (Price 
1953: 20). Stoljar herself endorses the aristocratic resemblance relation. She 
claims that entities count as women by virtue of resembling an exemplar of the 
type, a woman-paradigm, sufficiently closely (Stoljar 1995: 284). These 
entities (that resemble certain woman-paradigms) are then classified together as 
women. 
The woman-paradigms (on Stoljar's view) are picked out using the four 
clusters of features associated with women (female sex, female 
phenomenology, certain roles associated with women and attribution of 
womanness). These paradigms must possess features from "at least three" of 
the four clusters of features mentioned (although Stoljar admits that this is not 
uncontroversial) (Stoljar 1995: 284). She then goes on to outline four woman-
paradigms claiming "the following group could constitute the exemplars of the 
type", not that these are the only possible exemplars (1995: 284): 
(i) "An Afro-American who has an XX chromosome and female sex 
characteristics, a characteristic female gait, attributes woman ness to 
herself, and is oppressed on the basis of sex; 
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(ii) an Asian-American transsexual who attributes womanness to herself and 
dresses as a female, has female secondary sex characteristics, and has 
many of the elements of female phenomenology though she lacks an XX 
chromosome; 
(iii) a white European hermaphrodite who has been brought up 'as a girl' and 
as a result satisfies typical female roles, has many aspects of female 
phenomenology, and dresses and lives as a female though she lacks 
female sex characteristics; 
(iv) a Papua New Guinean with an XX chromosome and female sex 
characteristics who calls herself a woman and is called a woman, and has 
responsibility for child-rearing and other family oriented tasks." (Stoljar 
1995: 284) 
Stoljar concludes: "any individual resembling any of the paradigms sufficiently 
closely (on Price's account, as closely as they resemble each other) wiII be a 
member of the resemblance class 'woman'" (1995: 284). So, if an individual 
resembles a woman-paradigm sufficiently closely (to the same degree to which 
that paradigm resembles other woman-paradigms), the individual will count as 
a member of the class of women. 
This appears to solve feminist worries over classification. Again, 
consider the Queen and the Sudanese refugee. The Queen differs hugely from 
the woman-paradigms outlined due to her social position, but she seems to 
resemble the third paradigm in that they both come from similar cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds both having being brought up as girls in Europe. They also 
have similar phenomenological experiences and roles (like wearing typically 
female clothing). The Sudanese refugee also differs from these paradigms, but 
she seems to resemble them by virtue of many phenomenological features and 
in her experiences as a woman. She also resembles the paradigms by virtue of 
the tasks and responsibilities she is endowed with as a woman (such as child-
care). Although the two women differ greatly from one another, resemblance 
nominalism enables us to say that they are both members of the same class of 
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women. At the same time, no claims are made about features all women (qua 
women) must share that are likely to be problematic. 
IV 
Despite being able to classify women qua women in a seemingly plausible 
manner, Stoljar's resemblance nominalism is not unproblematic and I argue, it 
should not be endorsed. I will show this with the following two problems. 
Criteria for type membership 
Stoljar's notion of sufficient resemblance seems to be the same as Price's 
(Stoljar 1995: 284). Price claims that "anything which has a sufficient degree of 
resemblance to [certain paradigms] is thereby a member of the class; and 
'resembling them sufficiently' means 'resembling them as closely as they 
resemble each other'" (Price 1953: 22). On this view, the degree to which x 
must resemble the F-paradigms (in order to count as F) should be the same 
degree to which the F-paradigms themselves resemble one another. If the 
paradigms for the type red were a (an entity that is red, square and hot), b (an 
entity that is red, round and cold) and c (an entity that is red, triangular and 
tepid), it is clear that the paradigms resemble one another in only one respect. 
This would then be the degree to which any particular must resemble the red-
paradigms in order to count as red. 
But, it turns out that Stoljar's notion of sufficient resemblance is not so 
clear after all. This is because the woman-paradigms do not resemble one 
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another to any single degree. Recall Stoljar's woman-paradigms. (For quick 
reference, these paradigms are also expressed in a table below.) 
(i) "An Afro-American who has an XX chromosome and female sex 
characteristics, a characteristic female gait, attributes woman ness to 
herself, and is oppressed on the basis of sex; 
(ii) an Asian-American transsexual who attributes womanness to herself and 
dresses as a female, has female secondary sex characteristics, and has 
many of the elements of female phenomenology though she lacks an XX 
chromosome; 
(iii) a white European hermaphrodite who has been brought up 'as a girl' and 
as a result satisfies typical female roles, has many aspects of female 
phenomenology, and dresses and lives as a female though she lacks 
female sex characteristics; 
(iv) a Papua New Guinean with an XX chromosome and female sex 
characteristics who calls herself a woman and is called a woman, and has 
responsibility for child-rearing and other family oriented tasks." (Stoljar 
1995: 284) 
S P R A 
Paradigm (female sex) (phenomenology) (roles) (attribution) 
(i) S (unclear) R A 
(ii) S P R A 
(iii) Not-S P R A 
(iv) S (unclear) R A 
Paradigm (i) resembles paradigm (iii) in only two respects but it resembles 
paradigms (ii) and (iv) in three. Paradigm (iv) resembles paradigm (iii) in only 
two respects but it resembles paradigms (i) and (ii) in three (and so on). As the 
paradigms themselves resemble one another in either two or three respects it 
seems unclear whether a particular should resemble a woman-paradigm in two 
or three respects in order to count as a woman. In fact, this may prove crucial. 
Imagine a black African male-to-female transvestite who has been brought up 
'as a boy' but has always felt uncomfortable of hislher gender. Slhe has decided 
to embrace many roles typically associated with women (like wearing women's 
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clothing) and subsequently attributes womanness to herself (thus possessing 
features R and A). Whether this individual should resemble a woman-paradigm 
in two or three respects, in order to count as a woman, is crucial. If it is the 
former, the black African transvestite will count as a woman (as s/he resembles 
all the woman-paradigms in two respects). But if the degree sufficient for 
classification is the latter, s/he will not (as this individual will not resemble any 
of the woman-paradigms in three respects). 
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra has argued that faced with such problems 
"the sensible thing [for a Pricean resemblance nominalist] to do would be to 
require that ... particulars resemble each paradigm at least as closely as the 
least resembling of the paradigms resemble each other" (2002: 129). In order 
for an entity to count as F, it should resemble the F-paradigms (at least) to the 
same degree the least resembling F-paradigms resemble one another. To 
illustrate, Rodriguez-Pereyra goes on to outline the following table of red-
paradigms that aims to capture the class of red entities (2002: 129). (For 
simplicity he assumes that these paradigms can only have three properties: 
colour, shape and temperature.) 
Colour Shape Temperature 
a Red Square Hot 
b Red Square Cold 
c Red Round Hot 
d Red Round Cold 
These red-paradigms do not resemble one another to any single degree: a 
resembles band c in two respects but resembles d in only one whereas b 
resembles a and d in two respects but resembles c in only one. Again, whether a 
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particular has to resemble the paradigms in one or two respects may prove 
crucial. Imagine e that is red, square and cold. If e has to resemble the 
paradigms in only one respect, it will count as red (since it resembles the 
paradigms in one respect). But if e has to resemble the paradigms in two 
respects, it will not count as red: e does not resemble c in two respects and the 
red-paradigms fail to capture the class of all and only red entities. 
With his modification (that sufficient resemblance should be understood 
as that between the least resembling paradigms, not all), Rodriguez-Pereyra 
goes on to show that the Pricean red-paradigm mentioned appear to 
successfully pick out the class of red entities. The least resembling red-
paradigms are band c as well as a and d. They resemble each other in only one 
respect: a and b resemble in the respects of being red and being square, band c 
in the respect of being red. c and d in the respects of being red and being round, 
a and d in the respect of being red, a and c in the respects of being red and 
being hot and finally, band d in the respects of being red and being cold. As a 
result, to sufficiently resemble the red-paradigms (and to count as red), an 
entity has to resemble the red-paradigms in only one respect (regardless of 
what that respect is). To test whether these paradigms now capture the class of 
red entities, reconsider e that was red, square and cold (and that earlier mayor 
may not have counted as red). This particular now needs to resemble the red-
paradigms in only one respect to count as red and it does: it resembles all of 
them in one respect, that of being red. Imagine another entity y that is blue, 
square and cold. Again, this particular needs to resemble the red-paradigms in 
only one respect to count as red. But we see it does not and (correctly so) will 
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not count as red: y resembles a in being square, b in being cold and being 
square and d in being cold but there is no respect in which y resembles 
paradigm c. The Pricean red-paradigms seem to successfully pick out entities 
that are red on this modified view. 
As Stoljar is committed to a Pricean resemblance relation it seems that 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's modification should also be applied to Stoljar's woman-
paradigms in order to clarify her notion of sufficient resemblance. So, on the 
modified understanding of sufficient resemblance any individual that resembles 
a woman-paradigm to (at least) the same degree that the least resembling 
woman-paradigms resemble one another will count as a woman. The least 
resembling woman-paradigms turn out to be (i) and (iii) and (iii) and (iv). 
S P R A 
Paradigm (female sex) (phenomenology) (roles) (attribution) 
(i) S (unclear) R A 
(ii) S P R A 
(iii) Not-S P R A 
(iv) S (unclear) R A 
The above table of woman-paradigms shows (ii) and (iii) resemble one another 
in three respects (P, R and A). Paradigms (iv) and (i), (i) and (ii) as well as (ii) 
and (iv) also resemble one another in three, albeit different, respects (S, Rand 
A). But paradigms (i) and (iii) and (iii) and (iv) only resemble one another in 
two respects (R and A). So, in order for a particular to count as a woman, this 
particular needs to resemble a woman-paradigm in (at least) two respects 
(regardless of what those respects are). With this in mind, we can see whether 
the black African transvestite mentioned counts as a woman or not. On the 
138 
modified understanding of sufficient resemblance s/he does: slhe resembles all 
of the woman-paradigms sufficiently (in two respects, R and A). I suspect 
Stoljar would be happy with this result and it seems Rodriguez-Pereyra's 
modification has clarified Stoljar's notion of sufficient resemblance in a 
desirable manner. 
This clarification does not, however, render Stoljar's position 
unproblematic. Unlike Price, who maintained that an entity must resemble all 
F-paradigms in order to count as F, Stoljar maintains that resembling only one 
paradigm is sufficient for classification (Stoljar 1995: 284). For Stoljar, in order 
to count as a woman an individual only needs to resemble one woman-
paradigm sufficiently closely (as closely as the least resembling woman-
paradigms resemble one another). This has detrimental consequences, however, 
as the criterion for membership in the class of women becomes too loose. 
Imagine an elderly Scotsman who stays home caring for his sick wife and fears 
walking in the streets at night dreading, perhaps, that he might be attacked. This 
individual will, on Stoljar's criterion, count as a woman because he resembles 
paradigms (ii) and (iii) sufficiently (in two respects): in the respect of having 
certain phenomenological features associated with women (P) due to his fear of 
walking in the streets at night and in the respect of engaging in typically female 
roles (R) since he stays home taking care of his spouse. The elderly Scotsman 
will count as a woman because he sufficiently resembles an Asian-American 
transsexual and a white European hermaphrodite. But claiming that this 
individual is a woman on any grounds (let alone on the ones Stoljar's view 
entails) simply seems counter-intuitive and a case of mistaken classification. 
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Take another individual, for instance, George W. Bush. He is male and 
he undertakes highly 'public' responsibilities as he is a very well-known 
politician (rather than undertaking typically female '''private' responsibilities" 
[Stoljar 1995: 284]). Given George W. Bush's high profile job, he is unlikely to 
feel safe going for a stroll alone at night in the streets of Washington DC; even 
during daytime he is surrounded by numerous bodyguards when appearing in 
public. On Stoljar's model, George W. Bush would also count as a woman 
since he resembles paradigm (iii), a white European hermaphrodite, in (at least) 
two respects: in the respect of lacking female sex characteristics (not-S) and in 
the respect of having some aspects of female phenomenology (P) as it is 
unlikely that George W. Bush feels safe walking in the streets alone at night. 
Yet few (if any) think that he should be classified as a woman. Given that the 
elderly Scot and the current occupant of the White House counter-intuitively 
and falsely count as women, the woman-paradigms clearly fail to collect all 
and only women. 
Prima facie Stoljar has an easy way out. Following Price, she could 
insist that entities should resemble all the woman-paradigms in order to count 
as women. But it seems very unlikely she could commit herself to this. In order 
to count as a woman-paradigm, an individual must exhibit features from (at 
least) three of the four clusters of features that pick our paradigms (female sex, 
certain phenomenological features, typical female roles and attribution of 
womanness). Now, it seems to me that numerous individuals would count as 
woman-paradigms with the result that Stoljar's class of woman-paradigms 
would be huge. And to insist that one must sufficiently resemble all of these 
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woman-paradigms (in order to count as a woman) no longer seems sensible; in 
fact, it looks quite improbable that any individual could resemble all the 
numerous woman-paradigms. It also seems Stoljar herself thinks this is 
improbable. Time and again she acknowledges the numerous and diverse ways 
in which women differ and it is precisely for this reason that she argues for 
resemblance nominalism. 
As a response to what I have argued, it might be claimed that George 
W. Bush does not resemble paradigm (iii) in such a way that I can claim he 
counts as a woman. This is because one of the two respects in which he 
resembles the white European hermaphrodite is not relevant for being a woman: 
one of the respects in which he resembles the paradigm is by not having female 
sex characteristics and as this is something we do not commonly think of as 
relevant for womanhood, George W. Bush does not count as a woman. 
However, this response does not succeed. On Stoljar's position all that is 
needed for George W. Bush to count as a woman is that he resembles a 
woman-paradigm sufficiently closely regardless of which features are 
responsible for this. Of course, in order for an entity to be a woman-paradigm, 
possession of certain features indicative of womanhood are relevant and when 
constructing the class of woman-paradigms, possessing female sex 
characteristics is a relevant feature. But in order to be classified as a woman (on 
this view), there are no relevant features that must be had apart from the feature 
of sufficiently resembling a paradigm. Being classified as a woman does not 
depend on sufficient resemblance in some relevant respects - it depends on 
sufficiently resembling a woman-paradigm regardless of what the respects are 
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with which this takes place and regardless of whether we commonly regard 
those respects as relevant for womanhood. Moreover, resemblance to a 
paradigm is crucial for Stoljar. If being a member of the class of women were 
merely a matter of possessing some relevant features, woman-paradigms would 
be unnecessary; individuals would be members of this class simply by virtue of 
possessing those relevant features. But this is something Stoljar explicitly 
rejects (1995: 283). 
My presentation of Stoljar's view might be further objected to by 
claiming that the criterion for classification is stricter than I allowed. On this 
suggestion, sufficient resemblance should not be understood in two, but rather, 
three respects. Although Stoljar is not explicit about paradigms (i) and (iv) 
having any female phenomenological features, it seems implicitly that they do. 
This is because (at least some of) the phenomenological features outlined seem 
to causally follow from a female sex. For instance, having female reproductive 
organs seems to provide at least a potential for childbirth (something Stoljar 
includes in her list of phenomenological features). As this is so, the least 
resembling woman-paradigms would be (i) and (iii), (ii) and (iii) as well as (iii) 
and (iv) resembling one another in three respects (P, R and A). The criterion for 
classification would then be stricter and in order to count as a woman, one 
would have to resemble a woman-paradigm in three (rather than two) respects. 
However, the criterion for membership in the class of women would 
still be too loose. The elderly Scotsman described above would still qualify for 
membership in the class as he resembles the white European hermaphrodite 
sufficiently closely (in three respects): lacking female sex characteristics (not-
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S), having certain phenomenological features (P) and engaging in typically 
female tasks and roles (R). Even though some individuals that earlier counted 
as women would no longer do so (like George W. Bush), numerous others 
would stiIl counter-intuitively count as women. For example, every male 
prisoner who fears rape and has been selected to engage in so-called 'domestic 
tasks' usually associated with women (like cooking, cleaning, laundry and so 
on) would count as a woman. After all, they sufficiently resemble paradigm 
(iii), the white European hermaphrodite, in three respects: lacking female sex 
characteristics, having certain phenomenological features associated with 
women (fear of rape) and engaging in typically feminine domestic tasks. This 
consequence is, however, clearly absurd. 
Criteria for being a paradigm 
As I argued above, the criterion for being classified as a woman seems too 
loose and many individuals counter-intuitively count as women. This was 
because the notion of sufficient resemblance was problematic. But classifying 
women (qua women) in the manner Stoljar suggests is problematic for another 
reason as well. The classes (or types) man and woman tum out to overlap to a 
large extent due to the criterion for being a woman- or man-paradigm. Stoljar 
maintains that any individual will be a woman-paradigm as long as that 
individual possesses some features from three of the four clusters of features 
mentioned (sex, phenomenology, roles and attribution) (Stoljar 1995: 284). 
Furthennore, it seems one only needs to possess a single aspect listed under a 
specific feature in order to possess the feature or, in Stoljar's words, "to satisfy" 
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a feature (1995: 282). For example, the list of phenomenological features (P) 
includes a whole host of different phenomena ranging from physical features 
(like female sexual experiences and childbirth) to social factors (such as the fear 
of rape). Now, it seems that only one aspect listed under the heading of 
'phenomenological features' needs to be possessed in order for an individual to 
possess the feature ofJemale phenomenology. 
Stoljar is not explicit about this. But, I argue, this is so. For example, 
paradigm (i) is clearly taken to satisfy certain roles associated with women (R) 
but in her description of (i), Stoljar only mentions one aspect listed under this 
feature: that (i) is oppressed on the basis of her sex. Unless (i) satisfied the 
feature (R) on the basis of this single aspect mentioned (sex-based oppression), 
(i) would not satisfy the criterion for being a woman-paradigm since she would 
possess features from only two of the four clusters mentioned. It seems then 
that one only needs to possess a single aspect listed under a feature in order to 
possess that feature (in order to possess S, P, R or A). 
Stoljar goes on to claim that one of the main advantages of her approach 
is that individuals like the male-to-female transvestite character Dil in the 
movie Crying Game count as women because Dil resembles sufficiently a 
woman-paradigm. She "dresses as a woman, has the gait and bearing of a 
woman and hence has womanness attributed to her by others, [Oil] also has 
many aspects of female phenomenology" (Stoljar 1995: 285). As a result, Dil 
counts as a woman resembling paradigms (ii) and (iii) in (at least) three 
respects: with respect to phenomenology, roles and attribution of woman ness. 
Now, I am happy to classify Oil is as a woman. However, following Stoljar Oil 
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would not only count as a woman; she would also count as a woman-paradigm 
by possessing features from (at least) three of the four clusters of features that 
pick out woman-paradigms. And this in my view generates a serious worry. 
To spell out this worry more clearly, consider how men in Stoljar's 
account would be classified together. Different uses of the term 'man' would 
capture a cluster of features commonly associated with men and it seems fair to 
assume that these would be largely parallel to those captured by 'woman': male 
sex, male phenomenological experiences, male roles and attributions of 
manness. Certain man-paradigms could then be picked out and in order to 
count as a man, one must sufficiently resemble such a paradigm. It also seems 
fair to assume that the criterion for being a man-paradigm would be parallel to 
the criterion for being a woman-paradigm: one has to possess features from 
three of the four clusters of features mentioned that our use of 'man' captures. 
Now, Stoljar claims that Dil (who, she earlier argued, counts as a 
woman) also "satisfies many of the features of the concept 'man' and in 
principle could be a member of the type 'man'" (1995: 285). Dil has human 
male sex characteristics, Dil can be said to have a range of male 
phenomenological features (like male sexual experiences), Dil engages 
occasionally in typically male roles (like wearing male clothing) and Dil has 
maleness attributed to him when his sex characteristics are revealed (Dil is 
called 'a man'). Possessing these features means that Dil would be classified as 
a man as he (supposedly) resembles some man-paradigm sufficiently closely. 
However, it seems to me that Dil would also count as a man-paradigm 
possessing features from (at least) three of the four clusters of features that pick 
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out man-paradigms. Oil not only counts as both a man and a woman. Oil, in 
fact, counts as both a woman-paradigm and a man-paradigm.24 
Oue to this, the criterion for being a paradigm (woman or man) is 
problematic. As Oil can be a paradigm for two classes, any individual that 
sufficiently resembles Oil will count as a member of both classes. In other 
words, if x is both an F -paradigm and a G-paradigm, any other particular that 
sufficiently resembles x will count as both F and G. The upshot of this is that 
any particular that sufficiently resembles Oil (and individuals like Oil) will 
count as both a woman and a man. The two classes (man and woman) end up 
picking out many of the same individuals as their members and, as a result, the 
distinction between women and men largely dissolves. 
Again consider the Queen. She has female sex characteristics, attributes 
womanness to herself, dresses as a woman and has female phenomenological 
experiences (such as having experienced childbirth). Insofar as the Queen 
resembles Oil sufficiently closely (in that they both attribute womanness to 
themselves, they both exhibit certain roles associated with women and they 
both have certain phenomenological features) the Queen counts as a woman. 
But because the Queen resembles Dil sufficiently closely, she will also count as 
a man. It seems that the same would also be true of the Sudanese refugee and 
Princess Royal. Then again, take our old friend George W. Bush. He has male 
sex characteristics, attributes manness to himself and he seems to experience 
24 Possessing certain features that pick out paradigms seems to be context-dependent. 
For example, only after Dil reveals his sex characteristics in the film Crying Game, is 
manness attributed to him. Given that this is the case, it is not problematic to claim Dil 
possesses features associated with both being a woman and being a man. 
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many phenomenological features associated with men. George W. Bush 
resembles Dil in three respects (with respect to male sex, attribution of 
maleness and male phenomenological features such as male sexual experience). 
As a result, George W. Bush counts as a man. The film actor John Wayne and 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant also seem to count as men on this criterion. But 
they not only count as men, they also count as women as they resemble Dil 
sufficiently closely. As it turns out both types man and woman pick out the 
Queen, her daughter, George W. Bush, John Wayne, the Sudanese woman 
displaced by ethnic cleansing and the philosopher Immanuel Kant (to name but 
few). 
Not only is this absurd and counter-intuitive: it is also false. Moreover, 
Stoljar argues for resemblance nominalism in order to make sense of the class 
of women for feminist political purposes. On her view, however, this class 
includes individuals who we think of as men. Given Stoljar's political goals, 
this is highly undesirable: clearly the manner in which the class of women on 
this view is made sense of cannot ground feminist politics that aims to work on 
women's behalf only. Following Stoljar. the class of women would include not 
only a woman who is a victim of sexual abuse, but it would also include George 
W. Bush and Immanuel Kant: two individuals who hardly need or should 
receive feminist political representation.25 
25 These are not the only problems with Stoljar's position. Consider an objection 
Russell levels against resemblance nominalism in general. He claims that "[ilf we wish 
to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity. we shall choose some particular 
patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or triangle if it 
has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the resemblance 
required will have to be a universal. Since there are many white things, the 
resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is the 
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Stoljar's manner of classifying women, I argued, is not plausible and should not 
be endorsed. For a start, the criterion for membership in the class of women is 
too loose, being unable to capture all and only women. Then again, the criterion 
for being a woman-paradigm was problematic since it allowed for some 
individuals to count as paradigms for both womanness and manness. As I 
argued above, this has the consequence of dissolving the distinction between 
men and women to a large extent. As it turns out, Stoljar fails to make sense of 
the class of women that would justify feminist action on behalf of women. 
characteristic of a universal" (Russell 1967: 55). Russell's idea is that in order to 
account for resemblance or a resemblance structure, some reference to a feature shared 
by all entities of a particular sort will have to be made. Pricean resemblance 
nominalists will have to admit that all white entities (for example) will share the 
feature of sufficiently resembling a white-paradigm. This would be a feature all white 
entities have in common and it would be necessary and sufficient for whiteness. It 
seems that Stoljar endorses precisely such a view and that women on her account share 
something that is necessary and sufficient for womanness: they all resemble a womao-
paradigm sufficiently closely. As it turns out, women would be classified together on 
the basis of this shared feature. Stoljar seems to do just the thing she wanted to avoid: 
she provides an account of gender that relies on a feature necessary and sufficient for 
womanness that women have in common. 
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CHAPTERS 
IIASLANGER, OPPRESSION AND WOMEN 
I 
In the three previous chapters, I have argued against certain gender nominalist 
ways to make sense of the class of women. Contra such views, Sally Haslanger 
has argued for a gender realist position in her paper "Gender and Race: (What) 
are they? (What) do we want them to be?" (2000b; see also Haslanger 2005). 
Haslanger's views are strikingly different from those commonly held by 
feminist theorists and from those considered previously. She writes: "In the 
context of feminist theory, realism about both kinds and types ... is generally 
assumed not to be an option. Forms of scepticism and nominalism are by far the 
preferred positions. This, I think, is a mistake" (Haslanger 2000a: 117). 
Haslanger argues further that women do share something that grounds 
classification and that makes them women: they all occupy sex-marked socially 
subordinate positions. Understanding womanness in this way (Haslanger goes 
on to suggest) enables feminist theorists to employ gender concepts man and 
woman as tools with which to fight against sexist injustices (Haslanger 2000b: 
Although I find Haslanger's position refreshing and she makes many (in 
my view) correct observations about recent gender nominalist accounts, I will 
argue that her position is also unsatisfying. Despite thinking that she is right to 
insist that women have something in common qua women, I will, nevertheless, 
26 In her paper, Haslanger also argues for racial concepts with which racist injustices 
can be fought. However, I will not discuss her position on race here. 
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argue that the feature Haslanger thinks women share generates problems for her 
position. First, Haslanger's position ends up having politically undesirable 
consequences and, second, it ends up providing a rather unintuitive view of 
womanness that many (I suspect) would find foreign. I go on to argue, contra 
Haslanger, that a more intuitive picture of womanness would be better suited for 
feminist political endeavours. To begin with I will map out some background to 
Haslanger's position (in section II). In section III, I will outline her definitions 
of woman and man in more detail. Next I consider how Haslanger's position 
responds to worries raised by Spelman and Butler (in section IV). I end with a 
discussion of the shortcomings of her position (in section V). 
II 
How does Haslanger propose we can make sense of the class of women? How 
do the Queen and the Sudanese refugee on this view both count as women? 
Haslanger's reply is straightforward. The two have something in common that 
makes them women: they both occupy sexually marked subordinate social 
positions. (This answer may surprise many since the Queen does not appear to 
be particularly disadvantaged due to her social position. In fact, it may turn out 
that following Haslanger's definition of woman, the Queen will not count as a 
woman although she does count as a female human being. I will return to this 
shortly.) In order to argue for her view, Haslanger begins by outlining an 
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approach that she believes feminist philosophers should endorse when defining 
gender concepts. Haslanger calls this an analytical approach27: 
"On this approach the task is not to explicate our ordinary concepts; nor is it to 
investigate the kind that we mayor may not be tracking with our everyday 
conceptual apparatus; instead we begin by considering more fully the 
pragmatics of our talk employing the terms in question. What is the point of 
having these concepts? What cognitive or practical task do they (or should 
they) enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our 
(legitimate) purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these purposes 
better?" (Haslanger 2000b: 33) 
Haslanger contrasts the analytical approach with two other (on her view) 
unsatisfying approaches. First, she contrasts it with a conceptual inquiry that 
"seeks an articulation of our [ordinary] concepts" and second, with a descriptive 
inquiry that focuses on the extension of our everyday concepts in order to 
determine whether natural or social kinds man and woman exist that our use of 
the concepts man and woman tracks (Haslanger 2000b: 33). 
Haslanger's reasons for rejecting these two approaches and for 
endorsing the analytical (or ameliorative) inquiry are pragmatic. She claims not 
to be interested in capturing the nuances of our ordinary concepts woman and 
man but rather she wants to examine and revise those concepts for certain 
theoretical and political purposes. The analytical (or ameliorative) project will 
not merely aim to define the terms in question; it also aims to show why we 
need gender concepts and what purposes do they serve. Haslanger writes: 
"The responsibility is ours to define them [man and woman] for our purposes. 
In doing so we will want to be responsive to some aspects of ordinary usage 
(and to aspects of both the connotation and extension of the terms). However, 
neither ordinary usage nor empirical investigation is overriding, for there is a 
stipulative element to the project: this is the phenomenon we need to be 
thinking about. Let the term in question refer to it. On this [analytical] 
27 In her recent work, Haslanger calls this approach ameliorative, not analytical 
(Haslanger 2005). 
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approach, the world by itself can't tell us what gender is ... it is up to us to 
decide what in the world, if anything, [it is]." (2000b: 34) 
As mentioned, Haslanger holds that gender concepts are needed to 
"fight against [sexist] injustice" (2000b: 36). This in mind, she claims that a 
viable concept of woman (with which sexist injustices can be fought) must be 
responsive to four concerns: the concept must be able to be used to identify 
persistent gender inequalities; it must be such that various differences amongst 
women can be recognised; woman must be such that we can use it to examine 
whether disciplines that appear to be gender neutral are in fact gender biased; 
and finally, woman must be such that it can help feminists to "develop an 
understanding of agency that will aid feminist ... efforts to empower critical 
social agents" (Haslanger 2000b: 36). 
The analytical approach Haslanger endorses is further informed by 
material feminism that takes the material realities of women's lives as crucial 
for a proper understanding of gender. This strategy provides an analysis of 
gender that "defines [it], in the primary sense, as a social class" (Haslanger 
2000b: 37). It "undertakes to explain a variety of connected phenomena in 
terms of their relations to one that is theorized as the central or core 
phenomenon" (Haslanger 2000b: 37). Defining woman in this manner means 
that we theorize a particular phenomenon of women's lives as central to all 
other phenomena women encounter and explain the latter in terms of the central 
or core phenomenon. 
What is the core phenomenon central to women's lives on Haslanger's 
analytical approach? Haslanger thinks that this is social subordination: "males 
and females not only differ physically, but [they] also systematically differ in 
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their social positions" (2000b: 38). Generally speaking, societies are structured 
such that those individuals with male bodies are privileged whereas those with 
female bodies are subordinate. This leads Haslanger to conclude: 
"The core phenomenon to be addressed is the pattern of social relations that 
constitute the social classes of men as dominant and women as subordinate; 
norms, symbols, and identities are gendered in relation to the social relations 
that constitute gender." (2000b: 37) 
For Haslanger, gender is not a set of psychological dispositions or an identity, a 
set of attributes that denote 'masculinity' and 'femininity' or certain way of 
adhering to gender norms that define certain gender roles. For her, gender 
denotes a social class that people belong to by virtue of occupying sex-marked 
social positions as either subordinate or dominant. 
III 
Examining women's lives illustrates that more often than not, women occupy 
subordinate social positions whereas men occupy dominant positions. As this is 
so, woman is to be defined "in terms of women's subordinate position in 
systems of male dominance" (Haslanger 2000b: 38). Haslanger summarises this 
view in the following manner: 
"Gender categories are defined in terms of how one is socially positioned '" 
[they] are defined hierarchically within a broader complex of oppressive 
relations; one group (viz., women) is socially positioned as subordinate to the 
other (viz., men), [where] [s]exual difference functions as the physical marker 
to distinguish the two groups, and is used in the justification of viewing and 
treating the members of each group differently." (2000b: 38) 
She goes on to provides a tentative definition of woman: 
"s is a woman iff S is systematically subordinated along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is 'marked' as a target for 
this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be 
evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction." (Haslanger 2000b: 
39) 
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This definition requires some clarification. Firstly, what counts as 
evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction? Haslanger is not explicit 
about this. However, she seems to think that such a role is not coextensive with 
sex characteristics: 
"These analyses [of gender] allow that there isn't a common understanding of 
'sex' across time and place. On my account, gendered social positions are 
those marked by reference to features that are generally assumed in the context 
in question to either explain or provide evidence of reproductive role, whether 
or not these are features that we consider 'sex'." (Haslanger 2000b: 53) 
It seems to me that perhaps certain features we commonly take to enable child 
bearing and lactation would be the kind of evidence Haslanger has in mind. 
Probably the most obvious cues of childbearing capabilities are features such as 
breasts, a certain body shape and wide curvy hips. It seems that other cues not 
directly relevant to reproduction might also count as evidence of this sort. I 
have in mind features such as having a certain hairstyle associated with women, 
wearing make-up and dressing in clothing typicalIy associated with women. 
Saying this, the sort of evidence Haslanger has in mind seems to depend 
largely on the context in which an individual exhibits these features. For 
instance, if George W. Bush addressed the American people wearing a dress, I 
suspect nobody would think this is evidence of George W. Bush's female role 
in reproduction. This is because he is a familiar figure and wearing a dress in 
this context is out of the ordinary. However, think back to the previous chapter 
and the character of Dil in the movie Crying Game. The cues (wearing female 
clothing, make-up and appearing to have a female body) are sufficient to 
suggest that Dil has features indicative of a female role in reproduction. This is 
because within the context of the movie, these cues do not seem out of place. 
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The second issue in need of clarification is this: what is it to be 
systematically subordinated (or oppressed) by virtue of certain bodily features 
indicative of femaleness? Haslanger elaborates on this drawing from Marilyn 
Frye (1983) and Iris Marion Young (1990). First, she takes oppression (or 
subordination which Haslanger uses interchangeably with oppression) as "a 
structural phenomenon that positions certain groups as disadvantaged and 
others as advantaged or privileged in relation to them" (Haslanger 2000b: 39). 
Oppression 
"refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of 
often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in 
ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of 
bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms - in short. [oppression 
happens during] the normal processes of everyday life." (Young 1990: 41) 
Oppression of this sort commonly takes five forms: exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and (systematic) violence 
(Young 1990: 40).28 Haslanger points out further that not only can oppression 
take many different forms but it can also be extended along different 
dimensions of social life. One might be extremely privileged on some aspect 
(for instance, one's economic position) and yet be hugely disadvantaged on 
another (for instance, on racial grounds). It may even be that "one might be 
28 Young's theory of oppression is formulated from a Marxist perspective with the 
emphasis on exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and 
violence due to people's economic classes. Much of her discussion deals with how the 
economic structures of production position individuals as subordinate given their race, 
gender or age. Such a heavy reliance on Marxist theory of production and class 
struggle ill fits Haslanger's aim. After all, women seem to be oppressed on numerous 
grounds and a theory of gender that takes oppression as central must recognise this. 
Haslanger appears to agree with this and intends Young's theory of oppression to 
capture exploitation. marginalisation, powerlessness. cultural imperialism and violence 
in general. 
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systematically subordinated along some social axis, and yet be tremendously 
privileged in one's overall social position" (Haslanger 2000b: 40). 
Then again, what does 'being oppressed as a woman' mean? Haslanger 
explains this quoting Frye: being oppressed as a woman means that having a 
female body is "significantly attached to whatever disadvantages and 
deprivations she suffers, be they great or small ... [In contrast,] [b]eing male is 
something [a man] has going/or him, even if race or class or age or disability is 
going against him" (Frye 1983: 16). Frye's thought (which Haslanger endorses) 
is that having a certain kind of body marks an individual and justifies the 
individual's position in oppressive social relations. In particular, 
"[i]n the case of women, the idea is that societies are guided by representations 
that link being female with other facts that have implications for how one 
should be viewed and treated; insofar as we structure our social life to 
accommodate the cultural meanings of the female (and male) body, females 
occupy an oppressed social position." (Haslanger 2000b: 40) 
That having certain bodily features is linked to an oppressed (or subordinated) 
social position is the result of certain cultural norms that create meanings 
imposed on sexed bodies. Haslanger argues that the reason having a female 
body significantly disadvantages individuals is because of certain norms, 
beliefs, ideologies and myths about sex that are dominant within our particular 
social structures and where the "dominant ideologies and dominant social 
structures ... work together to bias the micro-level interactions ... so that for 
the most part males are privileged and females are disadvantaged" (Haslanger 
2000b: 41). 
Having clarified her position, Haslanger modifies the tentative definition 
of woman. She writes: 
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"S is a woman iff 
(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in 
reproduction; 
(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's 
society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position 
that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying 
such a position); and 
(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic 
subordination, i.e., along some dimension, S's social position is oppressive, 
and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of 
subordination." (Haslanger 2oo0b: 42) 
She goes on to offer a complementary definition of man: 
"s is a man iff 
(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have certain 
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male's biological role in 
reproduction; 
(ij) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S' s 
society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social position 
that are in fact privileged (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such 
a position); and 
(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic privilege, 
i.e., along some dimension, S's social position is privileged, and S's 
satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of privilege." (2000b: 
42) 
Haslanger's point is that anyone who is judged to possess certain bodily 
features indicative of a female reproductive role is positioned such that they 
occupy a subordinate social position and thus, will count as a woman. Women 
(qua women) occupy subordinate social positions due to certain meanings 
given to their sexed bodies and occupying such positions is definitive of 
womanness: being a woman means that one is subject to sex-marked oppressive 
sort of treatment. Then again, anyone who is judged to possess certain bodily 
features indicative of a male reproductive role is positioned in a privileged 
manner and will count as a man. 
Haslanger is cautious (and rightly so) about what occupying these kinds 
of social positions entails. She suggests that on her account a Chinese woman 
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of the 1790s, a Brazilian woman of the 1890s and an American woman of the 
1990s all count as women "insofar as their subordinate positions are marked 
and justified by reference to (female) sex" (Haslanger 2000b: 39). But clearly 
the subordinate positions these three women occupy are very different from one 
another: 
"For example, a privileged White woman and a Black woman of the 
underclass will both be women insofar as their social positions are affected by 
the social meanings of being female; and yet the social implications of being 
female vary for each because sexism is intertwined with race and class 
oppression." (Haslanger 2oo0b: 39) 
She goes on to acknowledge that of course sexism is not the only source of 
oppression: 
"For example, in the contemporary US, there are contexts in which being 
Black and male marks one as a target for certain forms of systematic violence 
(e.g., by the police). In those contexts, contrary to Frye's suggestion, being 
male is not something that a man 'has going for him'; though there are other 
contexts (also in the contemporary US) in which Black males benefit from 
being male. In examples of this sort, the systematic violence against males as 
males is emasculating .,. but there are important differences between an 
emasculated man and a woman. On the sort of view we're considering, a 
woman is someone whose subordinated status is marked by reference to 
(assumed)female anatomy; someone marked for subordination by reference to 
(assumed) male anatomy does not qualify as a woman, but also, in the 
particular context, is not socially positioned as a man." (2000b: 41) 
Haslanger's point is that even though it seems a black man (by virtue of having 
features indicative of a male role in reproduction) is positioned as privileged in 
comparison to women, his skin colour will position him as subordinate in 
societies where racism is commonplace. 
In order to accommodate differences in social contexts, Haslanger 
distinguishes between having a gender and functioning as that gender. She 
claims that "a woman may not always function socially as a woman; a man may 
not always function socially as a man" (Haslanger 2000b: 42). The black male 
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who occupies a privileged social position due to certain meanings his maleness 
is endowed with will not always function as a man because certain racist 
meanings his skin colour is endowed with position him as oppressed. Consider, 
for instance, Nelson Mandela. On Haslanger's view, certain sex-marked 
features position Nelson Mandela as privileged in comparison to black South 
African women. Insofar as this is the case, Nelson Mandela satisfies the 
concept man. But his skin colour positions Nelson Mandela in certain contexts 
as oppressed and in those contexts he does not function as a man. Although 
Nelson Mandela seems to satisfy the concept man, it seems that he does not 
always function as if he satisfied that concept (since, in certain contexts, his 
skin colour positions him as oppressed although he is a man). 
Haslanger defines to function as a woman in specific contexts in the 
following manner: 
"s functions as a woman in context C iff 
(i) S is observed or imagined in C to have certain bodily features presumed to 
be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction; 
(ii) that S has these features marks S within the background ideology of C as 
someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social positions that are in 
fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's occupying such a 
position); and 
(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic 
subordination in C, i.e., along some dimension, S's social position in C is 
oppressive, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension of 
subordination." (2000b: 42-3) 
Haslanger notes that although someone who counts as a woman on this view 
may not always socially function as a woman, this does not suggest that the 
individual has functioned or counted as a man. So, even though Nelson 
Mandela did not function as a man during the years he spend imprisoned by 
South African government, this does not mean that during this time he 
functioned as a woman or that he ceased to be a man. 
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IV 
Haslanger recognises that her position is controversial. She also recognises that 
in order for her position to get off the ground, she must be able to adequately 
respond to the challenges set by Butler and Spelman (cf. chapter 1). To recap, 
Spelman (1990) questions whether women qua women share anything that 
makes them women whereas Butler (1999) "raises the concern that any 
definition of 'what woman is' is value-laden, and will marginalize certain 
females, privilege others, and reinforce current gender norms" (Haslanger 
2000b: 37). Haslanger's response to these feminist philosophers is novel 
amongst recent feminist philosophy. Even though she takes both Spelman and 
Butler to raise questions that sorely needed answering, Haslanger goes on to 
claim that what Spelman and Butler argue for do not threaten her position. 
Consider commonality. Haslanger remarks that "[o]n my analysis 
women are those who occupy a particular kind of social position, viz., one of 
sexually-marked subordinate. So women have in common that their (assumed) 
sex has socially disadvantaged them" (2000b: 45). This (she claims) is not 
problematic though. As being subordinate depends on numerous culturally 
variable social meanings imposed on sexed bodies, sexually marked 
subordination takes numerous different and culturally specific forms. This is 
evident in Haslanger's example described above. The American woman of the 
1990s will count as a woman on the basis of the same general criterion as the 
Brazilian woman living in the 1890's did in that they are both subject to 
sexually marked subordination. But the nature of this sexually marked 
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subordination differs as different societies and time periods endow sexed bodies 
with different meanings. As this is so, Haslanger claims her position is not 
refuted by an appeal to women's particularity since what Haslanger takes 
women to share qua women does not have a culturally uniform and trans-
historical form. 
Then again, consider Butler's normativity problem. Butler argued that 
all definitions of woman are politically insidious marginalizing some females 
while privileging others. As a result, all views that offer a uniform definition of 
woman should be rejected (Butler 1999). Now Haslanger does indeed offer a 
uniform definition of woman. She also offers a view whereby some females are 
excluded and marginalised: those who are not subject to any form of sexually 
marked subordination. Non-oppressed females will simply not count as women 
and they will be excluded from feminist politics on the view Haslanger is 
putting forward. However, Haslanger does not see the exclusionary and 
marginalising effects of her view as problematic. In fact, she holds that 
achieving a state of affairs where lots of females are excluded from feminist 
politics would be highly desirable as it would mean that feminists are achieving 
their goal: the end of women's oppression. Haslanger writes: 
"On the account I've offered, it is true that certain females don't count as 'real' 
women; and it is true that I've privileged certain facts of women's lives as 
definitive ... it may be that non-oppressed females are marginalized within my 
account, but that is because for the broader purposes at hand - relative to the 
feminist and anti racist values guiding our project - they are not the ones who 
matter." (2000b: 46) 
She goes on to claim: "I believe it is part of the project of feminism to bring 
about a day when there are no more women (though, of course, we should not 
aim to do away with females!)" (Haslanger 2000b: 46). That certain females are 
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excluded and marginalized (Haslanger thinks) is hugely desirable from a 
feminist perspective because it means they are not oppressed on any sex-
marked grounds. 
V 
I find many of Haslanger's suggestions appealing. I agree with her that the class 
of women must be made sense of. I also agree that in doing so we should not 
assume gender nominalism is the only (or the best) option. Despite this, I 
disagree with certain aspects of her suggestion. In particular, it seems to me that 
Haslanger's way of defining womanness does not deliver the political benefits 
Haslanger thinks it does. First, it seems her suggestion suffers because the 
notion of oppression Haslanger endorses is inadequate. Second, Haslanger's 
position (I argue) is unintuitive. It does not cohere well with common intuitions 
about women and womanness: something that (it seems to me) is important for 
any plausible feminist theory of gender. As this is the case, Haslanger's 
suggestion is unsatisfying and, I suggest, feminist philosophers should feel 
reluctant to endorse it. Saying this, it is not my intention to show that there is 
something unreparably wrong in Haslanger's way of defining gender. Rather, 
my point is this: a satisfying way to make sense of gender classes should cohere 
well with our intuitions about gender. Haslanger's definition of woman, 
however, does not appear to do so. 
Before I go on to show that Haslanger's notion of oppression is 
inadequate and to suggest that perhaps a position that cohered better with our 
intuitions would be more desirable, I will briefly discuss the role femaleness 
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plays in Haslanger's proposal. As it stands, the role that sexed bodies play in 
Haslanger's definition of woman is somewhat puzzling and her definition turns 
out to have some problematic results: it ends up excluding certain individuals 
from the scope of feminist politics for seemingly wrong reasons. I then suggest 
a modification to Haslanger's definition of woman that avoids this result. 
Definition of woman and being female 
Haslanger offers an account of womanness that (she claims) depends on certain 
social factors: being subject to sexually marked subordination due to social 
meanings sexed bodies are endowed with. Haslanger is explicit and clear about 
this. She claims: "gender [on my view] is not defined in terms of an 
individual's intrinsic physical or psychological features" (Haslanger 2000b: 
38). Rather, certain social meanings individuals' sexed bodies are endowed 
with determine one's social position and gender. Haslanger claims further that, 
as a result, some individuals can count as women even though they lack female 
bodies. As gender depends on the dominant beliefs, norms and ideologies, 
rather than on some intrinsic physical features males and females possess, sex 
and gender are not coextensive: "once we focus our attention on gender as 
social position, we must allow that one can be a woman without ever (in the 
ordinary sense) 'acting like a woman', 'feeling like a woman', or even having a 
female body" (Haslanger 2oo0b: 38). 
However, if we look at Haslanger's definition of woman more closely it 
seems that this does not hold. Rather, Haslanger's definition of gender appears 
to depend precisely on certain intrinsic physical features and one cannot satisfy 
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the concept woman without being female or without having a female body. 
Reconsider Haslanger's definition of woman: 
"s is a woman iff 
(i) S is regularly and for the most part observed or imagined to have 
certain bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological 
role in reproduction; 
(ii) that S has these features marks S within the dominant ideology of S's 
society as someone who ought to occupy certain kinds of social 
position that are in fact subordinate (and so motivates and justifies S's 
occupying such a position); and 
(iii) the fact that S satisfies (i) and (ii) plays a role in S's systematic 
subordination, i.e., along some dimension, S's social position is 
oppressive, and S's satisfying (i) and (ii) plays a role in that dimension 
of subordination." (2000b: 42) 
In premise (i) Haslanger claims S has to be generally speaking observed or 
imagined to have certain physical features that suggest S has bodily features 
provide evidence of female reproductive functions. (I suggested earlier that 
such features would be, for example, having breasts and relatively wide hips.) 
According to premise (i), whether or not S really has these features is irrelevant 
to S's being a woman. But, in premise (ij) S's being a woman actually depends 
on S having those physical features: "that S has these features marks S" for 
certain sort of treatment (Haslanger 2000b: 42, italics mine). It appears that 
Haslanger holds the following. S is not marked for certain oppressive sort of 
treatment because it is assumed or imagined that S's physical features indicate a 
female reproductive role. S is marked for this sort of treatment because S in 
actual fact has those features. If this is Haslanger's view, then it is necessary 
that S has a female body in order for S to count as a woman. Woman ness seems 
to depend on certain bodily features relevant for female reproductive functions 
and Haslanger's thought that one can be a woman without "even having a 
female body" (2oo0b: 38) does not seem to be possible. If one does not have 
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features that indicate female reproductive functions, one cannot satisfy the 
definition of woman. 
Prima facie this may appear trivial. After all, it seems that (by and 
large) being a woman and being female go together; Haslanger is unwittingly 
pointing to a very common phenomenon. Nonetheless, if we accept this, 
Haslanger's definition (as it stands) has some very problematic consequences. It 
seems that if we accept this definition some individuals who should (it appears) 
be classified as women, will not be so classified. In particular, I have in mind 
male-to-female transvestites and transsexuals who live their lives as women but 
who lack the features female role in reproduction requires. These individuals 
would not count as women and would fall outside the scope of feminist politics. 
Reconsider Dil from the movie Crying Game discussed in the previous 
chapter (chapter 4). Dillives as a woman, is treated as a woman and is taken to 
be a woman by those around her. Only after Dil's sex characteristics are 
revealed (two-thirds of the way into the film), is Dil treated differently: Dil is 
called a 'man' and treated as a man. Intuitively it seems that Dil should count as 
a woman and most viewers (and characters in the film) treated and considered 
Dil to be a woman. But, if Haslanger's definition of woman were accepted as it 
stands, Dil would not count as a woman. She would be an individual that, 
following Haslanger's definition, simply does not matter for feminist politics. 
Imagine the following scenario. Dil works in a hairdressing salon in the movie. 
Suppose a male client refuses to have his hair cut by Dil because he believes 
that women are predisposed to be bad hairdressers. Due to this, he never allows 
women to cut his hair. This customer judges Dil to possess a female body and 
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the beliefs he holds about female bodies appear to disadvantage Oil. Now, Oil 
seems to be precisely the kind of individual feminist politics should aim to aid 
because she seems to be subject to sex-marked subordination. But because Oil 
does not have a female body she fails to satisfy the concept woman and will fall 
outside the scope of feminist politics. 
Consider another case with similar results. Imagine Brenda who is a 40-
year old male-to-female transsexual. Brenda was born male (and lived the first 
20 years of her life as Brendan) but has undergone an extensive sex-change 
operation 20 years ago. Brenda feels like a woman and has (for the past two 
decades) lived as a female. Now, it seems Brenda should count as a woman on 
Haslanger's definition because Brenda (unlike Oil) actually possesses a female 
body. But, it could be claimed that the bodily features Brenda possesses are not 
'real' since they have been surgically created: breasts of a transsexual are not 
really breasts, they are just lumps of tissue, fat and silicone made to look like 
breasts. This type of thinking seems very common. People commonly think that 
(for example) fake fur is not really fur - it is just a chemically produced fur-like 
substance that resembles fur in many ways. Fool's gold is not really gold - it is 
just a substance that closely resembles gold in appearance. Fake snow is not 
really snow - it simply appears to be similar to snow in some respects. Most 
people, I suspect, would maintain that unless one has seen, experienced or 
touched real snow (and not just the fake stufO, one has not seen, experienced or 
touched snow. So, Brenda's artificially created breasts are not really breasts, 
they are simply some material stuff that has been made to look like breasts. 
This suggests that the female bodily features male-to-female transsexuals 
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possess are not really evidence of a female role in reproduction: they simply 
appear as if they were. 
Now imagine further that Brenda is subject to sex-discrimination at her 
workplace. It is very likely that she receives lower pay than her male co-
workers. She might even be subject to serious and damaging sexual harassment 
by her male colleagues. It seems that Brenda should fall right within the scope 
of feminist politics and that feminist politics should precisely aim to aid people 
like her: Brenda appears to be subject to sex-marked oppression. But on 
Haslanger's definition (as it stands) Brenda may not satisfy the criterion for 
being a woman if her bodily features are judged to be simply appearances of 
female bodily features. As a result, Brenda might not satisfy the concept woman 
and if so, she also would fall outside the scope of feminist politics. 
I suspect Haslanger would not be happy with this and that she would not 
want to exclude either Dil or Brenda. And yet, her definition of woman as it 
stands does precisely this. The examples of Dil and Brenda demonstrate that 
individuals might fail to satisfy the concept woman for the wrong reasons. They 
do not fail to satisfy it because they live in a utopian society where females are 
not subject to sex-marked subordination. Rather, they fail to satisfy woman 
because they lack 'real' female bodily features. Now, Haslanger intended her 
position to exclude only non-oppressed females. In order to achieve this, her 
definition of woman must be modified. In particular, Haslanger's second 
premise ('that S has certain features marks S for oppressive sort of treatment') 
must be rewritten to read the following: 'that S has (or is imagined to have) 
certain features marks S for oppressive sort of treatment'. If Dil and Brenda are 
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both imagined to posses 'real' female bodily features that mark them for 
subordinate sort of treatment, the consequences I outlined above are avoided. 
As actual possession of female bodily features is no longer required, Dil and 
Brenda will both count as women and they will fall within the scope of feminist 
politics. This alteration seems to modify Haslanger's position in a desirable 
manner. 
Oppression 
Modifying Haslanger's definition of woman such that premise (ii) reads 'that S 
has (or is imagined to have) features evidence of a female role in 
reproduction .. .' has the consequence of no longer excluding individuals like 
Dil and Brenda from the scope of feminist politics. As mentioned, Haslanger 
would probably be happy with this modification. Nonetheless, I will argue next 
that her position is still problematic. This is because the notion of oppression 
she takes as central to womanness results in individuals counting as women on 
possibly very trivial grounds. Although Haslanger avoids the consequence that 
certain individuals (like George W. Bush) counter-intuitively and falsely count 
as women, I argue that her position classifies women together on too trivial 
grounds as those individuals who are subject to sex-marked subordination. I go 
on to claim that we should ground the class of women on something other than 
oppression or that, at least, we should not ground it on the notion of oppression 
Haslanger currently makes use of. The notion of oppression Haslanger 
currently relies on in fact prevents, rather than facilitates, a change in the status 
quo along the lines feminist theorists (including Haslanger) want. 
168 
Haslanger claims to define woman in tenns of sex-marked subordination 
in order to provide a negative ideal that women will stand up against. She 
writes: 
"The question remains whether my definition of woman helps sustain gender 
hierarchy by implicitly offering a normative ideal of woman. Given that 
women on my definition are an oppressed group, I certainly hope not! Instead, 
the definition is more likely to offer a negative ideal that challenges male 
dominance." (2000b: 46) 
She goes on to suggest: 
"By offering these analyses of our ordinary terms, I call upon us to reject what 
seemed to be positive social identities. I'm suggesting that we should work to 
undermine those forces that make being a man, [or] a woman ... possible; we 
should refuse to be gendered man or woman ... I'm asking us to understand 
ourselves and those around us as deeply molded by injustice and to draw the 
appropriate prescriptive inference." (Haslanger 2000b: 48) 
Haslanger's idea seems to be something like this. By providing a negative ideal 
of what a woman is, she is hoping to empower (and, I suppose, enrage) female 
social agents to stand up and work against their subordination by challenging 
current beliefs, nonns and ideologies. To put this rather bluntly, by portraying 
women as victims Haslanger hopes that women will stand up against their 
victimisation. In so doing, she aims to "contribute to empowering critical social 
agents" (2000b: 48) and to ultimately bring about the day when there are no 
more women (or oppressed females) by undennining "the structures of sexual 
oppression" (2000b: 37). 
Nevertheless, the notion of oppression Haslanger is working with makes 
the criterion for womanness problematic in that the lcind of social change 
Haslanger is after simply cannot be achieved: the criterion for being subject to 
sex-marked subordination is too loose and it appears women would be unable 
to challenge their social positions as oppressed. And this seems hugely 
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undesirable given Haslanger's goals and broad feminist political concerns. 
Consider Young's definition of oppression that Haslanger endorses. 
Oppression, Young argues, "is something that happens to [groups of] people" 
(Young 1990: 40) where these people are subject to one or more of the 
following oppressive phenomena: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism or violence. But, as I argue, endorsing this conception of 
oppression generates problems for Haslanger. Being oppressed as a woman 
turns out to capture numerous different phenomena and, as a result, it seems 
unhelpful to endorse Young's notion of oppression when defining the concept 
woman. This is because even some trivial phenomena can count as sex-marked 
oppression and (Haslanger maintains) as long as females are subject to any 
sexually marked oppressive phenomenon, they will count as women. 
Consider bow ties. Wearing a bow tie is traditionally associated with 
men (and typically with certain stereotypic views about particular kinds of 
men). Generally speaking, it is considered very odd for a woman to wear one. 
Certain cultural and social norms about clothing, feminine and masculine dress 
codes and feminine appearances dictate that this is the case. By virtue of these 
norms and codes. it is traditionally not considered appropriate for women to 
wear bow ties and it seems that this is largely due to certain understandings 
about what individuals with certain physical features should and should not 
wear. The beliefs and ideologies that govern culturally defined clothing norms 
deem those individuals who have features indicative of female reproductive 
roles as individuals who should not wear bow ties. It seems that females in 
being considered to be individuals who should not wear bow ties are 
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marginalized due to certain socially defined meanings their sexed bodies are 
endowed with. Females are marginalized (or excluded) from the activity of 
wearing bow ties and this marginalization is clearly sex-marked. Now, as this 
would be an instance of sex-marked subordination or oppression, any female 
who is considered to be an individual who should not wear bow ties, will count 
as a woman. After all, an individual's overall social position does not matter: 
for as long as she is oppressed at least on one aspect of social life, she will 
count as a woman (Haslanger 2000b: 42). 
Of course, many individuals who satisfy the concept man seem 
marginalized with respect to bow ties since dress codes depend on other issues 
as well and these may not be sex-marked. For instance, if a man wants to avoid 
looking like a young Republican or a 'Tory boy', he is marginalised with 
respect to bow ties because wearing a bow tie typically carries stereotypical 
images of precisely such people. It seems likely that Tony Blair does not want 
to dress in ways that conjure up stereotypical images of Tory politicians. 
Insofar as this is the case, he seems to be marginalised with respect to bow ties. 
What makes this type of marginalisation different though, is that men who wish 
to avoid certain cultural stereotypes are not subject to sex-marked 
marginalisation. Being marginalised with respect to bow ties because one does 
not wish to appear as a particular kind of a man (a young Republican or Tory 
boy) does not amount to oppression. Only when marginalisation is sex-marked 
will an individual subject to it count as oppressed. So, although certain men are 
margin ali sed with respect to bow ties, this does not mean they are oppressed. 
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This is because they are not excluded from the scope of bow tie wearers for 
sex-marked reasons. 
It appears rather easy to satisfy the definition of woman: for example, 
being marginalised with respect to bow ties makes one a woman provided that 
this marginalisation is sex-marked. Now, contrast this with the definition of 
man. On Haslanger's view, an individual will count as a man provided that the 
individual is subject to sex-marked privileging due to observed or imagined 
physical features evidence of a male reproductive role. Again, the individual 
may be hugely disadvantaged in his overall social position but as long as he is 
privileged on some aspect due to his physical features, the individual will count 
as a man. Haslanger does not elaborate on what being privileged amounts to but 
her endorsement of Frye suggests that being privileged as a man means that 
being male is something an individual has going for himself (Frye 1983: 16). It 
seems fair to say that being privileged as a man involves numerous different 
things such as gaining certain benefits due to observed bodily features and in 
general having the society structured in ways that benefit those with male 
bodies. It seems to involve this rather blunt idea: if you have (or are imagined 
to have) features that indicate a male reproductive role, then 'the world is your 
oyster'. 
Feminists commonly argue that societies tend to be structured in ways 
that make it easier for males to attain certain social, political and economic 
gains (in comparison to females). Historically, numerous examples come to 
mind. For instance, until relatively recently property rights were solely granted 
for males. Politics is another familiar arena where males have traditionally been 
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privileged. Workplace practices also tend to privilege men and inadequate 
childcare provisions or the lack of affordable childcare facilities means that 
many women still find it hard to combine work and family life. (For other 
examples and an excellent discussion, see Saul 2003.) Examples such as these 
suggest that men find themselves privileged on numerous different grounds 
(though, of course, not on all grounds). In fact, it seems that even if a man tried 
not to be subject to sex-marked privileging in order to refuse his gender, the 
mere fact that males by and large earn more than their female counterparts, 
prevents this. In order to alter one's gender as a man, it seems that one will 
have to take some very radical steps. For example, men would need to refuse to 
be paid wages that are higher than their female co-workers'. However, even if 
one succeeded in not being privileged on some social dimensions, as long as 
one is subject to sex-marked privileging on any single social dimension this 
will be sufficient for manness. And considering how many aspects of our social 
dimensions are structured to benefit those observed to have (or imagined to 
have) bodily features evidence of a male role in reproduction, it seems very 
unlikely a man could refuse his gender given our current social structures. 
What the above examples suggest to me is that Haslanger's call for 
people to refuse their gender is not achievable due to the notion of oppression 
she is working with. First, it allows that individuals can occupy sex-marked 
subordinate social positions (and count as women) on fairly trivial grounds as 
the bow ties example illustrated. It seems to be rather easy to satisfy the concept 
woman and to count as oppressed. Due to this, it seems unclear how women 
ever could alter the status quo such that they become non-oppressed females. 
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However much one tries to refuse one's gender as a woman, as long as that 
individual is subject to sex-marked oppression on any single social dimension, 
even on very trivial grounds, the individual will count as a woman. The same 
appears to be true of men: they simply cannot refuse to be gender men. As long 
as male individuals are privileged on any single social dimension where this is 
sex-marked, men cannot alter or refuse their gender. And considering that our 
social structures in general privilege those with male bodies, it seems 
impossible to refuse to be gendered a man. 
This suggests to me that (on Haslanger's view) women cannot but be 
oppressed and men cannot but be privileged. The status quo perpetuating 
women's subordination cannot be altered since neither gender can refuse to be 
so gendered. This seems to seriously undermine the political force of 
Haslanger's position since her definitions of woman and man simply cannot do 
the work she designed them to do: they cannot be employed to facilitate social 
and political change. Change that will bring about the end of women's 
oppression can only come about if females are no longer subject to sex-marked 
oppression of any kind and males are no longer subject to sex-marked privilege 
of any kind. But, as I have shown, this is not achievable and the emancipatory 
potential of Haslanger's position does not get off ground. Although Haslanger 
provides a way to make sense of a unified class of women, her manner of doing 
this is not in my view acceptable. The class of women feminist politics is 
organised around should not be such that feminists end up fighting for women 
who are oppressed because they are marginalised with respect to bow ties. Such 
marginalisation does not appear to be particularly pressing or significant from a 
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political point of view nor is it something that feminist theorists should spend 
time trying to alter. 
Intuitions 
Haslanger admits that "there are of course unresolved difficulties in working 
out a satisfactory theory of oppression; I'm afraid I can't take on that further 
task here, so I can only invoke the rough outlines of the background view with 
the hope that an adequate account can at some point be supplied" (2000b: 39). I 
sympathise with Haslanger that much of feminist work has to be done without 
an adequate conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, (as I argued above) I also feel 
that Haslanger's definition of woman is problematic as it stands precisely 
because a satisfactory notion of oppression is not available. Saying this, it 
seems that the problems I pointed out in the previous section could be 
responded to provided Haslanger modified the notion of oppression she takes to 
be central to gender concepts. It seems perfectly reasonable to think that 
oppression could be described as a structural phenomenon that does not have 
the consequence I draw attention to above. If oppression were redefined in a 
way that avoids the problems I discussed above, Haslanger's position would 
work on its own terms. It provides a definition of woman and an account of 
gender classes that is not refuted by Spelman's and Butler's arguments. Further, 
Haslanger recognises that there are many different kinds of women and her 
definition accommodates these differences avoiding problematic and false 
claims about women in general. 
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Despite this, I argue next that feminist theorists should feel reluctant to 
endorse Haslanger's position because it does not cohere well with common 
intuitions about women and womanness. Haslanger's gender classes work 
within the context of feminist philosophy but I doubt many outside this 
discipline would find her arguments persuasive. Were I to introduce 
Haslanger's definition of woman to a non-academic group of people, I suspect 
many would find it foreign and strange. I find this particularly unsatisfying: 
adequate gender concepts should be such that both feminist philosophers and 
those outside feminist philosophy will find them persuasive. This suggests that 
womanness should be defined in a more intuitive manner than Haslanger does. 
It is worth clarifying what I take intuitive to mean: intuitions are non-
inferential beliefs about the world and they are, to an extent, governed by social 
codes and practices. By and large, intuitively held beliefs are not arrived at 
through reflection; rather, they are like commonsense beliefs and gut-feelings. 
(For more on different ways to understand intuition, see Sosa 1998.) I take it 
that most people have intuitions and intuitively held beliefs about gender that 
include beliefs such as which individuals are men and which are women. For 
example, if asked whether the Queen is a woman or not, most people (I suspect) 
would say that she is. They would probably not be able to articulate their 
reasons for thinking so and few would begin considering arguments for and 
against the Queen being a woman. It seems to me that the same would also be 
true of Condoleezza Rice and the Sudanese refugee fleeing violence in Darfur. I 
would expect most people to hold an intuitive belief (a non-inferential gut-
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feeling) that the Queen, Condoleezza Rice and the Sudanese refugee are all 
women. 
Now, it may tum out that on Haslanger's view only the Sudanese 
refugee satisfies the concept woman. This is because the Queen and 
Condoleezza Rice may not count as oppressed females given their social 
positions (provided trivial phenomena do not count as oppressive). The Queen 
certainly does not appear to be oppressed on sex-marked social and political 
grounds, she does not appear to be economically disadvantaged nor does the 
Queen appear to be culturally disadvantaged due to certain physical features she 
is presumed to possess. Much of the same appears to be true of Condoleezza 
Rice: she is wealthy and privileged in many respects occupying one of the most 
powerful political offices in the US (and perhaps in the world). If it turns out 
that the Queen and Condoleezza Rice are non-oppressed females, following 
Haslanger this means that they are not women. 
This appears to generate a clash between philosophical theory and 
common intuitions about gender. Imagine telling an unsuspecting member of 
the public that contrary to what they thought, the Queen is not a woman 
(because the Queen is not sex-marked for oppression). It seems to me that many 
would find this odd and that many would dispute my claim. What philosophers 
often do when philosophical theory and intuitive beliefs clash is to employ the 
method of reflective equilibrium: philosophers either modify their philosophical 
theories to fit with intuitions or they try to show that commonly held intuitions 
are false (and that their philosophical theory is correct). In short, philosophers 
aim to achieve a state of affairs where common intuitions and philosophical 
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theory match as closely as possible. (For more on reflective equilibrium, see 
Cummins 1998.) 
So, when our intuitions about womanness and philosophical theory of 
gender clash, feminist philosophers have two options: they can either try to 
show that commonly held intuitions about gender are false or they can modify 
the philosophical theory of gender such that it will correspond better with our 
intuitions about womanness. In this case, I suggest that feminist philosophers 
should choose the latter course of action and, as a result, they should feel 
reluctant to endorse Haslanger's position. First, the former option seems hugely 
difficult and time consuming. Many people (I suspect) do not think that 
womanness depends on sex-marked subordination as Haslanger suggests and 
altering our intuitions about gender to cohere with Haslanger's suggestion 
would require a major shift in the way people commonly think of gender. In 
order to achieve this, feminist theorists would probably have to work hard on 
changing people's beliefs perhaps at the expense of other worthwhile feminist 
projects and this does not seem particularly feasible. Moreover, many feminist 
philosophers probably find Haslanger's proposal hard to stomach and, as a 
result, would feel reluctant to embark on a mission to change people's intuitions 
about gender. This is because Haslanger is asking that feminist theory and 
politics be geared towards abolishing gender and womanness - something many 
feminist theorists feel is crucial to feminist theory and that which gives 
feminism its political direction (see e.g., Young 1997). It seems, then, that 
modifying the theory of gender such that it coheres better with common 
intuitions should be the way to proceed. 
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Second, it seems important that our gender concepts match with 
intuitive beliefs about gender as closely as possible. For one thing, it seems 
more people are more likely to accept a theory if it maps onto their intuitions 
about the phenomenon being theorised: if intuitions and philosophical theory 
match, this makes the latter more persuasive. Consider a hypothetical analogy 
from moral philosophy. Imagine one was to suggest a definition of morally 
sound character whereby an agent satisfies this definition provided that the 
agent commits at least one morally praiseworthy act a day. Even though the 
agent may commit numerous morally reproachable deeds every day, as long as 
that agent commits at least one praiseworthy deed, the agent is of morally good 
character. So, imagine someone orders a mass killing of certain people (perhaps 
due to these people's race or ethnicity) and directly after giving orders to kill 
these people helps an old lady across the street. This person would, as a result, 
satisfy the hypothetical definition of morally good character: s/he has 
committed (at least) one morally praiseworthy deed that day and since this is 
sufficient for having morally good character, the person satisfies that notion. 
Even though the person has ordered a mass killing of people on (what seem to 
be) thoroughly unjustifiable grounds, this does not matter. What matters is that 
s/he has helped an old lady across the street. 
Now, I suspect few would agree that this person actually is of morally 
good character. Many would also dispute the definition of morally good 
character because it seems to go against our ideas about what morally good 
agents are like. The proposed hypothetical definition is not persuasive: it goes 
against commonly held beliefs and intuitions about moral agency and morally 
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good character. In order to make this definition more acceptable, we would 
have to alter it such that it would cohere better with what we intuitively think 
morally good character entails. In a similar sense, it seems that philosophical 
theories of gender should cohere with our intuitions about women and men in 
order to make them more persuasive. And this seems to be a good reason to 
favour a notion of womanness that coheres as closely as possible with our 
intuitions about gender. 
Intuitions matter for another reason as well: it seems important to have 
an intuitive view of gender because feminist theory is very closely connected 
with feminist politics and practice. Promoting an unintuitive theory of gender 
that feminist politics should make use of seems practically counterproductive. 
Hoping to provide a way to achieve tangible political changes and to devise 
effective political strategies that aid women using a notion of womanness that 
many (I would think) find unintuitive sounds to me an unsatisfying way to 
proceed. Promoting an unintuitive theory of gender does not appear to be 
conducive to feminist political goals as many who are fighting for these goals 
(it seems) would be unwiJIing to endorse such a theory. Providing a way to 
make sense of gender classes such that they cohere as closely as possible with 
our commonsense intuitions about women and men seems to be politically 
more desirable than providing philosophically complicated and unintuitive 
definitions of commonly observed social phenomenon like gender. 
It seems that such unintuitive and complicated definitions of gender are 
also practically unnecessary. We have intuitions about gender, gender classes 
and who counts as a man and a woman. In many cases these intuitions have 
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been sufficient and feminist activists have found them useful when conducting 
their political campaigns. For instance, campaigners for women's suffrage in 
the early 1900s were not stifled in their political efforts due to insufficient 
conceptual precision. On the contrary, many (I suspect) would have found 
Haslanger's definition of woman unnecessary for their political struggle and 
achieving feminist political goals in no sense hangs on such complicated 
philosophical theories of gender. In my view, this also gives good reason to 
prefer an intuitively appealing view of gender. 
VI 
Prima jacie Haslanger's position offers a clear and concise principle with 
which we can classify women (qua women): in order to be a woman, one must 
be subject to sexually marked subordination. Being subject to such 
subordination is what all women have in common and that which makes them 
women. Haslanger appears to offer the means with which feminist worries over 
gender classification are resolved and the threat to feminism's political vigour 
is avoided. Nevertheless, I have argued that Haslanger's notion of oppression 
that is central to gender classes creates problems. If Haslanger's suggestion is 
accepted and endorsed as it stands, it seems that feminist philosophers would 
be unable to alter the status quo that perpetuates women's oppression: 
something feminist theorists in general think of as a key feminist goal. I went 
on to claim that this problem is, nevertheless, reparable: what Haslanger needs 
is a better definition of oppression. Although Haslanger has a way out of the 
problems I pointed out, I still go on to suggest that feminist theorists should feel 
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reluctant to accept her position because it does not cohere well with our 
intuitions about gender. It seems to me that arguing for an account of gender 
that is more intuitive would be an advantage and, in the next chapter, I go on to 
do precisely this. 
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CHAPTER 6 
HEGEL, ARMSTRONG AND GENDER CLASSIFICA TION 
I 
How can feminist philosophers make sense of the class of women? One 
response is to argue that women all share something that makes them women. 
Feminist philosophers commonly assume this entails one of the following: 
either women share some physical and anatomical features that make them 
women or there is some social factor women have in common that is definitive 
of womanness. As I outlined in chapter 1, feminist philosophers commonly 
reject both formulations. They argue that there is no physical feature uniformly 
shared by all women and that there are no cross-cultural and trans-historical 
social factors that make women women: 
"An essentialist [or a realist] approach to conceiving women as a social 
collective treats women as a substance, a kind of entity in which some specific 
attributes inhere. One classifies a person as a woman according to whether that 
person has the essential attributes all women share: something about their 
bodies, their behaviour or dispositions as persons, their experience or 
oppression. The problem with this approach to conceptualizing women as a 
collective is that any effort to locate those essential attributes has one of two 
consequences. Either it empties the category woman of social meaning by 
reducing it to the attributes of biological female, or in the effort to locate 
essential social attributes it founders on the variability and diversity of 
women's actual lives. The effort to locate particular social attributes that all 
women share is likely to leave out some persons called women, or to distort 
their lives to fit the categories." (Young 1997: 32) 
Feminist philosophers hoping to make sense of gender classes commonly hold 
that women do not share anything that makes them women and that the class of 
women must be made sense of without appealing to common features. 
In chapters 2-5, I considered four recent feminist responses to gender 
classification arguing that they are all inadequate in various ways. First, the 
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way to make sense of gender classification suggested by Frye (chapter 2) failed 
to pick out women because the criterion for womanness seemed to capture a 
number of individuals we wouldn't commonly think of as women. Young 
(chapter 3) suggested women form a series (a particular kind of social 
collective) because their actions are organised around similar objects. But (as I 
argued) these objects were so broadly defined that it seemed impossible to 
make sense of a single class of women on this criteria. Thirdly, Stoljar's 
resemblance nominalist suggestion was inadequate: it failed to pick out only 
women as members of the class that (in Stoljar's view) is crucial for feminist 
politics (chapter 4). Finally, Haslanger's proposal was (I argued) inadequate 
because it seemed to go against our intuitions about women and womanness 
(chapter 5). Although this is an issue that Haslanger herself would find 
unproblematic, I argued that gender should be understood more intuitively than 
she does. 
In what follows, I will argue for a way to make sense of the class of 
women that is more successful than these four accounts I considered in the 
previous chapters. In doing so, I suggest a different way of understanding what 
it is that women might share that makes them women. I propose that we can 
make sense of the class of women on the basis of a common feature: members 
of this class all share the feature of being a woman or womanness that makes 
them women. My suggestion is gender realist. Nevertheless, I do not reduce 
womanness to biological features nor is my proposal incompatible with the 
view that women have different and dissimilar features, traits and experiences 
qua women. Contra commonly held beliefs about gender realist positions, I will 
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show that the recognition of differences amongst women does not count against 
my proposal. 
The key to my position is what I take womanness to be. In short, I take 
it as a rather thin notion that merely aims to provide a way to pick out certain 
individuals (namely, those who are women). But in doing so I will not tackle 
the question, what is it to be a woman. This requires that I keep distinct what 
Charlotte Witt calls in a different context, the 'population question' and the 
'definitional question': "which things or entities are x's?" and "what it is to be 
an x?" respectively (Witt 1989: 194). I wiJI provide a way to respond to the 
former question (and a way to pick out women) without answering the latter 
question (what it is to be a woman). I want to stress that my aim is not to 
answer queries about the nature of womanness so that feminist philosophers can 
say something substantial and true about all women (above and beyond that 
they all are women). This is because for the purposes of making sense of the 
class of women only the population question must be responded to. 
Classification at its minimum does not depend on knowing something 
substantial about the entities being classified - it depends on being able to 
recognise entities of certain sort so that they can be classified. Most everyday 
classifications (it seems) do not require that the definitional question is or can 
be successfully answered. For instance, I cannot say what it is to be a cat; and 
yet, I can tell which animals are cats. If I see a cat crossing the street, I need not 
rely on some necessary and sufficient conditions of catness to recognise that the 
animal in question is a cat. One of the reasons why gender classification has 
become so very difficult is because feminist theorists have assumed that it 
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requires substantial knowledge about all women, like knowing the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of womanness. As they could not articulate or point 
out such conditions making sense of gender classes seemed hugely problematic 
and some argued, impossible. As I will show, gender classification does not 
require that these conditions are, or that they even can be, articulated. 
As mentioned, I will argue for a realist way to understand gender 
classes. On my view, there is a feature women have in common that makes 
them women: being a woman or woman ness. In the previous chapters, I have 
outlined just how unpopular gender realist positions are within current feminist 
philosophy. In chapter 1, I argued that the commonly accepted arguments by 
Spelman and Butler against gender realism do not give good reason to reject it 
in general. In this chapter, I will expand on this thought and argue for two 
gender realist views that do not have the adverse political consequences 
feminist philosophers commonly think gender realism has. My aim in doing so 
is not merely to settle the issue of gender classification; my aim is also to show 
how tenable realist ways of thinking about women are and to convince feminist 
philosophers that gender realism can offer fruitful ways to think about gender 
classes. 
I draw on the works of two philosophers, O. W. F. Hegel (1969, 1991) 
and David Armstrong (1978b), to argue for my gender realist positions. Hegel's 
notion of substance-universals and Armstrong's notion of substantival 
universals are particularly useful for my purposes. As I will argue, if 
womanness is understood either as a Hegelian substance-universal or as an 
Armstrongian substantival universal, gender classes can successfully be made 
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sense of. Saying this, 1 am not aiming to provide wholeheartedly Hegelian or 
Armstrongian theories of gender. For a start, neither philosopher (I suspect) 
would agree with my appropriation of their positions. Second, when arguing for 
Hegelian or Armstrongian womanness 1 am very selective with the material that 
I find useful. The manner in which feminist philosophers often appropriate 
works of non-feminist philosophers has been described by Linda Singer as that 
of a feminist 'Bandita'; in the words of Iris Marion Young, a feminist Bandita 
is someone who "raids the texts of male philosophers and steals from them 
what she finds pretty or useful, leaving the rest behind" (Young 1997: 22). My 
appropriation of Hegel and Armstrong is largely of this kind: 1 appropriate 
parts of their work for my own theoretical purposes leaving out parts that, I 
find, are less useful. Finally, it is worth pointing out that I am not concerned 
with what Hegel and Armstrong claim about gender and womanness in 
particular. Rather, 1 make use of their metaphysical writings. 
I begin by outlining Hegel's position in general and then go on to 
suggest how it may help feminist philosophers hoping to make sense of gender 
classes. In doing so, I offer a Hegelian understanding of womanness (section 
11). Next, I will outline Armstrong's view and sketch out an Armstrongian way 
to understand womallness (section III). I end with a discussion of the benefits of 
understanding womallness in these ways (section IV). 
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II 
Overview of the Hegelian position 
Hegel's notion of substance-universals aims to explain (among other things) 
how we classify and categorise entities of certain sorts. In doing so, he is 
proposing an alternative to Platonism that took entities of a certain sort to be of 
that sort because they partake in or instantiate the same Form: "there exist 
certain Forms of which these other things come to partake and so to be called 
after their names; by coming to partake of Likeness or Largeness or Beauty or 
Justice, they become like or large or beautiful or just" (Plato, quoted in Loux 
2002: 21-2). Russell (endorsing a more modern version of Platonism, 
Transcendent Realism) claims that instead of talking about Forms, philosophers 
should be talking about universal properties where "a universal will be 
anything which may be shared by many particulars" (1967: 53). Recall his 
realist view of justice: 
"If we ask ourselves what justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, 
that, and the other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common. 
They must all. in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in 
whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they 
are all just, will be justice itself, the pure essence the admixture of which with facts 
of ordinary life produces the mUltiplicity of just acts." (Russell 1967: 52) 
Further, Plato and Russell took universals (like justice and beauty) to be 
abstract and transcendent. They are said to subsists independently of the 
particular entities that partake in or instantiate them, particulars somehow 
interacting with universals such that we can attribute (for instance) redness to 
individual red things, horseness to particular horses and triangularity to 
triangles. This view presupposes a two-tier view of reality: there are two 
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separate and distinct ontological realms, one with all the abstract entities 
(universals) and the other with all the concrete entities (particulars). 
Hegel differs from Russell and Plato firstly, in his views on which 
universals count as ontologically fundamental. Many of the universals 
mentioned above are not ontologically fundamental on Hegel's view: these 
include justice, beauty and redness. Hegel takes the Platonist universals to be 
'abstract'. By contrast, those universals Hegel takes as ontologically 
fundamental must be (in his terms) 'concrete': they must be substance-
universals. The common mistake leading to the incorrect picture of universality, 
which the Platonist holds, is this: if a philosopher aims to account for redness or 
justice, they proceed by abstracting from the particular features of all red 
entities or all just acts with the view of discovering what is their common 
nature responsible for their redness or justness. When people ordinarily (in 
Hegel's view) "speak in this way of the 'concept' of colour, or of a plant, or of 
an animal, and so on ... these concepts are supposed to arise by omitting the 
particularities through which the various colours, plants, animals, etc., are 
distinguished from one another, and holding fast to what they have in common" 
(Enc.§163Al).29 Hegel, nevertheless, maintains that this does not yield the 
kinds of universals that are fundamental: "We can, indeed, abstract from the 
29 The quotes from Hegel's Encyclopaedia lAJgic will be denoted with Enc. Next is the 
number of the section the quote is in and whether the quote is in the remark (R) or in 
the addition (A) to that section. If it is in the main body of the section, no indication is 
given. If a section has more than one addition, I will indicate which addition is in 
question. For example, Enc.§ 166Al denotes that the quote comes from the first 
addition to section 166. Hegel's Science of lAJgic will be denoted with SL and 
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art with LA. References for quotes from these works 
follow a different convention indicating a page number to a relevant translation and 
edition to be found in the bibliography. 
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content: but in that case we do not obtain the [truly] universal ... [we obtain] 
only the abstract universal. which is an isolated. imperfect moment of the 
Notion and has no truth" (SL. 603-4). 
Contra Platonism. Hegel argues the universals that are fundamental 
individuate entities thereby endowing entities with a foundation such that they 
can be further characterised with attributes like redness and squareness. For 
Hegel. ontologically fundamental universals do not exist separated from and 
"opposed to the particular and the individual" (SL, 602). By contrast, the 
ontologically fundamental universals should be understood to depend upon 
their individual instances and to exist indistinguishably from them. 3o These 
kinds of universals answer the question 'what sort of an entity is x?' and (in 
Hegel's view) include features such as humanness and animality: 
"[Such a] universal is the ground and soil. the root and substance of the single 
instance. For instance. if we consider Caius. Titus. Sempronius. together with 
all the other inhabitants of a city or country. the fact that they are all men is not 
something that they simply have in common; on the contrary. it is what is 
universal in them. it is their kind. and none of them would be what he is at all 
without this kind. The situation is quite different in the case of the superficial. 
merely so-called ·universality·. whose status is in fact merely that is pertains to 
all the single instances in question. and is what they have in common. It has 
been noticed that one thing that men have in common. as distinct from 
animals. is that they are furnished with earlobes. But it is obvious that if 
perhaps someone or other were not to have earlobes. this would not affect the 
rest of his being. his character. his capacities. etc., whereas it would not make 
sense to assume that Caius might perhaps be brave. learned. etc .• and yet not 
be a man. The single human is what he is in particular. only insofar as he is. 
first of all. human as such. and within the universal; and this universal is not 
just something over and above other abstract qualities or mere determinations 
of reflection. but it is rather what permeates all the particulars and embraces 
them within itself." (Enc.§175A) 
30 Hegel writes "universality and singularity [or individuality] distinguish themselves 
[from each other] within [each judgement]. but at the same time they are identical" 
(Enc.§ 167). 
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Hegel's thought is that we can distinguish between universals that denote the 
underlying being of entities and universals that are merely qualities and 
attributes that characterise those entities. The Platonist appeared to take both 
kinds of universals as ontologically fundamental without distinguishing their 
metaphysical importance in any way. Hegel, on the contrary, thinks only the 
former are ontologie ally fundamental whereas the latter (qualities and 
attributes) simply abstractly characterise the world and, as he puts it, have no 
metaphysical truth (SL, 603-4). Hegel does not deny that there are qualities and 
attributes that characterise individuals. He merely denies that such properties 
amount to fundamental universals philosophers should concern themselves (as 
Plato and Russell did). In Hegel's terminology, qualities and attributes that 
characterise individuals of a particular sort (such as the ones he mentions 
above) are called particu lars. 31 
Hegel holds that in order to characterise individuals in any way, they 
must already exemplify some substance-universal. We could not characterise 
Caius any further (claiming that he was brave, learned and so on), if Caius did 
not already exemplify a universal being a human being that picked him out as 
an individual human being: 
31 
"[E]ach human being though infinitely unique is so primarily because he is a 
man, and each individual animal is such [an] individual primarily because it is 
an animal: if this is true, then it would be impossible to say what such an 
individual could still be if this foundation were removed, no matter how richly 
endowed the individual might be with other predicates, if, that is, this 
foundation can equally be called a predicate like the others." (SL, 36-7) 
For Hegel, 'individuality' denotes what metaphysicians commonly call 
'particularity'. Throughout this thesis when I have talked of women's particularity, 
Hegel would have talked of women's individuality. Hegel's notion of particularity (in 
German Besonderheit) denotes distinctiveness, specialness and peculiarity. In common 
metaphysical sense, 'particularity' doesn't have such connotation: it commonly 
denotes singular entities ('this particular cup' or 'that particular horse'). 
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Roughly, Hegel's view presupposes a substance-attribute view: there is an 
underlying foundational substance (like humanness) to which qualities (like 
bravery) are attributed. In order to attribute these qualities, the foundational 
substance must be in place; it would not make sense to attribute these qualities 
to something that lacked the underlying foundation. Features such as bravery 
can be predicated only if an entity exemplifies some substance-universal to 
begin with (like humanness). Saying this, Hegel's view is unlike the traditional 
substance-attribute view in that neither the substance nor its attributes exist 
independently from one another. Rather, they ontologically dependent upon one 
another. 
As mentioned, Hegelian substance-universals individuate their 
instances. They make individual entities of some sort or kind: "[w]hat is 
universal about the concept is indeed not just something common against which 
the particular stands on its own; instead the universal is what particularises 
(specifies) itself, remaining at home with itself in its other, in unclouded 
clarity" (Enc.§ 163AI). Hegelian substance-universals appear to be sortal 
universals: "[a] sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and 
counting particulars which it collects. It presupposes no antecedent principle, or 
method, of individuating the particulars it collects" (Strawson 1959: 168). 
Further, "sortal universals [are those] of which basic particulars are more 
characteristically instances (e.g. man, mountains, apples, cats, trees)" (Strawson 
1959: 205). A sortal concept (that corresponds to a sortal universal) provides an 
answer to the question 'what sort of an entity is x?' - if x falls under a sortal 
universal F that picks out entities of some sort (f), then x is of that sort. 
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Sortal universals individuate in (roughly) two ways: they pick out 
instances of certain sorts such that being of this sort is either essential to the 
individual instances (qua individuals) or it is not. In other words, suppose a 
sortal universal F picks out entities x, y and z as members of some sort (f). 
Being of this sort mayor may not be essential to x, y and z qua individuals. If it 
is essential, x, y and z would not survive losing F. They would no longer remain 
the same individuals. This distinction (broadly speaking) maps onto a 
distinction between ultimate and phase sortals (Wiggins 2001). Ultimate sortals 
"[apply] present-tensedly ... to an individual x at every moment throughout x's 
existence, e.g. human being" (Wiggins 2001: 30; see also, Robinson 2004: 20) 
whereas phase sortals apply to individuals only at certain times of their 
existences, such as boy and cabinet minister (Wiggins 2001: 30). The latter 
"denote part of the life history of something, which, as a whole, is denoted by 
another sortal. So, child is a phase sortal which applies to a phase of the things 
fully designated by [the ultimate sortal] human being" (Robinson 2004: 21). 
It seems that Hegelian substance-universals are similar to ultimate 
sortals. They appear to tell us something about an individual that remains the 
same throughout the individual's existence. Hegel writes: "[t]he universal ... is 
posited as the essential being of its determinations, as the latter's own positive 
nature" (5L, 603).32 Now, it is less clear whether (at least) some Hegelian 
32 This quote might be seen as suggesting that Hegel thought the substance-universals 
constitute some core essence of individuals that is more significant than the particular 
features of individual entities. This is not quite what Hegel had in mind though. For 
Hegel, substance-universals are not somehow above and beyond their individual 
instances being more important or significant: "the universal is ... the substance of its 
determinations; but in such wise that what was a contingency for [traditional views of] 
substance, is the Notion's own self-mediation ... this mediation ... raises contingency 
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substance-universals could be understood as phase-sortals. I suggest, however, 
that they can and should be so understood in particular contexts. This would 
yield certain important theoretical advantages. Take (for example) Aristotle 
who is singled out by the ultimate sortal human being that tells us what sort of 
an entity Aristotle is throughout his existence. Many phase sortals also apply to 
Aristotle at certain times of his existence: these include child, boy, man and 
philosopher. These phase-sortals do not entail anything essential about Aristotle 
qua an individual. If they did, it seems that (for instance) being a child would 
be essential to Aristotle such that as Aristotle grows older (no longer being a 
child), he would cease to be the same individual. If child individuates Aristotle 
in some essential manner, the thirty-year old Aristotle would not be the same 
individual as the ten-year old Aristotle. This, however, seems counterintuitive 
and understanding child as a phase sortal avoids this problem. It is this idea that 
phase sortals are non-necessary to individuals that I find particularly appealing. 
I also find this very useful when discussing womanness: being able to think of 
Hegelian womallness as a phase sortal can plausibly account for changes of 
gender. (I will return to this shortly.) I take it, then, that Hegelian substance-
universals can individuate in the manner of ultimate and phase sortals. 
to necessity ... the Notion is not the abyss of formless substance, or necessity as the 
inner identity of things or states distinct from, and limiting one another" (SL, 603). 
What Hegel seems to have in mind is this: in traditional substance-attribute views, 
what is essential to an individual is its substance (or kind) whereas all other attributes 
and qualities are merely contingent to the individual qua an individual of this kind. For 
Hegel, this is not so. The substance-universal is ontologically dependent upon the 
particular qualities attributed to the individual. Particular qualities are not something 
contingent to individuals of certain sort; rather, they are necessary aspects of 
substance-universals that pick out these sorts. Hegel did not think that the substance-
universals determine some essential core distinct and independent of particular 
qualities of individuals. Rather, what may be thought of as the essential core (the 
substance-universal) is shaped by the particular qualities of individuals that exemplify 
it. 
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Now. Hegel differs from Plato (and Russell) on what sorts of universals 
are ontologically fundamental. He considered abstract qualities (roundness and 
redness) as ontologically less important than substance-universals (humanness 
and animality). This is not the only difference though. Hegelian universals 
differ from the Platonic universals also in their mode of existence. The Platonist 
thinks universals are transcendent: they subsist wholly separated and distinct 
from individual entities said to instantiate them. The Hegelian substance-
universals. by contrast. are immanent: their existence depends upon individual 
entities that are said to exemplify them and they are ontologically dependent 
upon them. Hegel writes. 
"in speaking of a definite animal. we say that it is [an] 'animal'. 'Animal as 
such' cannot be pointed out; only a definite animal can ever be pointed at. 'The 
animal' does not exist; on the contrary, this expression refers to the universal 
nature of single animals. and each existing animal is something that is much 
more concretely determinate, something particularised. But 'to be animal', the 
kind considered as the universal. pertains to the determinate animal and 
constitutes its determinate essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its 
animality we could not say what it is." (Enc.§24A1)33 
33 Which universals count as Hegelian substance-universals is somewhat confusing. 
Hegel is explicit that humanness and animality are substance-universals. He also 
claims that "[b]eing a metal ... constitutes the substantial nature of gold. without which 
whatever else there may be in it ... could not subsist" (Enc.§I77A). This seems to 
suggest that particular species of animals (dogness or horseness) and particular metals 
(being gold) are not substance-universals. It seems to me. however. that dogness. 
horseness and goldness should all count as substance-universals on Hegel's own view. 
First, Hegelian substance-universals individuate aiming to answer the question 'what 
sort of an entity is x?'. Although being an animal and being a metal provide some 
understanding of the sorts of entities at hand, it seems that being a dog. being a horse 
and being a lump of gold also tell us what sort of an entity something is: if we deprived 
the dog of its dogness we could not say what sort of an entity it is anymore than we 
could say what sort of an entity a dog was if we deprived it of its animality. Second, 
Hegel seems to think that certain normative consequences follow from individuals 
exemplifying particular substance-universals. He seems to think that certain 
paradigmatic ways of exemplifying a substance-universal exist that provide a basis for 
our judgements about entities: "[t]ruth, on the contrary, consist in the agreement of the 
ob-ject with itself. i.e., with its concept. It may certainly be correct that someone is ill, 
or has stolen something; but a content like this is not 'true'. for an ill body is not in 
agreement with the concept of life, and similarly theft is an action that does not 
correspond to the concept of human action" (Enc.§I72A). It seems that Hegel though 
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Later on in his Encyclopaedia Hegel makes similar commitments: "[ w ]hen we 
say, 'This rose is red', or 'This picture is beautiful', what the assertion 
expresses is that it is not just we who, from outside, dress the rose in red, or the 
picture in beauty, but, rather, that these are the objects' own characteristics" 
(Enc.§ 166A).34 
The interdependence of universality and individuality (Hegel claims) 
also has an epistemic dimension and this is manifested in the way we 
comprehend the world around us: 
"Each of them, the universal and individual, is the totality, each contains 
within itself the determination of the other and therefore these totalities are one 
and one only, just as this unity is the differentiation of itself into the free 
illusion of this duality - of a duality which, in the difference of the individual 
and the universal, appears as a complete opposition, yet an opposition which is 
so entirely illusory that in thinking and enunciating the one, the other also is 
immediately thought and enunciated." (SL, 582) 
Hegel's idea seems to be something like this. Prima jacie, it appears that we 
can think about (for instance) the universal human being independently of 
thinking about individual human beings (and vice versa). It also seems that in 
that there is some ideal way in which human bodies should be (which an ill body does 
not correspond to) and that there is some ideal way in which humans should act (which 
theft does not correspond to). In other words, there are some paradigmatic ways of 
being a human body and a human action. This would suggest that there are some 
paradigmatic ways in which an entity is an animal or a metal and that we can judge 
whether something that exemplifies the universals animality and being a metal 
correspond to these paradigms well or badly. Nevertheless, it seems that it is not 
enough that an entity may correspond well to the paradigm way of being an animal. 
For instance, it is perfectly conceivable that an individual dog may be a good specimen 
of animality but that it is bad specimen of dogness (it may, for example, behave in the 
manner cats paradigmatically do). In order to judge whether this dog corresponds well 
to an ideal of dogness it seems that dogness must also be a substance-univeral. After 
all, animality of a dog does not tell us much about the entity qua a dog nor does it 
provide sufficient grounds for making normative claims about whether it is a good or 
bad specimen of its kind. 
34 See also Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art where he asserts that universality, 
particularity and individuality "have no independent existence ... such separated 
bodies are in themselves defective and abstract existents" (LA, 116). 
196 
doing so we can comprehend something about the universal independently of 
comprehending something about individual human beings (and vice versa). 
This is because universality and individuality appear to be constitutively 
independent from one another (though, of course, they are not thought of as 
being unrelated). Hegel claims that this turns out to be false. If we try to think 
about human beingness (or humanness) in order to comprehend what it is to be 
a human being independently of thinking about individual human beings, we 
don't get very far. Conversely, if we try to comprehend something about 
individual human beings qua individual human beings independently of their 
underlying humanness, the end result will be the same. This suggests (to Hegel) 
that we simply cannot comprehend anything about the universal human being 
or individual human beings separately from one another and that a sharp 
distinction between universals and individuals rests on a mistake. Humanness 
as such (as Hegel puts it) does not exist; only particular human beings exist. 
Nevertheless, in order to say that Cauis and Titus are individual human beings, 
the universal humanness must already underlie the being of Caius and Titus - in 
making that judgement, we already know that they exemplify the universal 
humanness without which no other qualities could be assigned to them. 35 
3' Hegel expresses this interconnectedness of universality and individuality in a 
number of different places. When he is discussing (what he deems to be) judgements of 
the highest kind -- necessary judgements -- Hegel claims: "[s]ubject and predicate [in 
judgements of the type a is FJ correspond to each other and have the same content, and 
this content is itself the posited concrete universality; it contains, namely, the two 
moments, the objective universal or the genus [Fl, and the individualized universal [a]. 
Here, therefore, we have the universal which is itself and continues itself through its 
opposite and is a universal only as unity with this opposite" (SL, 662). Elsewhere 
Hegel argues: "[i]n the abstract judgement: 'The singular is the universal', the subject 
'" is immediately concrete; the predicate, on the contrary, is what is abstract or 
undetermined - it is the universal. But since they are connected by 'is', the predicate, 
too, must contain within its universality the determinacy of the subject; hence this 
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Finally, Hegel's position differs from the Platonist picture with respect 
to diversity. Hegel claims that there are no two roses, or two horses or two 
human beings that are exactly alike but his explanation for this differs from the 
Platonist explanation. Roughly, on the Platonist view all roses (for instance) 
instantiate the same universal roseness that makes them roses. Differences 
amongst individual roses depend on the other universals they instantiate: a red 
rose and a pink rose both instantiate the same roseness but because the former 
instantiates redness whereas the latter instantiates pinkness, they differ from 
one another. Diversity (amongst entities of certain sort) comes from outside the 
universal feature that makes these entities of the same sort. 
However, for Hegel diversity and multiplicity inhere in the nature of 
universals. Insofar as universal features inhere in their (infinitely variable) 
instances, the Hegelian universals are differently realised in each individual as 
every individual has a particular way of exemplifying a universal. Diversity is 
embedded in the nature of Hegelian substance-universals: "the true, infinite 
universal ... [in itself] is as much particularity as individuality ... It determines 
itself freely; ... [and] it differentiates itself internally" (SL, 605). Elsewhere 
Hegel argues the following: 
"That everything is different from everything else is a very superfluous 
proposition, for things in the plural immediately involve manyness and wholly 
indeterminate diversity. But the proposition that no two things are completely 
like each other, expresses more, namely, determinate difference. Two things 
are not merely two ... but they are different through a determination. Ordinary 
thinking is struck by the proposition that no two things are like each other - as 
determinacy is particularity, and this particularity is the posited identity of the subject 
and the predicate" (Enc.§169). In other words, in judgements of the kind 'a is F', the 
subject and predicate cannot be considered in abstraction from one another. The 
jUdgement 'Caius is a human being' determines something about Caius (namely, that 
he is a human being) and it determines something about the universal being a human 
being (namely, that Caius exemplifies this universal). 
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in the story of how Leibniz propounded it at court and caused the ladies to look 
at the leaves of trees to see whether they could find two alike. Happy times for 
metaphysics when it was the occupation of courtiers and the testing of its 
propositions called for no more exertion than to compare leaves! ... The law of 
diversity... asserts that things are different from one another through 
unlikeness, that the determination of unlikeness belongs to them just as much 
as that of likeness, for determine difference is constituted only by both 
together." (SL, 422-3) 
This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Hegelian substance-
universals. As universality inheres in individual entities of particular sorts and 
the individual entities all differ from one another, the underlying substance-
universal that provides an answer to the question 'what sort of an entity is x?' is 
differently realised in each individual: it is differently exemplified in each 
individual of a certain sort and every individual has its own particular way of 
exemplifying a universal and being the sort of entity that it is. Take the case of 
roses. Every individual rose exemplifies the substance-universal rose without 
which we could not say what those individuals are. Nevertheless, each 
individual rose has features particular to that rose. Some roses are red, others 
white, others pink and still others blue. They vary in length, width, in the 
number of thorns and so on. But these differences are not contingent to or 
distinct from their roseness. Rather, all these differences are integral to the 
substance-universal rose. That individual roses exemplify this substance-
universal in different ways is in the nature of the universal rose itself and the 
universal rose is differently realised in each rose. In short, every individual rose 
has its own unique way of being a rose. For Hegel, "determinateness, therefore, 
is not introduced from outside when we speak of it in connexion with the 
universal" as is the case with Platonic universals (SL, 603). Rather, the 
universal "differentiates itself internally" (SL, 605). Substance-universals 
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individuate entities thus revealing their kind or sort but, in doing so, "we cannot 
speak of the universal apart from the determinateness which to be more precise 
is particularity and individuality, for the universal ... contains determinateness 
in and for itself' (SL, 603). The nature of universals is such that they contain 
"within [themselves] difference and determinateness in the highest degree" (SL, 
601) where this difference is not only quantitative, but it is also qualitative: the 
"nature [of universals] is completely misunderstood when ... the wider extent 
of the universal is taken to mean that it is something more or greater quantum 
than the particular and the individual. As absolute ground, it is the possibility of 
quantity, but equally so of quality, that is, its determinations are just as much 
qualitatively distinct" (SL, 617). Because substance-universals inhere in unique 
individuals, substance-universals contain the criteria for distinctness and 
diversity both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
I have outlined above that Hegelian substance-universals individuate 
(they make entities of some sort or kind), that they are immanent (rather than 
transcendent), and that they are differently realised in each individual entity of a 
particular sort or kind. This leaves some questions unanswered though. What do 
we know about individuals that exemplify the same substance-universal qua 
individuals of that sort (apart from knowing that they exemplify the same 
universal)? What do individuals of certain sorts tell us about the nature of the 
substance-universals they exemplify? The answer is: nothing. Hegel seems to 
think that we do not know anything about individuals of some kind or sort 
above and beyond that they all exemplify the same substance-universal, 
because substance-universals are inexplicable: 
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"As universality is the utterly simple determination, it does not seem capable 
of any explanation; for an explanation must concern itself with definitions and 
distinctions and must apply predicates to its objects, and to do this to what is 
simple, would alter rather than explain it. But the simplicity which constitutes 
the very nature of the universal is such that ... it contains within itself 
difference and determinateness in the highest degree ... The universal ... is 
that simplicity which ... no less possesses within itself the richest content." 
(SL, 601-2) 
It is not entire clear what Hegel means by this. On the one hand, he seems to 
hold that universals are simple in that they are bare and have no content. If so, 
Hegel seems to hold that universality should not be explained because all 
explanations will involve applying predicates to what is being explained and 
this will alter (and distort) universality supposedly by endowing it with content. 
At the same time, he maintains that substance-universals possess incredibly rich 
content even though they are simple. Later on Hegel claims that ontologically 
fundamental universality "far from being empty, '" has through its Notion a 
content, and a content in which it not only maintains itself but one which is its 
own and immanent in it .. (SL, 604). This seems to go against the thought that 
Hegelian substance-universals are bare lacking in content (and in this sense 
simple). 
In order to make sense of Hegel's claims I suggest his notion of 
simplicity should be understood as an epistemic notion. It seems that substance-
universals are epistemically simple in that we may be unable to reductively 
explain a given substance-universal or break it down to some component parts 
(such as necessary and sufficient conditions). Nevertheless, this does not 
suggest the universal has no component parts; it's just that we cannot tell what 
those parts are. The reason our explanatory efforts are frustrated might be 
precisely because the universal contains "within itself difference and 
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determinateness in the highest degree" (SL, 601) - because there simply are so 
many different ways of exemplifying a universal that a fully reductive 
explanation seems improbable (if not impossible). Nonetheless, we can say 
individual entities are of some sort or kind (and that they exemplify a particular 
substance-universal) even though we cannot say anything substantial about the 
substance-universal or the individuals exemplifying it as a result. 
Hegelian womanness 
I will claim next that if womanness is understood along the lines of Hegelian 
substance-universals we can make sense of the class of women in a gender 
realist way. I will also claim that this does not reduce woman ness to biological 
features or ignore women's diversity and dissimilarity. What would be the 
characteristics of womanness understood in the Hegelian manner? First and 
foremost, womanness would provide an answer to the question 'what sort of an 
entity is x?' by individuating its instances. Of course, womanness would not be 
the only individuating universal picking out women: obviously, the universal 
being a human being would also pick out women. It seems that both features 
individuate in that they both provide answers to the question 'what sort of an 
entity is x?' and both of them appear to provide a foundation needed in order to 
characterise entities further. For instance, it would not make sense to say the 
Queen is learned or wise and to say she is not a human being (according to 
Hegel). At the same time, it seems that characterising the Queen as a mother or 
a sister entails that she is already singled out as a woman. Insofar as this is the 
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case, woman ness and being a human being both appears to individuate in the 
manner Hegelian substance-universals do. 
How should we understand the relationship between these two 
individuating universals? They, I suggest, should be understood as two 
mutually compatible types of sortal universals: as ultimate and phase sortals 
(outlined above). My thought is that being a human being applies to the Queen 
throughout her existence (being an ultimate sortal) whereas woman ness applies 
only at certain times (being a phase sortal). For instance, woman ness does not 
pick out the Queen at two-years of age but it does at the age of 32. 
Understanding womanness in this fashion allows for changes of gender without 
entailing anything about supposedly essential features of individuals. It seems 
that someone may lose or gain womanness at different times during their 
existence and this may provide a useful way to think about transsexual, 
transgendered and intersexed people. Womanness (as a phase sorta)) is not 
considered to be something essential to individual entities - it merely picks out 
its instances. Insofar as this is the case, changes of gender need not entail any 
fundamental or essential changes to individuals qua those individuals. It allows 
us to think that an individual may change one's gender without this suggesting 
that the individual has ceased to be the same individual. Of course, the 
foundation on which further characterisations rely will change. If the Queen 
lost her womanness and gained, say, manness, it would no longer make sense to 
characterise her as a mother or a sister. The Queen (it appears) would more 
readily be characterised as a father or a brother. 
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There are some difficult epistemic questions though: how is womanness 
(understood in a Hegelian manner) lost or gained and how does it pick out 
individual women? I have no clear-cut answers to these questions. However, 
these difficulties may not be as problematic as it first appears. For instance, 
consider a different example: when does a child or an adolescent gain 
adulthood? Roughly, at which point does child cease to pick out an individual 
and adult begin to pick the individual out? It seems hugely difficult to say and it 
seems impossible to point at some specific event or instance when this happens. 
It also seems impossible to explain how a child lost one's childhood and gained 
adulthood such that this will be true of everyone. But, generally speaking, this 
uncertainty does not appear to be particularly worrying nor does it seem that 
certain grey-areas pose a significant problem. It seems that we can (by and 
large) distinguish between children and adults although we cannot say how 
childhood is lost and adulthood gained. It also seems that although we might 
find it hard to say whether 15 to 17 year-olds count as adults or not, this grey 
area do not seem to threaten the distinction between children and adults. Insofar 
as this is the case with the distinction between adults and children, I see no 
reason to think that epistemic difficulties with changes of gender should 
generate scepticism about gender distinctions per se. It seems that (by and 
large) we can divide the world into women and men although we could not say 
in the case of transgendered individuals at which point exactly they ceased to be 
of one gender and became another (or how they lost a gender and gained 
another one). Further, it seems that there are epistemic difficulties at pointing 
out exactly when a girl becomes a woman or a boy becomes a man. How did 
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the Queen lose girlhood and gain womanness? It seems impossible to pin point 
a precise instance or event (apart from one that seems thoroughly arbitrary). 
Nevertheless, for the most part we can distinguish girls from women and grey 
areas themselves do not seem to threaten gender distinctions. 
On the Hegelian picture, substance-universals are immanent inhering in 
their particular instances that, as Hegel time and again reminds us, are all 
distinct from one another. As this is the case, a substance-universal is 
differently realised in each individual exemplifying the universal. Consider 
womanness in this light. In order to fit the Hegelian picture, it should inhcre in 
individual women who all have their particular ways of being women. Taking 
womanness as immanent is not uncontroversial and I will consider this in more 
detail shortly. However, the idea that individual women have their own unique 
ways of being women seems true. There are many different kinds of women 
and women differ from one another, not simply with respect to trivial fcatures 
(such as their hair colour, height and the width of their palms), but also with 
respect to factors traditionally associated with womanness. I have in mind here 
factors such as women's social positions and situations in various cultural, 
ethnic and racial arrangements; their roles and responsibilities at home and in 
the work place; and their physical features, appearances and what is expected of 
them as women. 
Again, the contrast between the Queen and the Sudanese refugee is 
fitting. These individuals appear to differ greatly from one another but at the 
same time, it seems that there is something they have in common: they are both 
women. Thinking about womanness as a Hegelian substance-universal provides 
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a way to reconcile these two aspects (that woman ness is something the two 
share but that it is also experienced, felt and manifested in different ways). 
Every woman (arguably) has her own way of being a woman. But as Hegelian 
substance-universals are ontologicaIly dependent upon the individuals 
exemplifying them (and vice versa), the substance-universal womanness 
contains within itself particular and dissimilar ways of being a woman. 
Diversity is not something contingent to womanness. Rather, on the Hegelian 
inspired view, it is integral to it and part of the universal qua a subtance-
universal. If womanness were not differently realised by each individual 
woman, it could not count as a Hegelian substance-universal. At the same time, 
the Hegelian view allows for a common thread that runs through all women qua 
women: they all exemplify the same substance-universal that makes them 
women. This provides a way to understand women as members of the same 
class at the same time maintaining that they differ from one another. 
Roughly, the picture put forward here is this. Individuals of some kind 
or sort are of this kind or sort because they share something: they all exemplify 
the same substance-universal that provides an answer the question 'what sort of 
an entity is x?'. The picture of womanness I am proposing suggests that women 
are of the same sort because they have something in common: they all 
exemplify the substance-universal woman. Now, Hegel goes on to claim that 
substance-universals provide a foundation that enables us to characterise 
entities of particular kinds further. This suggests that the Hegelian account of 
gender takes womanness to be the underlying foundation common to all women 
(qua women). However, many feminist philosophers (I suspect) would not be 
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happy with this perhaps because it sounds as if I am proposing that there is 
some essential nature women have in common that causes women's 
characteristic behaviour, traits and such like. I want to stress that this is not 
what I am proposing. My proposal (that there is some underlying thread women 
have in common) need not commit me to any heavy-duty metaphysics about 
essential features or specific characteristics women must have because they 
exemplify the same substance-universal. On the Hegelian picture, I need not 
and cannot tackle the issue of what womanness is or amounts to because 
substance-universals (Hegel holds) are inexplicable. They are not somehow 
mysterious and, due to this, unknowable. Rather, they are inexplicable since 
there are so many different ways of exemplifying a substance-universal. The 
nature of the substance-universal woman is to be diverse and because of this, it 
seems impossible to provide a fully reductive account of it. To put this in 
Hegelian terms, because womanness contains diversity and difference (both 
quantitative and qualitative) it cannot be reductively account for or explained. 
The Hegelian picture allows me to make sense of the class of women on the 
basis of a shared feature (womanness) without having to explain what being a 
woman amounts to and without having to characterise this feature above and 
beyond pointing at particular instances of it. In Hegel's terminology, 
womanness as such cannot be pointed out - only particular women can. And yet 
that we can point out particular women is enough to enable us to make sense of 
the class of women. 
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III 
As I mentioned to begin with, the Hegelian scheme is not the only realist 
metaphysical position that may help feminist philosophers hoping to make 
sense of gender classes: David Annstrong (l978b) argues for a different view 
that (I suggest) is also helpful for feminist philosophers. Armstrong identifies 
certain universals as particularising whereby they divide their instances into 
distinct entities. He terms such individuating universals substantival. Contra 
Platonism and Transcendent Realism, these universals are immanent inhering in 
their particular instances. (Annstrong employs the currently standard sense of 
'particular' where the term denotes individual instances.) Armstrong's 
substantival universals are particularly useful for my purposes and I will argue 
shortly that the class of women can be successfully made sense of if womanness 
is understood as such a universal. Before that, 1 will outline Armstrong's view 
in more detail. It is worth noting that I am not arguing for a wholeheartedly 
Annstrongian view of gender. Rather, I find that Armstrong's account of 
substantival universals is useful because, first, it illustrates that one can hold a 
realist view of universals and, in doing so, not have to rely on necessary and 
sufficient conditions. In addition, Armstrong illustrates that one can be a realist 
without ignoring the ways in which entities of certain sorts differ from one 
another. As 1 will shortly argue, both of these aspects are crucially important for 
a plausible feminist conception of womanness and, as a result, Armstrong's 
general picture is useful when making sense of womanness. 
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Armstrong's position in detail 
Armstrong summarises his position in the following manner: 
"[I argue] that there are universals, both monadic and polyadic, that is, 
properties and relations, which exist independently of the classifying mind 
[being objective] ... Second, it is argued that no monadic universal is found 
except as a property of some particular [entity], and no polyadic universal 
except as a relation holding between particulars. Transcendent or Platonic 
Realism is thus rejected. Third, it is argued that what universals there are is not 
to be determined simply by considering what predicates can be applied to 
particulars. Instead, it is the task of total science ... to determine what 
universals there are." (1978a: xiii)36 
Armstrong appears to reject Platonism for (roughly) the same reason Hegel did: 
the idea that universals exist above and beyond their particular instances seems 
implausible. For instance, take redness. For the Platonist, it exists in abstract 
form in a realm wholly distinct and separate from individual red entities. Now, 
Armstrong thinks this picture is hugely implausible. For a start, where is this 
abstract redness that exists wholly separated from individual red things? What 
reasons are there for thinking that it really exists? Even if philosophers grant 
that abstract universals could exist, how can we understand their interaction 
with particular entities such that this interaction makes particular entities red, 
36 Armstrong advocates a posteriori scientific realism whereby it is the task of natural 
sciences (and, in particular, physics) to determine what universals there are and what 
are the fundamental building blocks of reality. What makes Armstrong's position 
somewhat complicated is that he refuses to list and give examples of such fundamental 
universals claiming that it is not part of his project to do so: this is a matter for natural 
and empirical sciences. His task is merely to philosophically set the stage for 
discovering such universals. Now, it seems fair to assume that woman ness would not 
figure in the list of fundamental Armstrongian universals discovered by physics and, as 
a result, Armstrong's position may not seem very apt for my purposes. Despite his 
appeal to scientific realism that tells us what the precise set of fundamental universals 
will be, I find Armstrong's general framework useful in many respects and it appears 
that feminist philosophers hoping to make sense of the class of women will benefit 
from it. (I will discuss this more shortly.) Further, the framework itself does not appear 
to entail that one must endorse scientific realism as Armstrong did. Of course, if one 
were to provide a wholeheartedly Armstrongian position of gender, one would not be 
able to ignore scientific realism. But, as I not aiming to do so I do not find Armstrong's 
endorsement of it particularly problematic nor do I see it as something that renders my 
appropriation of Armstrong out of place. 
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square or round? These questions raise serious problems for the Platonist and 
Armstrong thinks the Platonist cannot adequately respond to them. Due to this, 
he holds that it is more plausible to think of redness (for example) as something 
that inheres in the individual red entities themselves. For Armstrong, the 
Platonist's insistence on keeping particulars and universals apart (with the two-
tier view of reality) is seriously misguided because "[u]niversals are nothing 
without particulars [and p]articulars are nothing without universals" (1978a: 
113). 
Why does Armstrong think there are universals to begin with? Why 
doesn't he simply agree with the nominalist that no universals exist in any 
shape or form? Armstrong argues that only metaphysical realism can account 
for certain phenomena to any plausible degree. These include resemblances 
between entities and changes of character in a given entity. For example, 
consider a pot of water that changes its temperature from cold to hot. 
Armstrong holds that the nominalist cannot plausibly account for the change in 
the water's temperature: an adequate account of change requires that 
philosophers recognise that there are some mind-independent features that are 
responsible for the water turning from cold to hot. Armstrong also holds that 
these features must inhere in the entity that is changing in order to make sense 
of change. And, he goes on to suggest, universals are the only way to make 
sense of such mind-independent features to any plausible degree. As a result, 
Armstrong thinks "we must admit objective universals which ... cannot exist 
independently of particulars ... The conclusion drawn [from this] is that 
210 
particularity and universality, [although being] irreducible to each other, are 
both involved in all existence" (1978a: xiv). 
So, Armstrong holds that there are objective universals but rejects the 
Platonist claim that these universals are transcendent. Rather, he takes an 
immanent view of universals: universals inhere in their particular instances. 
Armstrong further holds that there are three sorts of universals: property 
universals, relation universals and substantival universals. The first sort 
includes features such as redness and hardness, the second features such as 
being to the North of and being the brother of, and the third features such as 
being gold and being an electron. 37 (It is very likely that none of the universals 
mentioned above would be ones that Armstrong would include in his list of 
fundamental universals because of scientific realism. For more, see footnote 
36.) 
Substantival universals are "associated with the 'whole nature' of kinds 
of stuff (e.g. gold) or kinds of things (e.g. electron)" (Armstrong 1978b: 176). I 
find these kinds of universals particularly useful for my purposes. Now, it is 
worth pointing out that it seems Armstrong's list of ontologically fundamental 
universals will include only property and relation universals (Armstrong 1997: 
67). Unlike Hegel, Armstrong appears to think substantival universals are not 
37 These different sorts of universals are not unrelated or mutually exclusive. For 
instance, if we try to make sense of the relation universal being to the North of some 
reference to property universals must be made. Consider London and Edinburgh. This 
relation seems to hold between the two cities: they stand in certain spatial relations to 
one another such that Edinburgh is to the North of London. As a result. the relation 
universal being to the North of holds between London and Edinburgh. Nevertheless, in 
order to make sense of or analyse this relation it seems that one has to make reference 
to some property universals that London and Edinburgh both possess such that this 
relation wiIJ hold between the two entities. Such a property might be (for instance) 
having a determinate spatial location. 
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ontologically on a par with property and relation universals because of the 
following: if substantival universals (like being an electron) can be analysed 
and broken down to other more basic constituent parts (or if they can, at least, 
in theory be so reduced), then substantival universals are not ontologically 
fundamental. This is because substantival universals can (at least in principle) 
be accounted for in terms of other more primitive properties (Armstrong 1978b: 
Substantival universals (like Hegel's substance-universals) individuate 
their instances. Armstrong endorses the following Principle of 
Particularization: 
"For each particular, there exists at least one ... universal which makes that 
particular just one, and not more than one, instance of a certain sort. Such a 
38 How substantival universals correspond to classes of entities is not entirely clear 
(e.g., how the universal being an electron corresponds to the class of electrons). 
Armstrong holds that classes must be made sense of in terms of universals. He also 
holds that there will be different kinds of classes depending on the ways in which these 
classes correspond to universals (that supposedly make sense of those classes). 
Armstrong outlines four different kinds of classes: 
a) The class of Fs involves (or corresponds to) a single universal F -ness (e.g. the 
class of weighs one kilogram exactly involves the universal weighs one 
kilogram exactly). 
b) The class of Fs involves (or corresponds to) a closely-knit resembling set of 
universals (e.g. the class of shades of red involves closely resembling 
universals such as carmillion. pink and so on). 
c) The class of Fs involves (or corresponds to) universals that do not resemble 
one another very closely (e.g. the class of games that involves a family 
resemblance relation amongst different games). 
d) The class of Fs involves (or corresponds to) a thoroughly heterogeneous set of 
universals (e.g., the class of entities that are not all shades of blue involves 
universals such as redness, whiteness, coldness and so on). (Armstrong 1978b: 
49) 
Prima facie. it seems that substantival universals pick out the first sorts of classes 
where the classes correspond to a single universal (for instance where the class of 
human beings corresponds to being a human being). But Armstrong's discussion 
elsewhere suggests that this is not so. Armstrong instead seems to suggest that many 
classes that initially appear to correspond to a substantival universal (like the class of 
human beings) in fact tum out to be classes of either the second or third kind. This will 
be discussed more shortly. 
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universal will be a 'particularizing' universal, making that particular one of a 
kind. Without such a universal, the particular is not restricted to certain 
definite bounds, it is not 'signed a certain quantity', we do not have a 
'substance', we do not have a particular." (1978b: 64) 
The idea is that substantival universals make entities of a certain sort and no 
other. Such universals provide an answer to the question 'what sort of an entity 
is x?'. If an entity were not of any sort, we would not be able to say what it is. 
However, Armstrong explicitly rejects the view that individuation entails 
anything essential about individual entities claiming "I reject ... the doctrine of 
irreducibly substantival universals which determine the true essence of certain 
particulars" (Amstrong 1978b: 75n; see also 1978b: 64). On this view, 
substantival universals pick out entities of certain sort but this does not entail 
that being an entity of this sort is essential to the individual qua individual. 
As mentioned, Armstrong thinks these universals are not ontologically 
fundamental because they can be analysed in terms of other more basic 
constituent parts. Substantival universals are complex: they are composed of 
other simpler property and! or relation universals (Armstrong 1978b: 67). 
Armstrong goes on to suggest that many philosophers assume that if some 
features are complex, they must be such that we can reductively analyse them 
and point out some ultimate constituent parts that make up the complex (like 
necessary and sufficient conditions). If some property cannot be broken down 
into its constituent parts, (the assumption goes) this property must be primitive 
and simple. Armstrong, however, holds that these assumptions are misguided 
and that assuming all complex properties can be broken down into simple parts 
is asking too much of metaphysics. It may turn out that some universals are 
infinitely complex and can never be broken down to their ultimate constituent 
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parts: the complex universal may either have infinitely many constituent parts 
or the constituent parts of the complex universal may themselves be so complex 
that no ultimate constituents can be discovered (Armstrong 1978b: 67). In both 
cases, philosophers are unable to analyse the universal exhaustively (if at all). 
Armstrong's argument goes as follows. Even though it may initially 
appear as if complex features can be analysed, it may turn out that they cannot: 
"Suppose that a certain universal is complex [being composed of parts]. It 
might, for instance, be a conjunctive universal. Suppose, further, that human 
beings notice that certain particulars fall under this universal and that they 
correlate a predicate with it. Suppose, however, that this complex universal is 
apprehended in a totalistic or gestaltist way so that users of the predicate are 
unable to resolve this universal in any way. For them, the universal is 
unanalysable. It is epistemologically simple for them. Such a predicate [that is 
correlated with a complex universal] will be called a 'naming' predicate '" 
Where a predicate is a naming predicate, the way it is correlated with its 
univeral or range of universals is obviously not the way in which a proper 
name is correlated with the thing it names. But there is a clear analogy. In both 
cases the word is functioning as a tag or labeL" (1978b: 53) 
He further continues claiming: 
"In the case specified the universal is complex but it is not apprehended as 
complex. Some philosophers seem to find such a situation difficult to 
understand. They would probably concede that we sometimes have the 
capacity to recognize a property or a relation while lacking any very clear idea 
of the exact structure of the universal in question. But they seem to cling to the 
notion that in such cases we still have some grasp of the structure ... Now it is 
true that in many cases we do have a vague grasp of the nature of complex 
universals, or disjunctive ranges of universals, although [we are] unable to 
make clear to ourselves the exact nature of the complexity involved ... But ... 
this is [not] necessary. It is perfectly possible that (a) a universal is complex; 
(b) particulars falling under this universal act (in virtue of this universal) upon 
our sense-organs in an all-or-nothing way. We might register the presence of 
particulars falling under this universal without being able to analyse the 
universal in any way ... We would then have 'simple idea' of a complex 
uni versal." (1978b: 54) 
Armstrong is suggesting that some features may be unanalysable, not because 
they are primitive, but because they are complex. They possess numerous 
constituent parts (maybe infinitely many) that make it extremely difficult, if not 
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impossible, to reductively analyse them by breaking them down into necessary 
and sufficient conditions. 
It seems to me that being a human being is a reasonable example of an 
Armstrongian substantival universal that cannot be analysed reductively due to 
its complexity. Certain particulars clearly fall under this universal and there is a 
predicate ('human being') that corresponds to this universal. It also seems that 
we can apprehend something very basic about this universal (namely, which 
entities fall under it) that allows us to classify entities into human beings with 
relative ease. Nevertheless, if one were to try to analyse and reductively account 
for this universal (aiming to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for counting as a human being), I suspect one would find this task near 
impossible. Even though it seems easy to judge who counts as a human being, it 
is much harder to say what being a human being amounts to or to say much 
about humans that would be true of all those entities called 'human beings'. 
Insofar as this is the case, it seems we can pick out human beings qua human 
beings without being able to say anything about conditions necessary and 
sufficient for being a human being. Human beings, as a result, would have the 
feature of being a human being in common (qua human beings) although this 
feature eludes precise analysis. Understanding being a human being in this way 
provides a realist picture of human beings without insisting that philosophers 
need to point out some specific features (definitive of being a human being) 
that all human beings have in common. 
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Admittedly it seems that Armstrong would not be happy with my 
thought (that being a human being is an example of a substantival universal). 
Consider the following passage from Armstrong: 
"In turning away from Nominalism it is all too easy to assume that, wherever 
tokens are of the same type, then there must be something identical in virtue of 
which the tokens are of the same type. The Nominalist can then counter-attack, 
asking to be shown this identity in specific cases. Take the class of human 
beings. Is there really something which all human beings have in common in 
virtue of which they are human beings? Consider men, women, children, 
geniuses, Mongols, the decorticated, mutations, quadruple amputees and so on. 
Is there really a one thing which holds together the many? ... It is not clear that 
there is. The Absolute Idealist response to this difficulty was to speak of 
identity-in-difference. This is as much as to say, identity without identity, 
which is incoherent ... Transcendent universals may be seen as another way of 
reacting to the same problem. If universals stand apart from particulars, then 
the latter may participate in or imitate the former to a greater or lesser degree 
... There is. however. a much simpler solution to the difficulty than the 
desperate expedients of Absolute Idealism or transcendent universals. It is a 
solution already hinted at by the Resemblance Nominalist, but barred to him 
by his Nominalism. The solution consists in taking an immanent view of 
universals. but denying any simple identification of sorts, kinds and types with 
universals. An account of sorts, kinds and types must be given in terms of 
universals. It must be given in terms of the properties and! or relations of the 
tokens said to be all of one type. But the properties and! or relations which 
make different particulars to be of a certain sort, kind or type need not be 
identical in the different particulars." (1978a: 75-6) 
Armstrong's point seems to be something like this: an account of the kind 
human being must be made in terms of ranges of universals, not in terms of a 
single universal being a human being that all humans possess. As it turns out, 
being a human being does not appear to be a universal of any kind for 
Armstrong. 39 Following this passage, why do I insist on arguing for womanness 
understood as an Armstrongian substantival universal? 
39 As a result, it seems that the class of human beings would be like the class of games 
(see footnote 38). Contrary to initial appearances, it would not be a class of the first 
kind (where a single universal corresponds to a class of entities, like the universal 
weighs one kilogram exactly). Rather. the class of human beings would have to be 
made sense of in terms of a range of universals and it seems that a family resemblance 
relation would hold between individual human beings. 
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My reason is this. The general framework of substantival universals is 
helpful and worth considering because it allows for a realist understanding of 
individuating universals where no necessary and sufficient conditions must be 
articulated and where the universal is understood (and it manifests itself) as 
complex. Further, substantival universals do not entail anything essential about 
individual entities of certain sorts illustrating that metaphysical realism per se 
does not entail essentialism of any kind. Applying this general framework to 
womanness is particularly helpful and worth considering because it allows for a 
gender realist view that does not rely on necessary and sufficient conditions, 
where womanness is not essential to individual women and where womalllless 
can be understood as structurally complex phenomenon that cannot be 
reductively analysed. Applying this general framework to gender illustrates that 
it is possible to make sense of gender classes in a realist manner and that, in 
doing so, feminist philosophers need not lose sight of women's particularity, 
diversity and the complexity of gender. Now, the details of Armstrong's 
position ill fit womalllless. But this is not a problem because I am not aiming to 
provide a wholeheartedly Armstrongian view of gender. 
Armstrongian womanness 
What would womanlless understood as an Armstrongian substantival universal 
look like? How can this view help feminist philosophers to make sense of the 
class of women? For a start, womallness would be immanent and inhere only in 
its particular instances rather than being abstract and existing above and beyond 
individual women. Second, womanness would be an objective and mind-
217 
independent feature of the world: our ascriptions of womanness would not 
depend on the classifying minds and whether or not we judge an individual to 
be a woman. Rather, there would be something about those individuals that fall 
under womanness and, as a result of this, we judge them to be women. The 
situation would be analogous to square entities. They are not square because we 
judge them to be square; they are judged to be square because there is 
something about square entities that give rise to our judgements that the entities 
are square. 
Gender (following Armstrong) would be objective and mind-
independent in that it could not be thought out of existence. Saying this, I am 
not suggesting that it would depend on some immutable biological features; 
mind-independent (and in that sense objective) features are not by definition 
antithetical to social construction. Sally Haslanger's (1995) work provides an 
extremely helpful clarification of this commonly held (and yet false) view. 
Feminist philosophers often seem to assume that if gender is an objective 
feature of the world and in this sense mind-independent, then it must (in some 
sense) be thought of as a natural and inevitable feature (see e.g., MacKinnon 
1989b). If woman ness is thought of as mind-independent, (the assumption goes) 
feminist theorists must give up the thought that gender is a matter of mutable 
social factors. Haslanger argues, contra this common view, that socially 
constructed features can also be thought of as mind-independent and objective 
because mind-independence is compatible with (at least some senses of) social 
construction. One such sense, (which Haslanger terms) "causal construction" is 
understood in the following manner: "[s]omething is causally constructed iff 
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social factors play a causal role in bringing it into existence or. to some 
substantial extent. in its way of being the way it is" (Haslanger 1995: 98). She 
goes on to argue that this type of social construction is perfectly compatible 
with mind-independence: 
"For example. opinions about what is appropriate for humans to eat and so 
about what counts as 'food' have had a huge causal impact on the size. 
distribution. and behaviour of animal populations. We may even want to say 
that in the causal sense. domesticated cows and chickens are socially 
constructed. But the deer in the woods. and the chickens in the barnyard (or 
more commonly. on the factory farm) are. nonetheless. independently real. 
Whatever might be at stake in claiming that there is an 'independent reality' • 
the concern is not to insist upon a reality untouched by the actions of human 
beings ... even if the case could be made that reality (as a whole) were 
causally constructed. this reality might nonetheless be independent of us. for in 
general. claiming that something is causally constructed does not challenge its 
independent reality." (Haslanger 1995: 104-5) 
Now. standard feminist understandings of womanness seem to fit the 
description of causally constructed features well: it is thought of as something 
that social factors have played a causal role in bringing into existence or. at 
least. have done so to a substantial extent. Televisions (and most artefacts. it 
seems) also fit the description of causally constructed features: social factors 
have played a causal role in bringing them into existence to a large extent (if 
not entirely). But it would seem odd to claim that women or televisions existed 
mind-dependently because they are products (to some extent) of social factors. 
Our understandings of them and the values we assign to (for example) women 
and televisions may be mind-dependent but their existence surely is not. Even if 
womanness is sensitive to social forces and construction, it may still be thought 
of as a mind-independent and objective feature. 
Although it seems plausible to think that womanness is a mind-
independent feature (in the sense I have suggested above). why should we think 
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that it is immanent? Why hold that woman ness inheres in its individual 
instances? It seems to me that womanness must be immanent because its 
metaphysical counterpart, the thought that womanness is transcendent, is hugely 
implausible. To think that some abstract entity or Platonic form of womanness 
exists that individual women somehow partake in seems very unlikely. For a 
start, where is this womanness that individual women supposedly partake in or 
instantiate and how do women instantiate this abstract womanness? It seems 
much more plausible to hold that woman ness inheres in individual women and, 
as far as I can tell, there are no good reasons to suppose that womanness is 
transcendent. And if we reject the thought that womanness is a transcendent 
universal, it seems that we must accept the view that it is an immanent 
universal. 
Womanness thought of as a substantival universal would pick out 
certain individuals without entailing anything essential about the individuals it 
picks out. Armstrongian womanness would be much like phase sortals child and 
adult in this respect: they both pick out individuals providing an answer the 
question 'what sort of an entity is x?' without suggesting that being an entity of 
this sort is essential to the individuals. It is true that on the Armstrongian view 
we may not be able to say much about women qua women. If womanness turns 
out to be complex and unanalysable, it seems that we may not be able to answer 
the definitional question 'what it is to be a woman?'. In fact, given how 
complex womanness appears to be, it seems very unlikely that this question 
could be successfully answered. For Armstrong though, this is not a problem. 
He holds that many universals appear initially analysable but, on closer 
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inspection, turn out to elude precise analysis due to their complexity. 
Philosophers simply are not in a position to provide reductive accounts of 
numerous common features, such as being a human being. Nevertheless, we 
can perfectly well divide the world into human beings and other sorts of entities 
even though we cannot articulate any necessary and sufficient conditions of 
humanness. 
Womanness seems to be analogous to being a human being in this sense. 
It is clearly a very complex phenomenon and providing a reductive account of 
being a woman seems hugely difficult (if not impossible). It seems impossible 
to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions of womanness. But on this 
gender realist view, our inability to do so is not a problem. It simply suggests 
that womanness is a complex universal. Being complex, it is likely that 
womanness could not be reductively analysed and many epistemic problems 
feminist philosophers have encountered when aiming to analyse womanness 
could be explained due to its complexity. The reason for its complexity is that 
individual women differ from one another in numerous ways: they have diverse 
and dissimilar experiences and traits as women and it is precisely this that 
makes womanness such a complicated phenomenon. Feminist philosophers 
commonly assume that gender realist views must always articulate some set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions of womanness. But, since articulating such 
conditions has proved to be extremely difficult some have argued that gender 
realism must be false and that gender nominalism should be preferred (e.g., 
Stoljar 1995). However, the Armstrongian view of womanness does not require 
that any necessary and sufficient conditions of womanness are pointed out and 
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so the inability to do so does not provide a reason to reject a realist view of 
gender. Women (on this view) simply have an extremely complex and, perhaps, 
unanalysable feature in common that makes them women. Complexity per se 
does not entail that feminist philosophers must give up gender realism or that 
womanness must be deemed irreducibly problematic. 
Following Armstrong, complexity entails that we cannot analyse or 
articulate some features constitutive of womanness. But this does not entail nor 
suggest that we cannot tell who the women are; on this Armstrongian inspired 
view recognising entities of certain sorts does not require a reductive account of 
the constitution of these entities qua entities of certain sorts. It seems that even 
though womanness cannot be broken down into necessary and sufficient 
conditions, this does not entail or suggest that we cannot pick out women. In a 
similar way, I cannot say anything substantial about human beings, cats or 
mussels (such as their necessary and sufficient conditions) but I can, 
nevertheless, classify entities as human beings, cats and mussels. How this is 
possible, is another issue much too extensive to be considered in detail here. I 
will, however, argue shortly that our intuitions sufficiently guide gender 
classification in a manner that will be conducive to various feminist goals. 
IV 
Why should my position be considered more plausible than those I considered 
earlier? What are the benefits of understanding womanness in these ways I 
propose? How does my proposal make sense of the class of women? First, my 
proposal (on both formulations) seems to make sense of the class of women in a 
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more intuitive way. Contra Haslanger, my proposal provides a more intuitive 
sense of who belongs to the class of women since it does not leave out 
individuals like the Queen. On Haslanger's account this exclusion was in some 
sense non-problematic; she defined womanness in terms of being subject to sex-
marked oppression and as the Queen (at least arguably) is not subject to such 
oppression, she failed to satisfy the concept woman. The Queen is not a 
counterexample to Haslanger's position. However, she does (in my view) 
illustrate how unintuitive Haslanger's definition of woman is. My sense is that 
the class of women should be more responsive to our intuitions about who and 
which individuals count as women. (I argued for this in chapter 5.) It should 
include the Queen regardless of the fact that she appears to be extremely 
privileged and not subject to sex-marked oppression. On my proposal, no single 
feature (or set of features) is put forward as definitive of woman ness. Instead I 
want to suggest that our common intuitions about gender are sufficient to 
enable us to pick out women and to delimit membership in the class of women. 
There is, one might argue, a worry here. It is possible (and quite likely) 
that intuitions about womanness vary. What should feminist theorists do when 
intuitions about womanness clash with each other? Are there some facts of the 
matter that can resolve such situations and if so, what are they? Then again, if 
there are no facts of the matter, how are feminist philosophers to decide upon 
the so-called hard cases? I have in mind here transsexuals, transvestites and 
people who are intersexed: how does the position I put forward deal with these 
individuals given that so much weight is placed on people's intuitions? 
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It seems that there must be some facts of the matter that guide gender 
classification since we can pick out women and quite effortlessly distinguish 
them from other entities. Nonetheless, that we can pick out women with relative 
ease does not entail that we can or that we need to articulate what the facts of 
the matter responsible for this are. It certainly seems that we cannot articulate 
some set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of 
womanness that could settle the hard cases mentioned. But this does not make 
my suggestion implausible or problematic. Simply because our intuitions about 
some hard cases may differ, we should not think intuitions about gender per se 
are useless and unhelpful or that making sense of the class of women such that 
it coheres with our intuitions is an unsatisfying way to proceed. 
Think back to the example of childhood and adulthood. Although we 
seem to be able to divide the world into children and adults with relative ease, it 
seems, nevertheless, that we cannot articulate some necessary and sufficient 
conditions that would settle which individuals are children and which are 
adults. (Or, at least, these conditions would appear to be thoroughly arbitrary.) 
Our intuitions about whether those individuals who fall within the age group of 
15 to 17 count as children or as adults may differ hugely. Despite this and 
despite our inability to say exactly when someone ceases to be a child and 
becomes an adult, the distinction between children and adults does not seem 
incoherent. Even though our intuitions about certain hard cases may clash, the 
idea that there are two distinct classes -- children and adults -- is not under 
threat. The fact that some cases pose problems for our classificatory efforts 
should not be taken to suggest that our classificatory efforts themselves are 
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futile. It seems then that even though there are hard cases and grey areas with 
respect to gender, gender classes themselves are not under threat due to these 
grey areas. On my account, we cannot and need not articulate some conditions 
that would rigidly mark class boundaries; the class of women will have flexible 
boundaries. This does not, however, suggest that the class cannot be made sense 
of. 
It seems that my proposal is more intuitive in another respect as well 
which makes it more plausible than the three nominalist positions considered 
earlier. Think back to the different gender nominalist positions argued for by 
Frye, Young and Stoljar. They all had to rely on something external to women 
to provide the criterion for classification because they held that there is no 
single feature that women qua women share. For example, Stoljar (chapter 4) 
claims that this external criterion is a certain resemblance relation that holds 
between an individual and a woman-paradigm. Similarly, Young (discussed in 
chapter 3) argues that the class of women must be made sense of in terms of a 
certain relation that holds between women and (what she calls) 'practico-inert 
objects'. There is a strange schizophrenia in these views. On the one hand, the 
task is to explain why women should be thought of as members of the same 
class. But at the same time, this task must be achieved by appealing to factors 
external to women (like resemblance or certain kinds of objects). Contrary to 
these views, I hold that membership in the class of women depends on 
something about women themselves, not on factors external to women. In 
general, it seems that features immanent to objects determine their class 
memberships and insofar as this is the case, it seems counterintuitive to appeal 
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to external relations to ground membership in certain classes. My position, as a 
result, provides a better and more intuitive view of gender classification 
because I hold that there is something about women themselves that grounds 
membership in the class of women: their womanness. 
Saying this, I do not attempt to provide a very substantial or thick notion 
of womanness. Because I am not aiming to provide a definition or a reductive 
account of it, recognition of women's diverse and dissimilar experiences as 
women does not count against my suggestion. What I have suggested fits many 
feminist insights about gender and diversity. Consider for instance Oil, the 
Queen and the Sudanese refugee. On my view, they all count as women since 
they all exemplify the same substance-universal or since they are all picked out 
by the same ontologicaIIy complex substantival universal (womanness). 
Nevertheless, sharing this feature (in whichever sense it is understood) does not 
rule out individual differences. Further, my proposal does not entail that 
individual differences are ignored. I am not making claims about any necessary 
and sufficient conditions that must be had; rather, I have argued that 
womanness may be realised differently by different individual women. For 
instance, because womanness is differently realised by individual women, Oil 
count as a woman although she lacks a female body: not having a female body 
is simply part of the way in which Oil exemplifies woman ness. 
One might argue that my proposal tells feminist philosophers nothing 
about womanness, thus being empty and uninformative. It is true that I say very 
little about the nature of womanness. If one hopes to find out what it is to be a 
woman or what womanness amounts to, my proposal is unhelpful. However, it 
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is not my intention to say what womanness amounts to. I am providing a way to 
make sense of the class of women without relying on a detailed account of 
womanness likely to be problematic and likely to result in false claims about 
women in general. My proposal aims to classify women without appealing to 
specific features women have in common and, in so doing, it aims to provide a 
better response to worries over gender classification than those responses 
looked at earlier. I admit that as a definition or explanation of womanness, my 
position is disappointing. But this is not a problem; rather, it is an advantage of 
my view that we can talk about the class of women without having to say 
something substantial about women first (such as articulate what the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of womanness are). 
One might further hold that a definition of woman (or a more substantial 
picture of gender) is needed for feminist politics. This, in my view, is a mistake. 
Having a thin notion of womanness does not suggest that feminist politics is 
impossible and that a more substantial notion is needed. If anything, my 
proposal provides a way out of the theoretical impasse that feminist worries 
over gender classes seem to have generated. It illustrates that feminist theorists 
need not articulate any necessary and sufficient conditions of womanness in 
order to talk about women in general and in order to do feminist politics. 
Feminist theorists should not think that being unable to define woman in some 
sense jeopardises their political programme. What feminist politics minimally 
requires is a way to make sense of the class of women such that feminist 
politics can be organised around aiding the members of this class. In order to do 
this, there is no need to articulate any necessary and sufficient conditions of 
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womanness. Commonly held intuitions are sufficient to make sense of 
membership in the class of women - the class that feminist politics aims to aid. 
In order to formulate effective political strategies with which common feminist 
goals can be achieved, it is unnecessary to endorse a thick notion of 
womanness. A thin notion (along the lines I have argued for) is sufficient for 
this. 
Consider a common feminist goal, ending women's discrimination at 
the workplace. Now, in order to formulate effective political and social 
strategies that aim to end women's discrimination at the workplace, it is crucial 
that feminist theorists can identify two things: the sort of treatment that is 
discriminatory in this context and those individuals who are subject to this 
discrimination. But in order to do the latter, it seems thoroughly unnecessary to 
employ a rich notion of womanness (that relies on some necessary and 
sufficient conditions). First, it seems feminist theorists need not check each 
employee against some conditions to see whether they are women or men 
(whether or not they satisfy the notion). I would suspect that a thin notion of 
woman that relies on our intuitions about gender classes is sufficient and can be 
successfully employed to identify women in this context. Second, having a rich 
notion of womanness adds very little (if anything at all) to the ways in which 
feminist theorists might tackle gendered workplace inequalities. By contrast, 
employing a rich notion of woman in this context may create problems for 
feminist politics: before feminist theorists can begin to think about how to end 
workplace discrimination, they must first come up with a rich notion of woman 
that all and only women satisfy so that they can determine who the women are. 
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This, however, seems to divert valuable resources away from trying to devise 
effective strategies that help women. The point I am making here is similar to 
that I made in the end of chapter 5: intuitive gender notions seem to be 
sufficient for feminist politics. And insofar as this is the case, it makes 
theoretical sense to endorse my proposal. 
v 
I have suggested that if womanness is understood in either the Hegelian or the 
Armstrongian manner, the class of women can be more readily made sense of. 
These two formulations show that, first, a plausible gender realist position need 
not entail anything essential about women qua individuals. Second, they 
illustrate that gender realism does not commit one to any form of biological 
determinism, thus reducing womanness to some physical features. Third, I have 
shown that gender realism per se is not incompatible with women's diverse 
traits and dissimilar experiences. Thinking that women share something (that 
makes them women) need not prevent feminist philosophers from recognising 
women's individual differences and experiences. Finally, I have provided two 
gender realist frameworks with which feminist theorists can talk of women in 
general at the same time avoiding having to articulate some necessary and 
sufficient conditions of woman ness. A thin notion of womallness, I argue, can 
be employed more readily by feminist theorists hoping to achieve commonly 
held feminist goals and endorsing my view, as a result, makes theoretical sense. 
In arguing for the two realist ways to understand womanness I aimed to show 
further that gender realist positions are not prima/acie philosophically useless 
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and untenable as feminist philosophers commonly think: the class of women 
can be made sense of in gender realist terms without this resulting in the 
harmful and counterproductive consequences feminist theorists commonly fear. 
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